Suyi控 Profile picture
Apr 14, 2022 19 tweets 7 min read Read on X
Thread. How can you take a settlement of 10k ppl with a rifle platoon? Normal commanders would say "no can do", crazy cmdrs may say "just charge them". Where Russian cmdrs will say: "if we strengthen our platoon with 30 tanks, 24 artillery pieces, it may perform better"...(1/n) Image
Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Agency @DI_Ukraine is making progress in "doxxing" Russian military unit personnel participated in the invasion. By now three RU Ground Forces combat units are included: (2/n) Image
The 37th Motor Rifle Brigade (omsbr) and thr 5th Guards Tank Brigade from the Eastern MD (link), the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade from the Southern MD, and the 1st Guards Tank Regiment, 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division of the Western MD. (3/n)
gur.gov.ua/content/voenno…
These sheets are revealing a disturbing similarity among RU units, that each of its motor rifle squads are composed of only 6 or 7 men, instead of the theoritical 9. Squads from the 5th gv.otbr have merely 5 men. Now you will find how does it hinder Russian operations. (4/n) Image
The first casualty of such a man shortage is squad tactics. Russian mrs should be divided into 3 parts: two men man the BMP, 4 men in a "support team", and 3 riflemen in a "maneuver team". BMP and spt team should pin down the enemy when mvr team moves to destroy them. (5/n) Image
Now that the whole maneuver team is gone. Then how to deploy this squad? How to perform "fire and menuver"? God knows maybe. And if you have one grunt WIA and another dispatched to escort him to the rear, the whole squad gets combat ineffective. (6/n) Image
In fact, Russian BTGs are already infamous for its lack of riflemen. Normal literature would argue it only has some "200 disembarked infantry" at disposal. But this estimation ignores not only the man shortage, but also another BTG structure: the "tank-heavy" BTGs. (7/n)
A "tank-heavy" BTG is organized by tank regiments/brigades basing on a tank battalion. Such BTGs are commonly seen from the 90th GTD in Brovary and the 4th GTD in Sumy. In theory there shall be 26-28 tank-heavy BTGs, some 1/4 of total RU BTGs committed. (8/n) Image
And we can see there is ONE motor rifle company, composing of NINE squads, each with 3-5 disembarked infantry, for a 600-men BTG. Such a BTG then has some 27-45 foot-mobiles, roughly a platoon worth. This is obviously way beyond simply "lack of infantry". (9/n)
Such a BTG obtains more combat vehicles than infantrymen. It is not suitable to either take a ground or to hold one. And when you order them to execute such a offensive or defensive action, you get either Brovary or Trostyanets. (10/n)
"Elite" Russian Formations i.e. the VDV and Naval Infantry can be somehow better, but they have their problems. The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet have 7 men per squad. (11/n) Image
This VDV BTG from the 247th Guards Airborne Regiment, 7th Guards Airborne Division is in 135 men short. The battalion merely has 74.9% of its authorised strength even before the war. (12/n) Image
The mostly manned unit discovered so far is the (unexpected) 727nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment of the... Caspian Flotilla. 8-men squad. But soon you'll find this battalion is full of "old hags". Just look at these two 40-yo grunts. Man...(13/n) Image
So where are the Russian manpower locates. In fact we can find very healthy manpower structure in its artillery formation, e.g. this 856th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment of the 144th Guards MRD. Fully-manned with young contracted soldiers. (14/n) Image
On the other side, the Russians are taking measures to compensate its shortage of infantry...with D/LNR "mobilizists". Local residents with zero military experience are drove into the military and fight alongside with the Russians as cannon folder. (15/n)
In fact, this met an old practice by the Red Army in late-WW2, known as "booty troops" by Walter S. Dunn: when in shortage of manpower, save your skilled men in sophisticated branchs(i.e. armored, artillery, signal, etc), and "loot" your infantry from "newly-liberated areas".(16 Image
But one can put serious doubt in the effectiveness of such "booty troops" since they can't cooperate with Ru armors and have even lower morale than the regular Russian Troops. The shortage of infantry will continue to haunt Russian Forces in the next phase of war. (17/End)
Update: 1st BTG, 70th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment has 6 men per their squad.
The 126th Coastal Defense Brigade is in a even worse shape. 5-man-squad are common. There is even a certain squad (1st Sqd/3rd Plt/1st MRCoy) was composed of merely TWO MEN: one squad leader + one driver. ImageImage

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More from @partizan_oleg

Jun 25, 2023
Speculation and comments on the events of the armed mutiny of PMC Wagner:
My guess is that Prigozhin's operation achieved its basic objectives, but not its further objectives.
Prigozhin's operation should have had three levels of objectives: 1/
1. his primary goal was to achieve the independence of Wagner (or at least a few thousand of his own soldiers) from the Ministry of Defense, which was achieved with his arrival in Belarus and the Russian announcement that the Wagner members who participated in the insurgency.. 2/
would not be contracted to the Ministry of Defense (I heard that these people were also going to Belarus? I am not quite sure of the accuracy of this source) was obviously achieved; 3/
Read 21 tweets
Mar 28, 2023
Another tank thread. How is Russian tank formation composed of now after they've lost thousands of tanks in their first year of fight? I will give my estimation and methodology. My calculation is based on three assumptions:
1, By end of November 2022, there has been no significant changes on the front. The war had entered a stage of attrition. No major reserves held by Russians. Tank losses are basically happened in a series of skirmishes and drone attacks all across the front.
Therefore, we can assume that the loss rate of all Russian tank types (maybe except for the T-62s) at this time is approximate. In reality the loss rate of relatively new tanks (e.g. the T-72B3s) may be slightly higher but I will ignore it.
Read 24 tweets
Mar 17, 2023
A T-80U thread. Russia inherited 600~700 T-80Us from the Soviet Army in 1991. According to SIPRI some 125 were exported to Cyprus and South Korea (among which 74 were exported before 2000). No recorded battle losses before Feb 2022.
The "T-80U" in this thread refers to the original T-80U, the T-80UD and the T-80UE-1.
The T-80Us were firstly introduced to the 4th Guards Tank Division in late 1980s and later the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division in early 1990s. Both divisions were very active during the 1991 Coup Attempt and the 1993 Constitutional Crisis.
Read 13 tweets
Mar 7, 2023
I tried to sort out Russian T-72 stockpiles with limited sources and many assumptions, and here it is: 1/n
Russian military basically stopped to build new T-72 hulls for its own armed forces since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2013 some 1100 T-72B3/B3Ms were converted from existing T-72B hulls. So the Russian T-72 stockpile maintained unchanged since 1991. 2/n
According to Internet sources (!!) that I can not 100% be sure, some 18,000 T-72s were made before the Soviet breakup. 3/n
Read 13 tweets
Feb 17, 2023
I don't know how credible this figure is, but it is very informative. /1
First of all, the issue of strength, the Tamanskaya Division (2nd GMRD) has been close to full strength, the 3rd MRD also has a great status recovery (to 22.2.24 status), and the 144th GMRD also seems to have recovered strength to some extent. /2
The rest, i.e. the 4th GTD, 47 GTD, 18th GMRD and the 90th GTD are in poor condition: no better than August-September 2022. /3
Read 12 tweets
Sep 22, 2022
Thread with rough calculations and estimations. Can be wrong.
Whether these "300-thousand" mobilized troops are integrated into existing units to compensate losses to form new ones, the Ru Army will still face a lack of experienced reserve officers and soldiers. 1/n
Previously, according to Russian soldiers, the volunteers recruited after the outbreak of the military conflict were thrown into the battlefield without effective training and were barely able to constitute a fighting force. 2/n Image
Russian front-line officers also at platoon-company level also suffered heavy casualties and were in urgent need of replenishment. Another problem is "cargo-500", the refusiniks, who is in great numbers in both enlisted and commissioned ranks. 3/n
Read 22 tweets

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