Andrei Belousov, deputy prime minister [this one wasn't reported in the West, but it's crucial]: economic stimulus to fight the crisis without risking further inflation is limited to 7-8 trln rubles and the government has already reached this limit. (4/11)
Thus there's not much room to further stimulate the economy financially. (5/11)
Overall: economic sanctions are very effective at disrupting the Russian economy. Whether they can weaken the war machine is another matter. There are two factors: 1) overall military budget, 2) dependence on imports in the military-industrial complex. (6/11)
Regarding the first factor: I don't think anything short of complete energy embargo can reduce military spending, and even that might not do it. (7/11)
Second factor is trickier, however. Military production is very opaque and no one will disclose import dependency there, obviously, but there is some indirect evidence. (8/11)
E.g. Dmitry Rogozin, then deputy prime minister, admitted in 2014 that 640 Russian military products require components from NATO and EU countries. (9/11)
There were plans to substitute most of these imports by 2018, but, knowing the general ineptitude of Russian economic policy, I seriously doubt that this goal was reached. (10/11)
Bottom line: logistical and other export-oriented sanctions likely disrupt supply chains in the military industry and therefore should stay. (11/11)
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This guy, who is now scraping the barrel trying to discredit Putin's courageous and principled opponents, has worked for a strongly pro-government Russian newspaper Expert at least until 2014 - while Navalny's team was fighting Putinism. This is just embarrassing.
"At least three million Turks live in Germany, and this number will only increase. Turkish communities create real “parallel communities” in German cities, in which the laws of Germany do not apply, in which a woman can be killed for not wearing a headscarf...
Al Jazeera asked me to reflect on the future of Putin's power. Unfortunately, I don't have much optimism. To paraphrase Fredric Jameson, it is currently easier to imagine a nuclear holocaust than an end to Putin's regime. (1/6)
Of course, it might simply be a failure of imagination. As anthropologist Alexei Yurchak argued in his famous, brilliant book, no one expected or dared to hope in the 1980s that the Soviet Union would collapse. Yet, paradoxically, no one was surprised when it did. (2/6)
2. Russia has no capability to destroy the Ukrainian military and thus end the war with one missile attack. It just doesn't work that way.
3. The war will not end quickly because of Russia's air supremacy. Russia lost in Afghanistan and Chechnya despite them having zero planes. And Ukraine does have an air force and air defense.
In this new article I explain how Russian economic integration into global capitalism as a "sub-imperialist" power has been reversed by its geopolitical ambitions since 2014. (1/5)
Russia's quest to disrupt the post-1989 world order coincided with a deterioration in US-China relations, which is structural in nature. The previous economic relationship between the US and China is no longer tenable. (2/5)
This is a tectonic shift that is perhaps more important at a global scale than Russia's reckless and failed conquest. The bottom line: Russia and China are moving closer together and the contours of a new bi-polar world are visible. (3/5)
Like most scholars of Russian politics, I have been grappling for weeks with a question of the war's causes. How could this reckless, catastrophic, pernicious decision be made? (A thread 🧵.) 1/15
I finally came up with something close to an answer.
It is a paradoxical combination of extreme short-termism and extreme long-termism. A mix of myopia and hyperopia that did not allow the Kremlin and Putin personally to see the reality at hand. 2/15
In November 2021, Joe Biden was elected as the US president. In Spring 2022, Russia began amassing troops on the Ukrainian border. Putin saw it as a negotiating tactic - an attempt to renegotiate the situation in Donbas (the Minsk agreements) and Ukraine's NATO bid. 3/15
Some Western "experts" with tankie sensibilities continue to rehash the claim that there were no or very few Russian troops in Donbas until February 2022. Consider this: /1
Exactly one year ago Ruslan Pukhov, a Russian military expert with strong government ties, openly admitted that Russian troops took part in the fighting in Donbas in 2014-2015. He even revealed the exact numbers. /2
According to Pukhov, in August 2014, Russian offensive in Donbas consisted of eight battalion-tactical groups (BTGs), that is, 6,000-8,000 soldiers. Another "small contingent" entered Donbas in early 2015. /3