Good morning Twitter. It appears one can comfortably assert that on 13 April 2022, a new piece of naval history was written in the context of this terrible affair that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A thread on the RFN cruiser Moskva (pennant No 121):
This is not a spring chicken in naval terms. It's a venerable, battle hardened, major surface combatant. Saw action in Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, when it was sent to secure the BS - and sustained a hit. wired.com/2008/08/georgi…
This is relevant because it raises a question about battle-readiness and overall op condition. A ship first commissioned in 1983, it was recommissioned in 2000, and was supposed to undergo refit and upgrade in 2016 - but it did not.
The extent to which the ship was in a less than ideal state is debatable, but a couple of things matter here: 1. this is the flagship of the BS Fleet of the RFN; 2. it’s primary mission was to secure sea control and exploit; 3. it saw action very early on in the invasion.
Perhaps the most iconic symbolism around the role of the Moskva is captured in the shelling of Snake Island, with the now image of the Ukrainian soldiers responding in kind to the ship hailing them to surrender: the ultimate David vs Goliath challenge. Grit and Determination.
Let’ be clear though. This wasn’t just about symbolism. Snake Island occupies a key strategic position for any op vs Odessa to take place, and RFN did what one would expect them to do early on: secure it. As the map shows this is an important place to prevent ops vs Odessa.
Further, with the closure of the Bosporus to all warships, it also meant that this ship would be the main asset available to support Russian naval ops in the BS. Couple that with the current shift in op focus south, this is not just any ship. This is key asset. This is ‘Moscow’.
So, what happened, and why does it matter?
We know from official sources that 2 Neptune missiles hit the ship and a major fire ensued. The ship was operating incredibly close to shore, which is remarkable given the limited point defence system it has.
This raises important questions about familiar themes in this invasion so far:
a. Russian conops;
b. Russian confidence/underestimation of UKR;
c. Russian preparation and readiness.
This ship had no real business so close to shore; it clearly underestimated op risk;
The dynamics confirm an old truth: fire is absolutely deadly threat to a naval combatant and if your crew and systems are not in tip top shape, that’s where the difference between success and defeat stands in war at sea. @CovertShores here is very helpful: navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
@CovertShores On the other hand, we need to be very cautious about suggesting that sinking a ship is easy, or that there are ‘lessons’ for any other in here.. whether NATO, China, or anyone else… if I hear anyone making silly comparisons with Taiwan I might explore (sorry I digress).
@CovertShores The one lesson that one can draw from these naval events is that sea denial is a real thing. And it can be done relatively cheaply - if geography and strategic objectives allow it. This here from @CIMSEC is spot on, and absolutely on the money: cimsec.org/an-anti-access…
earlier on today, there are three very important points to consider here (others as well but once things are clearer): 1. Militarily, the Russians are in a pickle on amphibious plans for Odessa;
@CovertShores@CIMSEC 2. Politically, explaining why Russia could loose its flagship in the theatre where it has sea control is going to be hard - or even hide it; 3. Symbolically, Moscow is on fire. This is Ukraine response to Snake Island. This is David exposing Goliath’s disorientation.
@CovertShores@CIMSEC More will be written on this, since this is one of the most severe naval losses since the Falklands War. I shall come back to this too in due time.
For now, expect some more turbulence on the naval front. As weapons arrive, denial will be on the menu.
@CovertShores@CIMSEC Tonight Russian commanders will feel less secure as they reflect upon the fact that the BS is no longer their lake. It’s a box with no way out. It’s where denial has exposed the limits of control. Things have got much harder.
Signing off for now. Thank you for reading!
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When (Bad) Strategy Drives Resources, by @cdrsalamandercdrsalamander.substack.com/p/when-bad-str… a very sensible, and sobering assessment by the ever insightful @ConsWahoo - a short thread about some key points in it, and about maritime strategy and national security:
@cdrsalamander@ConsWahoo The overall thrust is clear: seapower is a function of statecraft and the ambitions a country has in its foreign and security policy. This leads to the following dilemma to square away:
@cdrsalamander@ConsWahoo Either the navy - as a bureaucratic organisation - plans its force structure and budget around a government’s FP and national strategy, or governments adapt FP and national security to meet a navy’s ambitions. The two cannot be disentangled.
This is an excellent piece with two rather important observations: the rise of realpolitik minilateralism in international security, and what links comedy to tragedy: timing. A short thread exploring each, and why they matter to the Indo-Pacific and, relatedly, maritime strategy:
Realpolitik minilateralism. If you follow my work you know what I’m talking about. Usual references are to the flurry of minilateral organisations emerging in the Pacific -Quad, AUKUS, and trilats of various nature. But the piece makes absolutely clear this is true in Europe too.
JEF is a prime example of a nimble, task oriented organisation providing a particular type of response: high readiness forces to meet challenges outside the framework of war.
JEF has proved so far to act whilst others (notably NATO) were thinking. Its nature raises a key qs:
Joint Statement on U.S.-UK Consultations on the Indo-Pacific | Good evening Twitter. Yes. This is NOT a thread about Ukraine. I know. Very unfashionable. But also very significant so please bear with me. A few thoughts on an important statement: whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
As a preliminary observation - in keeping with the mad tradition of friday statements - this one came out as I was winding down for family time so apologies for the late catch up. On a practical level: if we want to do something on the IP, this time zone thing doesn’t help.
But now to the substance. Why the statement matters:
A. First things first. The statement opens with two important themes of the IR: partnerships and prosperity. 1. Partnerships. The statement pointed out that what a country like the UK can do in the IP will depend on partners;
Britain’s Foreign Office has badly lost its way, say critics | This piece joins a recurrent FT theme about the state of UK machinery for statecraft: argued to be at its lowest point, most criticisms in here are based on debatable assumptions. A thread: ft.com/content/422629…
‘Once the engine room of a global empire, Britain’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has in recent years been stripped of influence, prestige and self-confidence’. This is a serious opening. Followed by the benchmark: the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
I’m not sure where to begin here, but let’s just say that to use a single event - with core evidence related by a junior staff member - is somewhat of a problematic metric to make such an overarching opening.
Kishida tells troops capacity to strike enemy bases is option.
Good morning Twitter. There you have it. Japan’s new PM, Kishida-San, in the first ‘proper’ pic reminding us that he is also the ‘Commander in Chief’. A short thread on Jpn defence: asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Kishi…
Let’s talk about this in terms of the good, the bad, and the ugly framework - it’s the we after all.
The good. 1. National strategy. It’s now clear that Japan will launch a defence review process to produce a new national security strategy (NSS) in 2022.
This doc will replace the current NSS originally adopted in 2013. Defence reviews have had a shorter life shelf in Japan since 9/11; but the NSS was always designed to be an overarching framework to last longer - and it did hold the test of time. Abe’s NSS at heart had a vision.
Happy Trafalgar Day. Many - in a much better and more relevant positions - will probably add a few thoughts about a defining day. But a couple of observations on the continuous relevance of Trafalgar are worth sharing - a short thread:
1. The Battle. The battle of Trafalgar set the highest possible bar in naval warfare and cemented Britain’s repute as the foremost naval power of the age. Nelson’s tactical acumen in providing the leadership and technical skills making the success possible have been much debated.
For my money, Andrew Lambert’s ‘Britannia’s God of War’ is one of the most comprehensive pieces of work brining different layers of the naval cake together with a superb narrative:amazon.co.uk/s?k=britannia+… - on a personal note, it’s also been the book that defined my MA gen.