This Easter we will hear everyone wishing peace for ๐บ๐ฆ. And while "peace" is the word that for us all symbolizes hope & a better future, something we don't have to explain, understand instantly, there are different forms of peace. So which peace are you talking of?๐งต 1/8
1) The Ukrainian peace. This peace has ๐ท๐บ withdraw from / being forced out of all Ukrainian territory (perhaps save some concession, ie. Crimea), ๐บ๐ฆ democracy survive & being guarantueed by own & others' military capabilities. For some it also means NATO and/or EU membership. 2/8
2) The continued "peace". This is a continuation of what Westerners called "peace" since 2014. Parts of Ukraine are occupied, annexed & russified by Russian troops (eg. incl. new territories), intensity of conflict is lower. ๐บ๐ฆ will be unable to become part of NATO or EU. 3/8
3) The NATO peace. All of Ukraine will be occupied and/or annexed by Russia and subsequently be russified. Ukrainian democracy & many of its supporters as well as civilians will be oppressed or die *during* this "peace". But ๐ท๐บ will stop short of attacking any NATO country. 4/8
In public discourse, everyone wants & works for peace but people rarely say which of these forms they are pursuing. That's unfortunate given that they are of very different quality and imply vastly different livelihoods for millions of people & death for thousands at least. 5/8
By not saying which peace we pursue, we hide the costs & benefits of peace behind our universal embrace of peace. Let's be more explicit: arguably most people who support #heavyweapons#energyembargo want achieve the Ukranian peace. Many opposing these measures likely think 6/8
the Ukrainian peace is unachievable bc ๐ท๐บ will be militarily invincible (eg. eventually use nukes). My impression is that many ๐ช๐บ governments (esp. ๐ฉ๐ช) pursue the continued "peace" bc it will cause least disruption for them from the status quo. I guess that many citizens 7/8
in the West think of the NATO peace when they talk about peace. For this Easter I wish that we all start talking about peace explicitly and not just use it as an empty word. We owe it to the Ukrainian people & we will likely take better decisions when being transparent ๐. 8/8
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German Greens are really in a precarious position now. There is no party in ๐ฉ๐ช parliament who got more right on ๐ท๐บโ they had warned about ๐ท๐บ (esp. NS1/2) for years & decades. Usually, thatโs the penalty kick when you expose the mistakes of the others & collect electoral supportโฆ
โฆ& in this case, it wouldnโt be cheap exploitation of otherโs failures, it would just be showcasing your competence โ they had a better, more accurate analysis of the situation. A great opportunity! But so far Greens leadership has decided against bc it would mean exposing SPDโฆ
Their current & favorite coalition partner. Demanding investigations into ๐ท๐บ connection & criticizing SPD leaders publicly could end the coalition. SPD could try to portray Greens as unreliable & reckless. Huge risks for party & short-term stability of gov. But the dangers ofโฆ
Reading ๐ฉ๐ช commentators on Twitter & online forums on #steinmeier many say ๐ฉ๐ช is one of biggest donors of ๐บ๐ฆ, delivers weapons, has done โZeitenwendeโ & many demand that gov should โdraw conclusionsโ from ๐บ๐ฆ uninvite. What they donโt mention: ๐ฉ๐ช has sent & is sending more ๐ดโฆ1/5
for energy to ๐ท๐บ than anyone else & was (is?) key supporter of allowing ๐ช๐บ depend on ๐ท๐บ energy โ financing Putin. Normally, if you enable war you are not invited or applauded but must go through humiliation & make up for what you have doneโฆbefore even being talked to again. 2/5
Out of all countries ๐ฉ๐ช should know about this from its history. But perhaps thatโs precisely why it is hard to admit to oneself that one bears (some) responsibility (much less than in past) for war โ again. Itโs hard to see what โ by your identity โ is not allowed to happen. 3/5
Do parties' failures to represent voters fuel populist sentiment? Using a 12-country survey experiment during 2019 EP elections, @b_castanho & I find that they do - at least among those who were not populist pretreatment. Now out at @PSRMJournal ๐(1/9) cambridge.org/core/journals/โฆ
While many explanations of populism focus on economic & cultural grievances, one partially alternative, partially complementary argument is about parties' inability to represent voters' policy positions. If voters feel no party represents them, they may become more populist (2/9)
Causal inference (esp. simultaneity) is a key problem here: "poor" representation may make people more anti-elitist, think with a Manichaean outlook & demand "power to the people". Alternatively, populist attitudes may cause people to (mis)perceive representation as worse (3/9)
Out now in @AJPS_Editor "Multidimensional Representation" with Fabio Wolkenstein. This is a paper about *HOW* we should study political representation. Basic motivation is that there is a gap between theoretical and empirical work on representation. (1/8)
While recent theoretical work (e.g. by Mansbridge, Saward, Rehfeld), which we call the *NEW WAVE*, has highlighted various important & exciting dimensions of representation, empiricists have not incorporated these theoretical insights in their designs. Check these tables: (2/8)
Analyzing a random sample of empirical articles on representation, we find that most do not engage with theory at all, or draw on Hanna Pitkin's conceptions of representation (in particular, substantive & descriptive representation). "New wave" is absent in empirical work. (3/8)
Out now in @PolBehavior with @FabianNeuner! Using three conjoint experiments, we explore which exact components of populist ideology draw voters to populist politicians, focusing on the case of Germany and Bundestag elections. (1/5) link.springer.com/article/10.100โฆ
We identify key "thin" populist ideology components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, proclamation of crisis. As well as "thick" populist ideology components: anti-refugees, anti-EU, anti-globalization & pro-redistribution. We operationalize all as candidate attributes (2/5).
Results show that political candidates in Germany can increase expected vote shares with anti-refugee & pro-redistribution as well as people-centric appeals, but not with anti-elite or anti-globalization/anti-EU messages. (3/5)