There have been 8 shocks to the global food prices - yes eight (8). Most of them are ongoing!
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1/n As for team transitory,…
No 1 - War: Ukraine, which was known as the ‘breadbasket of the FSU’, has 1/4 of world’s ‘black soil’ fertile land. In 2021 Ukraine accounted for 20%, 7%, 18% of global exports of barley, wheat & corn, respectively. It is under attack & VVP wants this war to be a food crisis.
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He will get his will. The UN Food and Agricultural Organisation estimates that 20-30% of sunflower, grains and corn will not be planted or harvested. It forecasts food prices to rise by another 8-22% because of the loss of Ukrainian production (FT, 9 April).
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No 2 - Sanctions: Russia & Belarus are massive exporters of Potash and Nitrogen fertilisers. Russia accounts for 79% of EU Nitrogen fertiliser imports, largely owing to its cheap natural gas supplies & thus the cheapest feedstock.
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Western sanctions have made it more expensive and harder for importers to buy Russian and Belarusian exports.
Land-locked Belarus has lost access to all neighboring ports except Russian ones due to sanctions, causing severe disruptions to the fertiliser supply chain.
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Belarus has also banned the transit of fertilisers across its territory from Lithuania (as well as oil and other chemical products), in response to Lithuania stopping the transit of Belarussian potash fertiliser, adding further supply-chain pressures (Reuters, 2 February).
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The Russian government has also imposed export restrictions on grains in order to ensure internal food security. It has, for example, banned the export of wheat, rye, barley and maize from 14 March through 30 June, and exports of white and raw sugar until 31 August.
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No 3 - High Energy Cost: 1/3 of food costs are energy related: 80% of the cost of nitrogen fertilisers comes from gas, to which is added fuel cost of farm equipment or buildings. Energy cost are up big ($170/boe EU gas).
If you like avocado toast you love…?
8/n
No 4 - Higher transportation & packaging cost (7- 10% of food producers’ costs): Fuel accounts for 20-35% of costs for aviation companies and around 50% for shipping companies. The rerouting of trading with Europe will cause a sticky increase in transportation costs & delays.
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The west buying less Russian commodities and some countries, such as China and India, buying more of them is likely to push both freight rates and ton-miles up. Think Breton Woods III by Zoltan.
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CS analyst Lars Kjellberg estimates that 20% of fibre-based packaging and 35% of glass packaging is energy related, both direct & indirect ones: oil-derived chemicals used for fibre-based packaging, soda ash for glass and fossil-based feedstock for plastic.
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No 5 - Green Shift: We have seen increased demand for land to plant trees as a carbon offset, which puts further upward pressure on food prices as agricultural land becomes more expensive. A further source of pressure on food prices is the US Renewable Fuel Standard..
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The Biden Administration announced a temp waiver of the summertime ban on E15 gasoline (15% ethanol), which may lower oil prices at the expense of higher corn prices. E15 is only 10 cents cheaper, but less energy-intensive, so more volumes are likely to be sold.
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No 6 - Less Productivity: The price response should encourage more production, but not if input costs go up too much. Famers tend to sell part of their production forward, but face high input prices.
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There is evidence that farmers are finding it too expensive to buy fertiliser, so will use less. This reduces productivity. For instance, US government data estimates that high industrial fertiliser prices will reduce corn & wheat plantings by US farmers this spring.
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This is certainly true for rice farmers in Asia where end-consumer prices of rice did not appreciate to reflect higher feedstock prices of, say urea, as governments try to protect consumers (price controls). So farmers cannot afford the needed fertiliser - full stop.
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No 7 - A series of poor harvests
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No 8 - China Covid Policy: Lockdowns could disrupt the planting season. Up to 1/3 of famers in the northeastern province of Jilin, as well as in Liaoning & Heilongjiang provinces, have insufficient agricultural inputs after their villages were sealed off.
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These three provinces account for 20% of China’s food production (FT, 10 April). The lockdown also creates a potential for shortages of migrant workers.
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
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What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
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Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
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Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
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While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.