Christopher Wratil 🇺🇦 #StandWithUkraine Profile picture
Associate Professor for Government @univienna, works on political representation & behavior, public opinion, populism & the EU - usual disclaimers
Mar 25 13 tweets 3 min read
The @ZDF has asked 🇩🇪 if 🇺🇦 should relinquish territories to „end the war“ or „fight“ for them. 48% want it to keep fighting, 40% want to end the war.

🧵 on what you get if you ask such questions. Bottom line: a mix of things adding up to dangerous garbage.

@Makeiev @bctallis Exact phrasing of the question is:

„🇷🇺 has occupied parts of 🇺🇦 territory in the war against 🇺🇦. What do you think ...
- should Ukraine accept to relinquish these territories if this can end the war, or
- should Ukraine continue to fight for the liberation of these territories?“
Jan 23, 2023 14 tweets 8 min read
Sorry, but as a scholar of public opinion I am really sick of the „Scholz just follows public opinion“ argument on #Leopard2 🇺🇦. 1) Public opinion on war is highly fragile 2) Scholz shaped it, 3) Hence, responding to small majorities is self-referential, not democratic 🧵 (1/13) Public opinion can be influenced by a lot of things from information, arguments, events to elite action. We know that the less people have thought about an issue, the more complex & technical, the harder it is to obtain first-hand insight, the more changeable is opinion (2/13).
Jan 21, 2023 4 tweets 4 min read
Large parts of 🇩🇪 public, many govs and international experts & media are outraged at @Bundeskanzler decision to neither send #Leopard2 himself nor allow partners to do so #Ramstein. While responsibility lies with 🇩🇪 gov primarily, in this moment we should not forget that…(1/4) This responsibility is shared with 🚦 MPs in the Bundestag. Germany is a parliamentary democracy & @GrueneBundestag @fdpbt have ways to change course — either by legislating with CDU/CSU or (more likely) by threatening to do so, forcing the SPD. Ofc this involves high... (2/4)
Jun 21, 2022 17 tweets 9 min read
🇩🇪 will support EU candidate status for 🇺🇦 in upcoming #EUCO summit but will demand EU structural reforms to make 🇪🇺 ready! So far, so good. But let’s look at what #scholz German gov see as key points of this reform. Longish 🧵/ rant! Take a deep breath…

sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundes… According to @SZ the first proposal from the chancellor’s office is the abolishment of vetos — particularly in foreign policy. Why is foreign policy mentioned? Because in most areas vetos actually don’t exist anymore. EU takes about 85-90% of legislative decisions by majority…
Jun 10, 2022 12 tweets 5 min read
Unterstützen die Deutschen ein sofortiges Embargo gegen 🇷🇺 Energie? Und was beeinflusst die Meinung zum Embargo?
 
@b_castanho @Jwaeckerle und ich führten dazu Anfang Mai eine repräsentative Umfrage mit 3251 🇩🇪 Befragten durch.

Unsere Hauptergebnisse in kurzem🧵👇. Hold tight! 1) Mehrheit 🇩🇪 ist für Embargo: Auf die Frage, ob man ein sofortiges vollständiges Embargo für 🇷🇺 Energie (Gas, Kohle und Öl) befürwortet, sagen 52% „definitiv ja“ oder „eher ja“ während weniger als 40% dagegen sind. Werte sind im Einklang mit anderen Umfragen der letzten Monate.
May 24, 2022 8 tweets 4 min read
It increasingly looks like 🇩🇪 Bundestag vote for #heavyweapons to 🇺🇦 has achieved nothing — perhaps even the opposite of its intended objective: gov line of hesitation & caution appears unchanged, but pathways to amending this line have narrowed down due to vote. Short 🧵 (1/8). Many observers (incl. I) assumed that gov felt hindered by a lack of parliamentary mandate to step up weapons support or at least, would change course when receiving mandate. But voices inside & outside 🚦 coalition doubt there has been a change 👇 (2/8).

Apr 19, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
German Greens are really in a precarious position now. There is no party in 🇩🇪 parliament who got more right on 🇷🇺— they had warned about 🇷🇺 (esp. NS1/2) for years & decades. Usually, that’s the penalty kick when you expose the mistakes of the others & collect electoral support… …& in this case, it wouldn’t be cheap exploitation of other’s failures, it would just be showcasing your competence — they had a better, more accurate analysis of the situation. A great opportunity! But so far Greens leadership has decided against bc it would mean exposing SPD…
Apr 17, 2022 8 tweets 2 min read
This Easter we will hear everyone wishing peace for 🇺🇦. And while "peace" is the word that for us all symbolizes hope & a better future, something we don't have to explain, understand instantly, there are different forms of peace. So which peace are you talking of?🧵 1/8 1) The Ukrainian peace. This peace has 🇷🇺 withdraw from / being forced out of all Ukrainian territory (perhaps save some concession, ie. Crimea), 🇺🇦 democracy survive & being guarantueed by own & others' military capabilities. For some it also means NATO and/or EU membership. 2/8
Apr 14, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
Reading 🇩🇪 commentators on Twitter & online forums on #steinmeier many say 🇩🇪 is one of biggest donors of 🇺🇦, delivers weapons, has done „Zeitenwende“ & many demand that gov should „draw conclusions“ from 🇺🇦 uninvite. What they don’t mention: 🇩🇪 has sent & is sending more 💴…1/5 for energy to 🇷🇺 than anyone else & was (is?) key supporter of allowing 🇪🇺 depend on 🇷🇺 energy — financing Putin. Normally, if you enable war you are not invited or applauded but must go through humiliation & make up for what you have done…before even being talked to again. 2/5
Oct 18, 2021 11 tweets 4 min read
Do parties' failures to represent voters fuel populist sentiment? Using a 12-country survey experiment during 2019 EP elections, @b_castanho & I find that they do - at least among those who were not populist pretreatment. Now out at @PSRMJournal 👇(1/9)
cambridge.org/core/journals/… While many explanations of populism focus on economic & cultural grievances, one partially alternative, partially complementary argument is about parties' inability to represent voters' policy positions. If voters feel no party represents them, they may become more populist (2/9)
Sep 17, 2020 8 tweets 4 min read
Out now in @AJPS_Editor "Multidimensional Representation" with Fabio Wolkenstein. This is a paper about *HOW* we should study political representation. Basic motivation is that there is a gap between theoretical and empirical work on representation. (1/8)

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111… While recent theoretical work (e.g. by Mansbridge, Saward, Rehfeld), which we call the *NEW WAVE*, has highlighted various important & exciting dimensions of representation, empiricists have not incorporated these theoretical insights in their designs. Check these tables: (2/8)
Jul 5, 2020 6 tweets 3 min read
Out now in @PolBehavior with @FabianNeuner! Using three conjoint experiments, we explore which exact components of populist ideology draw voters to populist politicians, focusing on the case of Germany and Bundestag elections. (1/5)
link.springer.com/article/10.100… We identify key "thin" populist ideology components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, proclamation of crisis. As well as "thick" populist ideology components: anti-refugees, anti-EU, anti-globalization & pro-redistribution. We operationalize all as candidate attributes (2/5).