There have been 8 shocks to the global food prices - yes eight (8). Most of them are ongoing!
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1/n As for team transitory,…
No 1 - War: Ukraine, which was known as the ‘breadbasket of the FSU’, has 1/4 of world’s ‘black soil’ fertile land. In 2021 Ukraine accounted for 20%, 7%, 18% of global exports of barley, wheat & corn, respectively. It is under attack & VVP wants this war to be a food crisis.
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He will get his will. The UN Food and Agricultural Organisation estimates that 20-30% of sunflower, grains and corn will not be planted or harvested. It forecasts food prices to rise by another 8-22% because of the loss of Ukrainian production (FT, 9 April).
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No 2 - Sanctions: Russia & Belarus are massive exporters of Potash and Nitrogen fertilisers. Russia accounts for 79% of EU Nitrogen fertiliser imports, largely owing to its cheap natural gas supplies & thus the cheapest feedstock.
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Western sanctions have made it more expensive and harder for importers to buy Russian and Belarusian exports.
Land-locked Belarus has lost access to all neighboring ports except Russian ones due to sanctions, causing severe disruptions to the fertiliser supply chain.
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Belarus has also banned the transit of fertilisers across its territory from Lithuania (as well as oil and other chemical products), in response to Lithuania stopping the transit of Belarussian potash fertiliser, adding further supply-chain pressures (Reuters, 2 February).
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The Russian government has also imposed export restrictions on grains in order to ensure internal food security. It has, for example, banned the export of wheat, rye, barley and maize from 14 March through 30 June, and exports of white and raw sugar until 31 August.
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No 3 - High Energy Cost: 1/3 of food costs are energy related: 80% of the cost of nitrogen fertilisers comes from gas, to which is added fuel cost of farm equipment or buildings. Energy cost are up big ($170/boe EU gas).
If you like avocado toast you love…?
8/n
No 4 - Higher transportation & packaging cost (7- 10% of food producers’ costs): Fuel accounts for 20-35% of costs for aviation companies and around 50% for shipping companies. The rerouting of trading with Europe will cause a sticky increase in transportation costs & delays.
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The west buying less Russian commodities and some countries, such as China and India, buying more of them is likely to push both freight rates and ton-miles up. Think Breton Woods III by Zoltan.
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CS analyst Lars Kjellberg estimates that 20% of fibre-based packaging and 35% of glass packaging is energy related, both direct & indirect ones: oil-derived chemicals used for fibre-based packaging, soda ash for glass and fossil-based feedstock for plastic.
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No 5 - Green Shift: We have seen increased demand for land to plant trees as a carbon offset, which puts further upward pressure on food prices as agricultural land becomes more expensive. A further source of pressure on food prices is the US Renewable Fuel Standard..
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The Biden Administration announced a temp waiver of the summertime ban on E15 gasoline (15% ethanol), which may lower oil prices at the expense of higher corn prices. E15 is only 10 cents cheaper, but less energy-intensive, so more volumes are likely to be sold.
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No 6 - Less Productivity: The price response should encourage more production, but not if input costs go up too much. Famers tend to sell part of their production forward, but face high input prices.
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There is evidence that farmers are finding it too expensive to buy fertiliser, so will use less. This reduces productivity. For instance, US government data estimates that high industrial fertiliser prices will reduce corn & wheat plantings by US farmers this spring.
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This is certainly true for rice farmers in Asia where end-consumer prices of rice did not appreciate to reflect higher feedstock prices of, say urea, as governments try to protect consumers (price controls). So farmers cannot afford the needed fertiliser - full stop.
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No 7 - A series of poor harvests
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No 8 - China Covid Policy: Lockdowns could disrupt the planting season. Up to 1/3 of famers in the northeastern province of Jilin, as well as in Liaoning & Heilongjiang provinces, have insufficient agricultural inputs after their villages were sealed off.
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These three provinces account for 20% of China’s food production (FT, 10 April). The lockdown also creates a potential for shortages of migrant workers.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.
Pre-2020, Gold had one marginal buyer, that being gold-backed ETFs.
Today, gold has at least 3 marginal buyers that can overlap or alternate each other. They are:
- Gold backed Western ETFs (which buy, sell or hold based on US real rates);
- Central Banks seeking higher gold reserves (China; India; Thailand; Vietnam; Qatar, KSA or even Poland) for geopolitical & other reasons;
- Chinese & other Asian wholesale or retail market participants and professional speculators;
Who bought most last? India!
Why? The government cut import duties on gold by 9% at end of July, triggering a renewed surge in demand. “The impact of the duty cut was unprecedented, it was incredible,” said Philip Newman, managing director of Metals Focus in London. “It really brought consumers in.”
At least for now, there seems to be always somebody.
1/n
Note however that Chinese retail buying has slowed down recently, as best illustrated by the Shanghai gold premium over international prices.
I will elaborate on the Chinese retail clients more soon.
2/n
However, professional Chinese speculators have increased their futures positions somewhat again. Who is the better indicator of what comes next, retail or the pros? IDK
In 2023, I said I will tweet less about oil and I will stick to this promise but today I make an exception and will break the promise as we enter a period of more volatility for oil...
So let's talk about OPEC and Saudi market share. It's decision making time.
The Saudis decided to keep oil from falling <$75 for 2y by cutting overproportionally in their OPEC+ quota context.
They have cap for 12mbpd but produce 9mbpd. It was 10.5mbpd in 2022. Pick a number but they are 15-20% below their fair share.
2/n
Why did they do so?
Likely because of bad advisers. There is a whole crew of supply gloomers out there charging clients money to claim the Permian or US shale is about to roll over.
Let me share some real time data on the EU natgas market that are hard to get.
European gas consumption for 28 countries matches last's years to the cubic meter (Oct 2022 - Oct 2023 = Year 2022).
However, consumption remains 17% below 2019/20 season.
Is there a supply issue? Rubbish. The global LNG market is oversupplied from every corner; EU storages will be filled by end of Aug where we sit. We have too much gas.
#TTF 1/4 (in mcm/day and YTD)
Three factors matter why there is less consumption vs 2019/20 season:
1) Milder weather: 70% of total consumption is temperature related. Temperatures are milder, thus Europe consumes 14% less vs 2019/20.
Is that permenant? It sure looks like a trend where I sit. But climate scientists can answer that best.
Households Consumption; 2/4
2) Less power generation: Europe replaces more and more natgas in the grid with solar & wind and in the case of France with better capacity utilisation of its nuclear fleet. That adds up...!