So apparently we're doing 'do modern people work more than pre-modern farmers' discourse again on Twitter, so it seems like a good time to point out I have a series on pre-modern farming which discusses the considerable labor demands: 1/acoup.blog/2020/07/24/col…
The statistic that gets passed around - 150 working days a year for a medieval farmer - is badly incomplete; the 150 days is the required labor of a peasant on the lord's estate; farming any other land and literally any other task is extra. 2/
How much extra? A lot depends and I am better here with the Roman evidence. Columella (2.12), a Roman agricultural writer, figures that there were 290 working days in a year, accounting for festivals, market days, rain and the general seasonal cycle. 3/
How many of those days would you need to survive? Probably nearly all of them. It depends very heavily on the size of your household and the land you have to work. One can run a lot of simulations, assuming different yields, taxes or rent owed, etc. 4/
In a number of cases, we see that peasant labor was 'inefficiently allotted' in the countryside - too many farmers in a household for the land - so you might have 'excess labor' but pre-modern societies had all sorts of ways to soak up that excess labor. 5/
For instance, the 150 working days you are required to work your lord's estate where you only get a fraction of the food produced. Or systems of corvee labor. In the Roman Republic, an average of 7-10 years of military service per citizen male.
Gotta factor that in too! 6/
Of course you'd also need to err on the side of working more, because error in the other direction means you starve in the long gap between one harvest and the next. Generally, you'd be pretty close to Columella's 290 days, once all those demands were accounted for. 7/
Of course we should also note that farming labor wasn't the only labor going on in the peasant household. Household textile production, generally done by women, was also a huge full-time job time skink (acoup.blog/2021/03/05/col…). 8/
And we also want to note that the 'work day' in the high labor demand seasons (planting, harvest) was a lot longer than an 8-hour workday too - harvest especially was all-hands-on-deck dawn-to-dusk schedule, for weeks at a time. The pre-modern version of 'crunch.' 9/
And it also seems worth noting that we have a lot more non-work *years* too - peasants started working (boys in the field, girls spinning) at very young ages and effectively never 'retired,' so when you account for all of this, factor that in too. 10/
The end result is that your intuition is likely to be correct: the average pre-modern peasant worked more days than the c. 260 work days that you see somewhat typically (with exceptions) in the United States. Probably around 20-30 more days, w/ longer hours.
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This notion -the Romans had tiers of citizenship based on ethnicity- keeps coming up. I have no idea where from, but it is mostly wrong before 87 BC; entirely wrong afterwards.
Citizenship attached fully regardless of origin; Romans could be snobby bigots but their law was not.
Prior to the Social War (91-87) the Romans did have a category of citizenship sine suffragio ('without votes') which had all the legal rights of citizenship except voting and office holding, usually extended to allied communities in Italy with their own local officials. 2/
Sometimes that was extended as a reward ('here are all the benefits of citizenship, but you can keep your local government'), sometimes as a penalty ('we are extinguishing your polity but not giving you a full say in ours'), but it was community based, not ethnic. 3/
This is simply and obviously wrong in easily demonstrable ways, from the expansiveness of Roman citizenship to the incorporation of Persian elites under Alexander and the Seleucids (however poorly) to obvious things like the numbers of Scots in key posts in the British Empire.
One thing that white nationalists all seem to share is an absolutely astoundingly terrible grasp of history, unable to imagine the - again, quite obvious - fact that people in the past defined racial & ethnic boundaries differently than we do and that those boundaries were fluid.
There were, of course, ethnically exclusive polities in antiquity - the Greek polis is a good example.
They tended to be small, weak and tend to be overrun by more diverse polities (as the Greeks were by the Macedonians and then the Romans).
(Grok has also, unsurprisingly, parroted Musk's own catastrophic misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of Augustus' moral legislation - which was aimed at family's in Rome's tiny sub-2% elite, not at general population.
No surprise there.) 2/
On the point of the evidence - our demographic evidence from antiquity comes mostly from funerary inscriptions and, in Egypt (and really only there) fragmentary census reports.
Both systematically underreport young children, making it impossible to pin down a TFR. 3/
We're not quite to discussing labor in peasant households in my on-going series of pre-modern peasant lifestyles (keeping in mind peasants made up 90+% of the population pre-1750) but functionally all women worked, beginning very young and essentially never 'retiring.'
The core of that work was textile production (discussed here: ), but equally women typically handled childrearing and food preparation and were still expected to be in the fields during periods of peak labor demand (e.g. planting, harvest).acoup.blog/2021/03/05/col…
Worth answering 'on main' & cross-posting from The Good Place.
Victor Davis Hanson's work has been reappraised in 2 ways: the quality of his work substantially changed post-1998, but also the arguments of his early work experienced pushback, which he has largely not answered. 1/
Let's start with the early works, by which we mostly mean Warfare and Agriculture (1983; rev. 1998), Western Way of War (1989) and The Other Greeks (1995).
These, especially WWoW, made substantial impacts when they first appeared, set the 'orthodoxy' on hoplites in the 90s. 2/
Large parts of that WWoW model have come under significant scholarly pressure - @Roelkonijn can sing on this, for he is one of the chief critics here.
Critiques range from the mechanics of battle to the social underpinnings of hoplite warfare, and they're very substantial. 3/
('Enrichment' here is sorting out fissile u-235 (about 0.7% of naturally occurring uranium) from stable u-238 (the other ~99.3%)).
So it sure seems like if you were going to attempt a first-strike against a uranium enrichment program, you'd want to know where the uranium was.
My sense is this has always been one of the chief concerns for why 'deal' might be preferable over 'strike' - if you strike and miss, the uranium vanishes into the vastness of Iran until it reemerges as a successful nuclear test in 6 months, a year, two years.