The Dupuy Institute (TDI) Profile picture
Founded by Trevor N. Dupuy, The Dupuy Institute is dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict.
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May 21, 2022 17 tweets 5 min read
Counting Holes in Tanks in Tunisia: A Thread A while ago, the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute (now part of @usacac) published a student battle analysis exercise on the Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943./1 usacac.army.mil/sites/default/…
May 10, 2022 19 tweets 3 min read
It is likely that there is a methodological problem with the way DOD assesses military power. Dr. Stephen Biddle discussed this in his 2004 book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018/06/1… Biddle took to task the study of the conduct of war, which he asserted was based on “a weak foundation” of empirical knowledge.
May 8, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
The shallowness of the foundation for quantitative modeling, simulations, and wargaming in U.S. military analysis goes back decades. It has a name: "the base of sand" problem. rand.org/pubs/notes/N31… In 2004, military analyst and academic Stephen Biddle published Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, a book that addressed the fundamental question of what causes victory and defeat in battle.
May 2, 2022 16 tweets 3 min read
How Do We Know What We Know About Warfare? A Thread How do we know if the theories and concepts we use to understand and explain war and warfare accurately depict reality? There is certainly no shortage of explanatory theories available, starting with Sun Tzu in the 6th century BCE and running to the present.
Apr 27, 2022 9 tweets 2 min read
The U.S. Army's Version of the 3-1 Rule: A Thread Various three-to-one rules of thumb have existed in the U.S. Army and in writings, possibly as early as the American Civil War (1861-1865). These are fine as “rules of thumb” as long as one does not take them seriously and understands what they really mean.
Apr 23, 2022 10 tweets 2 min read
The 3-1 Rule: A Thread How many troops are needed to successfully attack or defend on the battlefield? There is a long-standing rule of thumb that holds that an attacker requires a 3-1 preponderance over a defender in combat in order to win.
Apr 10, 2022 13 tweets 2 min read
Some initial observations on the Russian Army Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept as implemented in Ukraine: (1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII.
Feb 4, 2019 13 tweets 15 min read
@warmatters @BA_Friedman @thinkdefence @barefootboomer Hello folks! While I cannot claim to have a solid grasp of all the literature, I can offer some suggestions. A lot has been written, but I agree that there is definitely a need for more study of the evolution of post-WWII US Army doctrinal thinking, @warmatters @BA_Friedman @thinkdefence @barefootboomer Here is a good one: Ben Jensen's Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army
sup.org/books/title/?i…