2. Russia has no capability to destroy the Ukrainian military and thus end the war with one missile attack. It just doesn't work that way.
3. The war will not end quickly because of Russia's air supremacy. Russia lost in Afghanistan and Chechnya despite them having zero planes. And Ukraine does have an air force and air defense.
4. The Ukrainian forces have undergone massive reforms since 2014 and are very capable. The West will supply them with weapons on the scale of a new land-lease program.
5. The resistance to the invasion will be particularly successful in big cities, where smaller defending force has multiple advantages.
6. Even if significant territories are occupied, the guerrilla resistance will be fierce. The Soviet forces have been fighting nationalist guerrillas in Western Ukraine for more than 10 years after the end of the second world war.
7. The bottom line: there will be no blitzkrieg and those who say otherwise will be deeply embarrassed.
So, this is 7 out of 7 for Khodorenok. I'm not a military expert, but most of these points are basic common sense. If only the Kremlin could maintain a minimal connection with reality...
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In this new article I explain how Russian economic integration into global capitalism as a "sub-imperialist" power has been reversed by its geopolitical ambitions since 2014. (1/5)
Russia's quest to disrupt the post-1989 world order coincided with a deterioration in US-China relations, which is structural in nature. The previous economic relationship between the US and China is no longer tenable. (2/5)
This is a tectonic shift that is perhaps more important at a global scale than Russia's reckless and failed conquest. The bottom line: Russia and China are moving closer together and the contours of a new bi-polar world are visible. (3/5)
Like most scholars of Russian politics, I have been grappling for weeks with a question of the war's causes. How could this reckless, catastrophic, pernicious decision be made? (A thread 🧵.) 1/15
I finally came up with something close to an answer.
It is a paradoxical combination of extreme short-termism and extreme long-termism. A mix of myopia and hyperopia that did not allow the Kremlin and Putin personally to see the reality at hand. 2/15
In November 2021, Joe Biden was elected as the US president. In Spring 2022, Russia began amassing troops on the Ukrainian border. Putin saw it as a negotiating tactic - an attempt to renegotiate the situation in Donbas (the Minsk agreements) and Ukraine's NATO bid. 3/15
Some Western "experts" with tankie sensibilities continue to rehash the claim that there were no or very few Russian troops in Donbas until February 2022. Consider this: /1
Exactly one year ago Ruslan Pukhov, a Russian military expert with strong government ties, openly admitted that Russian troops took part in the fighting in Donbas in 2014-2015. He even revealed the exact numbers. /2
According to Pukhov, in August 2014, Russian offensive in Donbas consisted of eight battalion-tactical groups (BTGs), that is, 6,000-8,000 soldiers. Another "small contingent" entered Donbas in early 2015. /3
Tremendous work by Philipp Chapkovski and Max Schaub. A clever sociological technique called "list experiment" allows to get closer to the "real" support for the war in Russia. /1
When asked a direct question, 68% of respondents said they supported Russia's military action in Ukraine. However, when asked indirectly, in a way that allowed to hide one's answer to this particular question, the figure was down to 53%. /2
This proves an obvious point that direct questions about one's support for the war in the context of 15-year sentences for basically any criticism of Russia's actions in Ukraine will never yield valid results. /3
One of the most popular questions right now is this: "Can Putin maintain his power?" In order to answer it properly, we need to distinguish between "power over" and "power to". /1
Putin will probably maintain his power over Russia in the short and medium term. Maybe for decades to come. Russian society faces the full weight of the repressive apparatus, which occupies a highly privileged position within Russia. /2
What possible motivation can FSB leadership have to stage a coup? Inside Russia, they already have everything. Outside of it, they won't have many opportunities anyway. And FSB rules Russia, make no mistake. /3
Every social network has its own preferred logical fallacy. Twitter is particularly fond of straw man/moral outrage combo.
"Big business cannot force Putin to stop the war even if you seize all their yachts. - Oh poor little oligarchs, want us to be nice to them, do you?"
"Russia is a poor country, sanctions-induced inflation will make basic goods unaffordable to people who already have no extra cash to spare. - Obviously you don't care about Ukrainian lives."
I could include disclaimers in every tweet, e.g. "of course my heart aches for Ukraine and Ukrainians have it infinitely worse than Russians"...