Again - important piece of info confirming that both UK AND US struck targets on the basis of legal notion of self-defence, which in turn explains why the last para in this note makes clear this was not part of the Prosperity Guardian operation. A couple of thoughts on this:

https://twitter.com/centcom/status/1746010301479174562

1. Proportionality. Emphasis on a legal basis for self-defence creates a clear ‘space’ in terms of depth and length of military action. Action is proportional to the type of challenge and threat to military assets in the Red Sea region;

Good evening. The pas few weeks have been quite eventful from a naval perspective. Several theatres have seen different types of action - all providing evidence of the declination of sea power in the contemporary world, and of how contested order at sea stands. A thread: I know. Cheeky to start off with an AI generated image. Rather misleading too because this thread is not about the US Navy -yet, it is important to stress that the irony of today’s contested seas is 25 years of assumed dominance leading to a critical lack of sustained investment.

A Chinese dispute with the Philippines is a test of America - a fine piece citing ⁦@IBKardon superb book. With revealing quotes from known PRC military analysts.⁩ economist.com/china/2023/11/…
economist.com/china/2023/11/… There is also in the quotes a golden quotes:
“I consider a collision almost inevitable, given the high frequency of encounters,” says Mr Zhou. But if Chinese pilots stayed farther away, that would amount to “escorting America as it harms China’s interests”. Zhuo Buo.

Good morning Twitter. It is out. The @CommonsForeign report on the UK and the Indo-Pacific was released earlier today. @aliciakearns (and @TomTugendhat as he previous chair) led a key effort which reminds us of the power of democracies: A Thread on why this matters. First off, preliminary observations: The full report is available here: and is the result of a pretty comprehensive set of submissions, oral evidence sessions and used - for the first time in the UK Parliament - a policy simulation as method of analysis;committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…

Good morning twitter. Yesterday was Defence Command Paper (DCP) Refresh day: - possibly the best document of this kind in a long time, when read next to the CP21 https://t.co/0g1rV8YBz8. In fact one needs to read them together to make sense of it all. A🧵:gov.uk/government/pub…
gov.uk/government/pub… First off, a personal note for full disclosure. Having had the privilege to witness first hand the energy and vibrancy in action of some of the Head Office Reform, notably the establishment of SONAC in '22 I have a positive predisposition towards DCP. This is for 3 reasons:

NATO removes Tokyo office mention from joint communique - excellent summary of what is fast becoming a rather anti-climatic petty drama. ⁦@kenmoriyasu⁩ makes sense of a situation that is embarrassing for it reveals about Europe-Asia ties: a 🧵: asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Inter… First off, a premise: I personally have no strong opinion on liaison office in Tokyo, since I don’t know what’s the gap between the alliance’s intention to actually develop a better grasp of the IP region, and bandwidth to enhance cooperation with key partners.

Naval innovation in a maritime century - this was one of the concept papers ⁦we developed with ⁦@ConGeostrategy⁩. In this one on innovation - one of 3 concepts informing the programme- ⁦@salisbot⁩ and myself review the tech-innovation link: geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world… A key notion set forth is here: ‘Technology is not, therefore, the analytical focus of the quest of innovation. Rather, it is a dependent variable which has to be reviewed against an attentive analysis of the demands of the strategic context of tomorrow.’

Winning without fighting? Why China is exploring 'cognitive warfare' | all war is cognitive - Clausewitz was always clear: war starts on the mind of the adversary when they do not bend to your will. A chilling and thoughtful piece. Some key passages: japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/05/2… ‘The term refers to operations based on techniques and technologies such as AI aimed at influencing the minds of one’s adversaries and shaping their decisions, thereby creating a strategically favorable environment or subduing them without a fight’ - nothing revolutionary here;

NATO not likely to intervene in an Indo-Pacific conflict, says MSC chief | mmm. What an unfortunate comment. Unclear about the context ‘conflict’ is very generic; unclear about the action ‘intervention’. Which really points to a key thought: japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/05/1… It would be absolutely a desirable starting point for any self appointed European influential voice to perhaps stop giving opinions of little substance and perhaps develop some little regional competency as a way to acquire some strategic fluency. I know - I’m being radical here.

Simon McDonald: “It’s the end of the game for Britain” - read attentively, this interview is indicative of the malaise behind the perceived irrelevance: a type of senior official that has very little to contribute to make a country diplomatically relevant: newstatesman.com/the-weekend-in… ‘I had come to meet McDonald to discuss British grand strategy, expecting a bullish view of our place in the world. Instead, I encountered a man who could uncharitably be described as being resigned to British irrelevance’ - this passage is damming.

Buongiorno Twitter. I'm back. The past 2 weeks have seen a flurry of commentary on the risks of an arms race in East Asia prompted by agreements like AUKUS. I don't agree with this view, and here I argue why that is the case: asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/AUKUS-… - a short thread: It's about 'Tech Minilaterals'. Both AUKUS and GCAP (the trilats on subs and jets, and advanced capabilities going with them) witnessed significant milestone moments. They are part of targeted and tailored responses focused on specific capabilities for maritime-centric theatres.

おはよございますTwitter! Greetings from a stunningly beautiful Chiba where #DSEI_JAPAN_2023 is about to kick off. Let's do a proper thread on submarines and ask a crucial question: is there a case of post-1945 sub development to gain guidance on challenges Australia might face? The answer is: yes, that is Japan post-1945. The following thread reviews and summarises some key points in work I have done on JMSDF submarine development and that can be found here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…, and here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… - let's put experience in context:

Good morning Twitter. The long anticipated new frameworks of Japan's defence and security are out. On schedule as planned. Like clockwork. The original docs are here on the JMoD page - mod.go.jp/j/approach/age… some initial thoughts which I will follow up on as I plow through them: First things first. The deadline was set so the docs had to come out today. In 2013, the docs were out both in Japanese and English versions. Not this time. That's not entirely surprising since language fine tuning lasted until last minute See here: asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan…

Good evening Twitter. Tonight PM Sunak gave his first big foreign policy speech. The text is below. The PM comes as a politician with limited FP experience, and criticisms already are emerging which I think miss much needed context, so here is a thread: gov.uk/government/spe… Context: Linking economic prosperity and security in a maritime sense.
What does this mean? Many will not be familiar with the very first piece of writing the PM authored back in 2017. It was a groundbreaking piece on sea cables and economic resilience: policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

Good morning Twitter. I am back. Courtesy of the Russian Navy's commitment to test if and how naval warfare evolves. Yes, a thread about the 'naval drone' attack conducted at the WE by seemingly Ukrainian forces against the Black Sea Fleet. Spoiler alert: NOT. A. REVOLUTION. First things first -as usual. Very grateful to @jkuehn50 for pinging me with @cdrsalamander latest - which as you'd expect - is spot on on the topic: cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/the-aspects-… -Allow me though to offer some additional thoughts on why this matters strategically more than tactically.

The Military is the Fourth Instrument of UK Power in the Indo-Pacific - a very strange piece from a most trusted analyst and a reminder that regional and thematic expertise need to go hand in hand for any analysis to make sense. Three points here: rusi.org/explore-our-re… 1. Premises. UK interests are presented as economic. No - not just. There are treaty obligations, political expectations, industrial projects. None of this is new, @CommonsForeign and @CommonsDefence run multiple sessions on these; I wrote on them in 2019: policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

China’s huge exercises around Taiwan were a rehearsal, not a signal, says Oriana Skylar Mastro | This is a strong take but perhaps one raising three issues: economist.com/by-invitation/… 1. The exercises are of much larger scale - yes. But so is the PLA. The key question is whether the Pelosi visit was the trigger or a happy set of circumstances; given prior behaviour I’d be tempted to suggest the latter;

Taiwan Starts Two-Day Defensive Drills as Tensions With China Remain High - Additional reporting on the Taiwanese drills - and the a. Ounces extension of PLA exercises with some observations from yours truly: wsj.com/articles/taiwa… ‘Announcing an extension to the exercises appeared to be part of Beijing’s psychological warfare strategy.
The PLA’s annual summer exercises have traditionally lasted two to three weeks, and the Taiwan drills, which serve as those exercises this year, should be no different’…

Morning Twitter. First days of PLA exercises completed, new phase just settling in, a few thoughts to recap what we have seen so far and the wider significance -a thread about missiles, joint manoeuvres, and the value of micro signalling hidden behind lots of military activities: 1. Context: Is war for reunification inevitable? And, crucially, is war with the US inevitable as a result of it? When all the chips are down these are key questions anyone is asking. Here, two recent publications set - I think - the contours of space for this debate:

Ni hao Twitter. Quite a bit of coverage of the Pelosi trip to Taiwan and Chinese military reactions to it -thus far. Allow me to offer a few thoughts on the military dimension and wider strategic context, with maps and indeed links to Russia and the Black Sea. Oh Yes. A thread: 1. First things first. For context, @osmastro FA piece is always a valuable reference; Bob Ross oldie 1995-96 Taiwan strait crisis is also a decent starting point; and -of course anything @fravel and @BonnieGlaser write is a must.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…; jstor.org/stable/2626754….

On Navy Day, Putin says United States is main threat to Russia | No wonder there. A few thoughts on what’s been reported, and on Putin’s references to a new naval doctrine: reuters.com/business/aeros… 1. A regional power with global footprint. Russia is no global naval power. Not in terms of capabilities, nor in terms of capacity to operate out at sea with complex formations for sustained time.
1a. On the other hand Russian geography lends itself to a country with presence: