Reading 🇩🇪 commentators on Twitter & online forums on #steinmeier many say 🇩🇪 is one of biggest donors of 🇺🇦, delivers weapons, has done „Zeitenwende“ & many demand that gov should „draw conclusions“ from 🇺🇦 uninvite. What they don’t mention: 🇩🇪 has sent & is sending more 💴…1/5
for energy to 🇷🇺 than anyone else & was (is?) key supporter of allowing 🇪🇺 depend on 🇷🇺 energy — financing Putin. Normally, if you enable war you are not invited or applauded but must go through humiliation & make up for what you have done…before even being talked to again. 2/5
Out of all countries 🇩🇪 should know about this from its history. But perhaps that’s precisely why it is hard to admit to oneself that one bears (some) responsibility (much less than in past) for war — again. It’s hard to see what — by your identity — is not allowed to happen. 3/5
+🇺🇦 desperate situation makes it hard to see our responsibility. On 24/2 🇺🇦 had to come begging on knees. It couldn’t be angry at us, point at our mistakes, call for atonement. This set the stage & now many are shocked by 🇺🇦 being undiplomatic & yet it is just more authentic. 4/5
„Never again“ must entail to never be blind to 🇩🇪 responsibility for war & atrocities. We must not exaggerate, but can recognize that we bear more responsibility for this war than likely any 🇪🇺 country. If we just proportionate our response to this, we can start reconciling. 5/5
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Do parties' failures to represent voters fuel populist sentiment? Using a 12-country survey experiment during 2019 EP elections, @b_castanho & I find that they do - at least among those who were not populist pretreatment. Now out at @PSRMJournal 👇(1/9) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
While many explanations of populism focus on economic & cultural grievances, one partially alternative, partially complementary argument is about parties' inability to represent voters' policy positions. If voters feel no party represents them, they may become more populist (2/9)
Causal inference (esp. simultaneity) is a key problem here: "poor" representation may make people more anti-elitist, think with a Manichaean outlook & demand "power to the people". Alternatively, populist attitudes may cause people to (mis)perceive representation as worse (3/9)
Out now in @AJPS_Editor "Multidimensional Representation" with Fabio Wolkenstein. This is a paper about *HOW* we should study political representation. Basic motivation is that there is a gap between theoretical and empirical work on representation. (1/8)
While recent theoretical work (e.g. by Mansbridge, Saward, Rehfeld), which we call the *NEW WAVE*, has highlighted various important & exciting dimensions of representation, empiricists have not incorporated these theoretical insights in their designs. Check these tables: (2/8)
Analyzing a random sample of empirical articles on representation, we find that most do not engage with theory at all, or draw on Hanna Pitkin's conceptions of representation (in particular, substantive & descriptive representation). "New wave" is absent in empirical work. (3/8)
Out now in @PolBehavior with @FabianNeuner! Using three conjoint experiments, we explore which exact components of populist ideology draw voters to populist politicians, focusing on the case of Germany and Bundestag elections. (1/5) link.springer.com/article/10.100…
We identify key "thin" populist ideology components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, proclamation of crisis. As well as "thick" populist ideology components: anti-refugees, anti-EU, anti-globalization & pro-redistribution. We operationalize all as candidate attributes (2/5).
Results show that political candidates in Germany can increase expected vote shares with anti-refugee & pro-redistribution as well as people-centric appeals, but not with anti-elite or anti-globalization/anti-EU messages. (3/5)