German Greens are really in a precarious position now. There is no party in 🇩🇪 parliament who got more right on 🇷🇺— they had warned about 🇷🇺 (esp. NS1/2) for years & decades. Usually, that’s the penalty kick when you expose the mistakes of the others & collect electoral support…
…& in this case, it wouldn’t be cheap exploitation of other’s failures, it would just be showcasing your competence — they had a better, more accurate analysis of the situation. A great opportunity! But so far Greens leadership has decided against bc it would mean exposing SPD…
Their current & favorite coalition partner. Demanding investigations into 🇷🇺 connection & criticizing SPD leaders publicly could end the coalition. SPD could try to portray Greens as unreliable & reckless. Huge risks for party & short-term stability of gov. But the dangers of…
Keeping still are likewise considerable: German policy may remain „too little, too late“ & Greens may be blamed for it as well. Plus: >70% of their voters want #energyembargo & #heavyweapons. Worst: SPD argument that 🇩🇪 industry can’t survive without 🇷🇺 oil/gas has already…
Gained traction in public & could eventually undermine Greens favorite climate agenda. Hence, this really is a high-risk game for them. At same time, their decision will likely define 🇩🇪 policy — no other party has an interest in reappraising past mistakes & changing course on 🇷🇺
The Greens hold all the keys 🔑 but fear what is behind the doors. Will they cover up the half-hearted approach by SPD or will they aim for a fundamental reset of German 🇷🇺 policy? They better get this decision right. #StandwithUkraine#scholz
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This Easter we will hear everyone wishing peace for 🇺🇦. And while "peace" is the word that for us all symbolizes hope & a better future, something we don't have to explain, understand instantly, there are different forms of peace. So which peace are you talking of?🧵 1/8
1) The Ukrainian peace. This peace has 🇷🇺 withdraw from / being forced out of all Ukrainian territory (perhaps save some concession, ie. Crimea), 🇺🇦 democracy survive & being guarantueed by own & others' military capabilities. For some it also means NATO and/or EU membership. 2/8
2) The continued "peace". This is a continuation of what Westerners called "peace" since 2014. Parts of Ukraine are occupied, annexed & russified by Russian troops (eg. incl. new territories), intensity of conflict is lower. 🇺🇦 will be unable to become part of NATO or EU. 3/8
Reading 🇩🇪 commentators on Twitter & online forums on #steinmeier many say 🇩🇪 is one of biggest donors of 🇺🇦, delivers weapons, has done „Zeitenwende“ & many demand that gov should „draw conclusions“ from 🇺🇦 uninvite. What they don’t mention: 🇩🇪 has sent & is sending more 💴…1/5
for energy to 🇷🇺 than anyone else & was (is?) key supporter of allowing 🇪🇺 depend on 🇷🇺 energy — financing Putin. Normally, if you enable war you are not invited or applauded but must go through humiliation & make up for what you have done…before even being talked to again. 2/5
Out of all countries 🇩🇪 should know about this from its history. But perhaps that’s precisely why it is hard to admit to oneself that one bears (some) responsibility (much less than in past) for war — again. It’s hard to see what — by your identity — is not allowed to happen. 3/5
Do parties' failures to represent voters fuel populist sentiment? Using a 12-country survey experiment during 2019 EP elections, @b_castanho & I find that they do - at least among those who were not populist pretreatment. Now out at @PSRMJournal 👇(1/9) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
While many explanations of populism focus on economic & cultural grievances, one partially alternative, partially complementary argument is about parties' inability to represent voters' policy positions. If voters feel no party represents them, they may become more populist (2/9)
Causal inference (esp. simultaneity) is a key problem here: "poor" representation may make people more anti-elitist, think with a Manichaean outlook & demand "power to the people". Alternatively, populist attitudes may cause people to (mis)perceive representation as worse (3/9)
Out now in @AJPS_Editor "Multidimensional Representation" with Fabio Wolkenstein. This is a paper about *HOW* we should study political representation. Basic motivation is that there is a gap between theoretical and empirical work on representation. (1/8)
While recent theoretical work (e.g. by Mansbridge, Saward, Rehfeld), which we call the *NEW WAVE*, has highlighted various important & exciting dimensions of representation, empiricists have not incorporated these theoretical insights in their designs. Check these tables: (2/8)
Analyzing a random sample of empirical articles on representation, we find that most do not engage with theory at all, or draw on Hanna Pitkin's conceptions of representation (in particular, substantive & descriptive representation). "New wave" is absent in empirical work. (3/8)
Out now in @PolBehavior with @FabianNeuner! Using three conjoint experiments, we explore which exact components of populist ideology draw voters to populist politicians, focusing on the case of Germany and Bundestag elections. (1/5) link.springer.com/article/10.100…
We identify key "thin" populist ideology components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, proclamation of crisis. As well as "thick" populist ideology components: anti-refugees, anti-EU, anti-globalization & pro-redistribution. We operationalize all as candidate attributes (2/5).
Results show that political candidates in Germany can increase expected vote shares with anti-refugee & pro-redistribution as well as people-centric appeals, but not with anti-elite or anti-globalization/anti-EU messages. (3/5)