7/ The #Candiru targeting that we saw was via email. Again, often super personalized.
They impersonated official COVID communications from Spanish gov, notifications from biz registries, etc.
Sometimes Candiru & #Pegasus targeting themes overlapped.
8/ Craziest story? Victim working on a live #Candiru infected computer had to be persuaded to step into the hallway using a ruse so we could explain the situation away from it's microphones...
Material was shared w/@MsftSecIntel which led to 1.4 billion devices getting patched.
9/ The folks at @AmnestyTech conducted an independent validation of our forensic methods on a selection of cases.
10/ Which government is behind #CatalanGate? Well, we aren't conclusively attributing to a specific government...
But substantial circumstantial evidence suggests a nexus with the Government of Spain.
11/ Big picture: people think the problem with mercenary spyware is that it gets sold to dictators. Who abuse it. True.
Turns out that when democracies acquire it, risk of abuse is dangerously high.
It's abundantly clear that this is now a major problem in the #EU.
12/ EU MEPs have begun weighing in👇
🇪🇺 EU Parliament's new committee on Pegasus spyware has first meeting tomorrow.
14/ Cases like this cannot come to light without the many victims & organizations that graciously consent to participating in our research, and chose to come forward & be named.
Without them, this report would not have been possible.
15/ Special acknowledgement to the team @domesticstream who helped us do the amazing graphical companion to our report.
A "damaging" leak of tools from a five eyes exploit developer?
Concerning. We need to know what's under this rug.
Big picture: "trusted, vetted" private sector players offensive cyber are not immune to losing control of tooling... with national security consequences 1/
2/ If true, a tooling leak at boutique firm Trenchant wouldn't be the first time that exploits from commercial offensive vendors wind up... in the wrong place.
Many questions.
In the meantime. Remember when Russian APT29..was caught with exploits first used by NSO & Intellexa?
3/ There will always be a push for states to turn towards the private sector to meet offensive needs.
It's appealing. For some, it's very lucrative.
But in practice it brings unavoidable counterintelligence & national security downside risk that shouldn't be downplayed.
NOW: US court permanently bans Pegasus spyware maker from hacking WhatsApp.
NSO Group can't help their customers hack @WhatsApp, etc ether. Must delete exploits...
Bad news for NSO. Huge competitive disadvantage for the notorious company.
Big additional win for WhatsApp 1 /
2/ Although the massive punitive damages jury award against NSO Group ($167m) got reduced by the court, as is expected in cases where it is so large (to 9x compensatory damages)...
This is likely cold comfort to NSO since I think the injunction is going to have a huge impact on the value of NSO's spyware product.
Comes as NSO Group has been making noises about getting acquired by a US investor & some unnamed backers...
3/ NSO also emerges from the @WhatsApp v NSO case with just an absolute TON of their business splashed all over the court records..