Speculation and comments on the events of the armed mutiny of PMC Wagner:
My guess is that Prigozhin's operation achieved its basic objectives, but not its further objectives.
Prigozhin's operation should have had three levels of objectives: 1/ 1. his primary goal was to achieve the independence of Wagner (or at least a few thousand of his own soldiers) from the Ministry of Defense, which was achieved with his arrival in Belarus and the Russian announcement that the Wagner members who participated in the insurgency.. 2/

Another tank thread. How is Russian tank formation composed of now after they've lost thousands of tanks in their first year of fight? I will give my estimation and methodology. My calculation is based on three assumptions:

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1640407369900277774

1, By end of November 2022, there has been no significant changes on the front. The war had entered a stage of attrition. No major reserves held by Russians. Tank losses are basically happened in a series of skirmishes and drone attacks all across the front.

A T-80U thread. Russia inherited 600~700 T-80Us from the Soviet Army in 1991. According to SIPRI some 125 were exported to Cyprus and South Korea (among which 74 were exported before 2000). No recorded battle losses before Feb 2022. The "T-80U" in this thread refers to the original T-80U, the T-80UD and the T-80UE-1.

I tried to sort out Russian T-72 stockpiles with limited sources and many assumptions, and here it is: 1/n

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1633151930955362308

Russian military basically stopped to build new T-72 hulls for its own armed forces since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2013 some 1100 T-72B3/B3Ms were converted from existing T-72B hulls. So the Russian T-72 stockpile maintained unchanged since 1991. 2/n

I don't know how credible this figure is, but it is very informative. /1

https://twitter.com/Kartinamaslom5/status/1624387562730029058

First of all, the issue of strength, the Tamanskaya Division (2nd GMRD) has been close to full strength, the 3rd MRD also has a great status recovery (to 22.2.24 status), and the 144th GMRD also seems to have recovered strength to some extent. /2

Thread with rough calculations and estimations. Can be wrong.
Whether these "300-thousand" mobilized troops are integrated into existing units to compensate losses to form new ones, the Ru Army will still face a lack of experienced reserve officers and soldiers. 1/n Previously, according to Russian soldiers, the volunteers recruited after the outbreak of the military conflict were thrown into the battlefield without effective training and were barely able to constitute a fighting force. 2/n

Man, this figure can not be more wrong. It looks like the author messed up with the concept of a (peacetime) battalion and a (wartime) BTG. 1/n

https://twitter.com/Volodymyr_D_/status/1554789862301204483

An Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade should have 1 tank battalion and 3 mech btns in peacetime; however, in combat deployment it will only organized into 3 mechanized BTGs, while the tank btn will be torn apart and attach to the BTGs as tank companies. 2/n

Always remember that Nova Kakhovka is the throat of Russian forces in Kherson region, which is even more important than Kherson city itself.

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1536716468330631168

The Dneiper is a large river and not easy to ford. In Kherson area there are only two bridges across Dneiper: one in Kherson, which is easy to be destroyed; the other one in Nova Kakhovka, however, is built on a dam.

Thread.
Why T-62s?
In late May there are solid evidence shows the Russian Army are transporting T-62M and T-62MVs to the front.
People may ask: "The T-62 is a vintage tank introduced in the 1960s and why is it still in storage and put into use?"

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1529490884978528257?s=20&t=Pz_rB4eqfUyQUexzOSLecw

The answer is: Russian Army was operating T-62s in active service as late as many can image: the early 2010s. And the T-62s, last produced in 1975, remain as the highnest readiness type in Russian tank storage.

As of March 15, the Russian 1st GTA reported 62 losses of its T-80U/UK/UE fleet. Given that the (12th and 13th tank regiment of the 4TD of the) 1st GTA is the sole user of the T-80U series tank, it gives us an unique chance to verify the data of @oryxspioenkop and his team. 1/n

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko7/status/1526133430798385154

There are currently 75 recorded Russian T-80U series lost per Oryx. Many pro-Rus guys (espicially in our Chinese-speaking world) would argue "there is a lot of duplications!" even through they can't point out which records are duplicated. 2/n

Ukrainian Defense Intelligence @DI_Ukraine released a captured OpOrd by the 1st Guards Tank Army to the 96th Ind. Recon Brigade on February 23rd, 2022. I strongly recommend this file since it is PURE GOLD to understand Ru conceptions of the invasion.
gur.gov.ua/content/rosiia… @DI_Ukraine First, this file reveals (one of)the front-level commands of the Russian invasion force, imeni "Group of Forces 'Center'". This Group of Forces Cmd apprently operated in Chernikiv-Konotop-Sumy and their vehicles are "O"-marked.

Thread. How can you take a settlement of 10k ppl with a rifle platoon? Normal commanders would say "no can do", crazy cmdrs may say "just charge them". Where Russian cmdrs will say: "if we strengthen our platoon with 30 tanks, 24 artillery pieces, it may perform better"...(1/n) Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Agency @DI_Ukraine is making progress in "doxxing" Russian military unit personnel participated in the invasion. By now three RU Ground Forces combat units are included: (2/n)

Thread. Open Source effort from @oryxspioenkop has tallied a total of 467 Russian tanks have been visual confirmed lost since 2/24. So how bad is it? (1/n) Many, including a certain "evidence-based only" sources would argue that the Russian Federation is operating some 10,000 tanks so 467 is "but a scratch". Which is certainly not true. (2/n)