Some initial observations on the Russian Army Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept as implemented in Ukraine:
(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII.
(2) The Russian Army's current emphasis on BTGs (vice regiments/brigades) is due to a lack of available manpower - they were used an as expedient during the Chechen war that the Ministry of Defense adopted wholesale in 2013 as a manpower hedge.
(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower.
(4) Western analysts believed that Russian BTGs were capable of networking long-range fires in real time (or near real time) i.e. the 2014 Zelenopillya strike. dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2017/03/2…
(5) It turns out the BTGs can't actually do this. They cannot even communicate via secure means, much less target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. This negates much of their supposed combat power advantage.
(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics. This is a fundamental failure as combined arms have been the sine qua non of modern fire and movement tactics since WWI.
(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.
(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true.
(9) The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.
(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.
(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.
(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.
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A while ago, the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute (now part of @usacac) published a student battle analysis exercise on the Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943./1 usacac.army.mil/sites/default/…
It included a diagram showing the locations of U.S. tanks knocked out during a counterattack by Combat Command C (CCC) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division against elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions near the village of Sidi Bou Zid on 15 February 1943./2
It is likely that there is a methodological problem with the way DOD assesses military power. Dr. Stephen Biddle discussed this in his 2004 book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018/06/1…
Biddle took to task the study of the conduct of war, which he asserted was based on “a weak foundation” of empirical knowledge.
He surveyed the existing literature on the topic and determined that the plethora of theories of military success or failure fell into one of three analytical categories: numerical preponderance, technological superiority, or force employment.
The shallowness of the foundation for quantitative modeling, simulations, and wargaming in U.S. military analysis goes back decades. It has a name: "the base of sand" problem. rand.org/pubs/notes/N31…
In 2004, military analyst and academic Stephen Biddle published Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, a book that addressed the fundamental question of what causes victory and defeat in battle.
Biddle took to task the study of the conduct of war, which he asserted was based on “a weak foundation” of empirical knowledge. press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…
How Do We Know What We Know About Warfare? A Thread
How do we know if the theories and concepts we use to understand and explain war and warfare accurately depict reality? There is certainly no shortage of explanatory theories available, starting with Sun Tzu in the 6th century BCE and running to the present.
All combat models, simulations, and wargames are theories about how combat works. Military doctrine is also a functional theory of warfare. But how do we know if any of these theories are actually true?
Various three-to-one rules of thumb have existed in the U.S. Army and in writings, possibly as early as the American Civil War (1861-1865). These are fine as “rules of thumb” as long as one does not take them seriously and understands what they really mean.
Unfortunately, we have now seen something that is a loose rule of thumb turned into a codified and quantified rule. This is annoyingly overstating its importance and as given in U.S. Army manuals, is patently false.
How many troops are needed to successfully attack or defend on the battlefield? There is a long-standing rule of thumb that holds that an attacker requires a 3-1 preponderance over a defender in combat in order to win.
The aphorism is so widely accepted that few have questioned whether it is actually true or not. Trevor Dupuy challenged the validity of the 3-1 rule on empirical grounds. He could find no historical substantiation to support it. dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2016/07/1…