1/ I'm going to pound the table a bit more about and show that shipbuilding capacity is insufficient to replace scrapping let alone accommodate trade volume growth.
But this time we will look at the global aggregate merchant fleet including all sectors.
2/ Across all sectors, the global orderbook is only ~10% of the active fleet compared to ~8% that is already beyond economic life in the new high fuel cost/low emissions requirement paradigm. It the time it takes the ~10% to deliver, ~14% more will approach end of economic life.
3/ In 2022, ships reaching critical decision age whether to scrap or repair for compliance increases significantly and continues to increase each year this decade.
Notice in 2022 and beyond, the capacity of ships delivered fails to match capacity hitting the new 20 year wall.
4/ The only way owners pay the huge repair and compliance bill keep these old uneconomic assets operating is with very high rates: high enough to amortize a $1.5M per year repair schedule, 30% worse fuel economy, a rate uncertainty premium, and a ROIC cash financing premium.
5/ At high enough rates to keep these old assets trading, modern fuel efficient ships that can be financed will make truly exceptional profits. The largest modern scrubber fitted ships currently earn ~$20k per day more than their oldest equivalents.
6/ Capital investment and constraints on ship ordering drives shipping cycles. Ship ordering lags rates, ship deliveries lag orders ~3 years, and new shipbuilding capacity lags years after that.
7/ The last cycle was demand driven with China joining the WTO and shipbuilding playing catch up for a decade. This one will be supply driven as capacity is now insufficient to replace ships from the last boom and meet more stringent emissions regulations.
Where are we at?
8/ But this cycle is different. It is a NO BRAINER. Who could have predicted the crazy demand increase in the 2000s cycle?
This time we have the visibility to see that supply is insufficient even under a pessimistic demand scenario of multi-decade low trade growth.
9/ What other capital intensive business that has grown consistently with global GDP do you have such visibility of 3+ years out of shrinking supply in lieu of high rates?
There is no short-cycle shale patch to ruin this party.
Only global economic and geopolitical tail risk.
10/ I will point out again that in addition to aggregate shipbuilding capacity being insufficient to keep up with replacements for the global fleet, today's orderbook is heavily skewed toward container and gas carriers.
1/ 15 months ago I penned an article entitled "Welcome to the New Container Shipping Supercycle" questioning the premises of popular conceptions of supply and demand at the time.
Some reflections on what I got right and what I got wrong.
2/ New ship deliveries are not hard to predict 2 years into the future as it takes upwards of 18 months to build most ships from contract date. A dearth of new ordering through late 2020 ensured insufficient supply coming to market to through 2023 to meet demand.
3/ I was also correct that there was limited capacity to add additional megamax ships in 2024.
What I completely underestimated was the enormous demand and shipbuilding slot availability for new panamax ships in lieu of available megamax capacity.
1/ #Tankers are the biggest beneficiary of changing trade patterns due to Russian sanctions. PERIOD.
A look into why tanker rates are surging this week and why this is just the beginning.
A 🧵...
2/ The picture is becoming even clearer that Russian oil which used to go via pipeline and short sea to Europe will go all the way to China and **BACK** instead.
3/ **BACK** from China? YES. The West is structurally short on refining capacity and the deficit is getting larger as Russian refining capacity becomes shut in and European refiners struggle to source the slate needed to run at full capacity. reuters.com/business/energ…
1/ After the initial spike on the news of the Ukraine invasion tanker rates initially retraced due to lack of employment while Russian exporters sorted out details on who would buy the oil.
With buyers found, aframax and suezmax rates are moving higher again on tight ship supply
2/ Even the massively oversupplied VLCC fleet has seen an uptick in rates (to slightly less loss-making levels) on the burgeoning tightness in the market.
But until this excess capacity in VLCC is removed from the market rates for smaller classes are likely to remain capped.
3/ So the question is how quickly is supply coming back to the market and when can we expect this VLCC excess capacity to be absorbed?
I will attempt to put the monthly 400kb/d OPEC capacity increase schedule into context as it relates to seaborne volumes:
1/ Simandou back on track with a new firm deadline to start shipping 3/31/25.
At 100MMt/yr it will be second only to Vale's S11D mine in its impact to seaborne ton miles.
There are not enough ships nor enough shipbuilding capacity through 2025 to accommodate this start date.
2/ Lets do some back of the envelope math:
Capesize round trip from Guinea to China around 110 days at 11kt = 3.3 trips per year.
To ship 100MM tons this distance you need an additional ~145 Newcastlemax ships. This is roughly equivalent to the ENTIRE orderbook today.
3/ But todays orderbook will be barely sufficient to keep up with the new normal of earlier demolitions let alone accommodate the massive growth coming from Simandou:
1/ A reply to Alex Turnbull @alexbhturnbull on his Reply to Zoltan Pozsar.
Zoltan is spot on with his high ocean freight thesis. Alex's rebuttal that commodities will trade overland instead is a nice thought but it doesn't actually work that way.
2/ Zoltan recently published a piece titled "Bretton Woods III" hypothesizing among other things that if Russian commodities go to China instead of the West it would cause very high ocean freight rates.
"One of the big losers in all of this is likely to be freight shipping: as China is likely to trade more with Russia the appeal of overland transport is going to be significant here both to avoid detection and ensure capacity."
1/ What do you get when you combine high fuel costs, impending emissions limitations starting in 2023, and record high scrap steel prices?
Large ships sold for scrap at much younger ages than usual despite an optimistic outlook on earnings.
Last week's demo sales per Advanced:
2/ It is no surprises to see large 18 and 19 year old tankers sold for scrap last week considering the weak rate environment but it is a bit of a surprise to see young capesize bulk vessels scrapped with rate futures expecting highly profitable rates in the balance of 2022:
3/ But I can't argue with the decision to sell an asset nearing the end of its life for more than double the scrap value that similar vessels fetched only 18 months ago.
That is nearly $15m of cash for each cape sold last week which can now be redeployed into a younger vessel.