2. Attacker then added the flashloaned amount (~350M Dai, 500M USDC, 150M USDT) to Curve.fi pool as liquidity and received 979,691,328 DAI/USDC/USDT(3Crv) LP tokens
3. The Attacker used all the gained assets from the flashloan to vote the #BIP18 proposal.
4. After passing the proposal, they immediately invoked the emergencyCommit() to execute the BIP18 proposal.
5. the attacker was then able to drain the 36,084,584 $BEAN, 0.54 UNIV2(BEAN-WETH), 874,663,982 BEAN3Crv and 60,562,844 BEANLUSD-f.
6. The attacker used the drained assets (in Step5) to repay the #flashloan
The root cause of the exploit is that the BEAN3Crv-f and BEANLUSD-f (used for voting) in the Silo system could be created via flashloan.
Due to the lack of an anti-flashloan mechanism in the Beanstalk protocol, the attackers were able to borrow tokens that are supported by the protocol and voted for malicious proposals.
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The @FBI is raising awareness on BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), which it said has attacked around 60 entities worldwide from November 2021 to March 2022.
@FBI Rust offers the attackers opportunity to take advantage of a lower detection ratio from static analysis malware detection tools, which aren't adapted to all programming languages.
@ElephantStatus's Treasury contract experienced a #flashloan attack leading to a loss of around $11M. The Treasury contract is unverified and unaudited.
The attacker took advantage of the redeem mechanism of the $TRUNK token, manipulated the price oracle to empower the token return, and stole ELEPHANT from the unverified Treasury contract.
Attack Steps 👇
1. The attacker deployed an attacker contract and borrowed $WBNB and $BUSD using flashloan from multiple pair pools.
2. Most of the borrowed WBNB was swapped for ELEPHANT to raise the price of ELEPHANT.