Thread by @WarrenRisks

Ukraine morning update 1. Another night of severe shelling in too many areas to individually list. Kharkiv (especially in northeast around Saltivka), numerous areas south of Izyum, several cities in the southeast, the Kherson region, and many more.

2. Reports of less air/missile strikes across the country overnight and at least one interception. Still verifying target sites and impacts.

3. Heavy fighting south of Izyum outside numerous cities and settlements. Less reports of fighting overnight along the Donets where there has been increasing fighting this week.

4. Heavy artillery exchanges and fighting in several locations around Kherson with reported explosions on city fringes.

5. Russian air activity was reportedly much less overnight in most areas, but is increasing this morning in the southeast.

Fighting in Mariupol continues with reports of another airstrike this morning near the port.

6. Reports of significant Russian Naval movements in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov the last 48hrs, with many vessels now painting over names, numbers and markings in an attempt to conceal tracking.

7. The current increase in movements seems to be both resupply rotations and possible readiness to move more troops into southeast Ukraine.

8. A large Russian resupply convoy sighted moving towards the Donbas region from the northeast late yesterday.

9. Much anticipation about a major Russian offensive now in the east, but many issues at stake and no certainty in what lies ahead, especially with timings. Additional thread to follow on this -

Ukraine/Russia 1. A major Russian relocation, reorganisation and importantly a reconstitution military phase is still underway across the borders mostly in Russia and Belarus, and there continues to be a number of obstacles for Russian forces.

2. Intelligence estimates assess the majority of the Russian Battalion Tactical Groups that moved out of the Kyiv operations area were rendered mostly combat ineffective due to casualties, damage and communications problems.

3. Furthermore, poor morale, significant damage, many losses, physical and mental injuries, and the amalgamation of some units is impacting redeployment.

4. Many units will be operating next in the field alongside more PMCs, mercenaries, conscripts and reservists, many called up and deploying with poor training and equipment.

5. The Kremlin may want a quick victory in the southeast, but Mariupol and a few satellite cities may be all its forces can achieve in a timely manner, unless a significant escalation in Russian air power and or other weaponry occurs.

6. Initial assessments of a large offensive commencing this week may be downgraded to lesser strategic imperatives as Russia’s reconstitution phase and the mobilisation of reinforcements is taking significantly longer than first anticipated.

7. The Ukrainian forces have high morale and a strong will to fight and their agility, adaptability and decentralised leadership with well trained Officers and NCOs on the ground has proved a significant advantage over Russian forces to date.

8. Russia has adapted some tactics and its command structure for the coming stages, but its resupply, communications, command and control, and other logistical nuances remain a persistent challenge.

9. However, Russian supply lines are generally shorter and simplified in many parts of the east and the topography may assist in several areas where Russia’s more traditional Combined Arms structure could be better suited.

10. As such Ukraine forces need to seize this lethargic Russian reconstitution phase slowing up the deployment of many more reinforcements, with deep air/missile strikes and SF operations behind Russian lines, to severely compound morale, resupply and control problems.

11. Ukrainian forces have so far relocated with more ease and pace into strategic defensive areas and many defences have been consolidated.

12. The pace of the supply and combat readiness of new weapons from the west will now be significant in impacting Russian forces, before they complete their current reconstitution phase and begin to gain any new offensive momentum.

13. The west must do everything within its power to assist Ukraine in winning this next stage. In simple terms the west must win this proxy war with Russia now or face a much more direct perilous one a little later!