When you look at a US Army MLRS or HIMARS launcher.
You see containerized pod six-packs with cranes built into the launcher and in the trucks that pick up & deliver them.
You see a persistent use of capital to replace labor for increased productivity per unit time.
2/
And please carefully note, this emphasis in the US Army predates Frederick Taylor's four principles of Scientific Management.
The M1819 Hall rifle & carbines built with interchangeable, mass produced, parts vastly reduced the number of trained artisans needed to build & 3/
...maintain its firearms.
The reason for the crane on the Uragan BM-27 & Smerch BM-30 reload trucks is their rockets were individually too darned big for a group of minimally trained & hungover conscripts move without damaging both the rocket & themselves. 4/
An apples to apples comparison of the US MLRS or HIMARS to the Smerch shows advantages for the US launchers.
1. Less manpower per launcher w/o a specialized reload vehicle 2. Faster reload time per launcher 3. More rockets can be fired per US Army MLRS or HIMARS per day. 5/
4. And all these labor saving devices built into MLRS & HIMARS launchers are easily trained at low risk.
The Twelve 300mm Smerch rockets need to be individually fused & armed. As does the 40 rockets of a 122mm rocket launcher. 6/
The US MLRS/HIMARS pod is factory loaded & sealed with all the fusing & arming being automated & remotely set via cab fire control computer.
Any US Army truck with a crane can lay out the pods for launchers to reload. No special rocket reload trucks are required. 7/
The US Army has always been short of people. The American Frontier & Congressional dislike of standing a standing army saw to that from the Revolution to WW2. 8/
WW2 conscription wasn't the answer to US Army manpower dreams. The USAAF & US Navy grabbed many of the best men and the needs of world wide logistics meant the US Army hit the wall of expansion in late 1942.
Mechanized logistics was the only way to move the mountains of 9/
supplies needed world wide.
And not just for itself, but for all the United Nations including Russia. 10/
In contrast, the Russian Army in all its incarnations until the late 1990's always acted as if "There's more conscripts where that came from, comrade."
While the nostalgia for the Red Army the Putin Regime had blinded it to the demographic realities 11/
...that the 21st Century Russian Army lacked the White Russian & Ukrainian manpower to replicate the Red Army.
The mechanized logistics pioneered in the West was simply applied to logistical issues beyond the capabilities of a mass of ill-trained conscripts. 12/
The fact that it took the Ukraine War for this gap in Russian logistical capability to be really NOTICED, let alone analyzed.
There has never been a real attempt at a comparative social history between the Russian and other Armies logistics.
BLUF: There is more evidence of reduced Russian glide bomb strikes due to Ukrainian OWA drone strikes on Russian depots, but the huge loss rate of Russian ISR drones may also be playing a part.
The WW2 US Army used mules in China and Italy because:
1. Fodder was native to China and fuel had to be flown in, and 2. North Africa had a lot of existing mule pack trains which could be swiftly shipped to Italy using local fodder
400 Houthi aerial drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles were fired at/near USN ships since Oct 2023
120 SM-2 & 80 SM-6 missiles, 160 five-inch main guns rounds, plus a combined 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow and SM-3 missiles engaged them.
Drone War Cost Trades 🧵 1/
Tyler Rogoway has reported the following missile costs:
SM-2 Block IIIC - $2,530,000 per missile.
SM-6 - $4,270,000 per missile.
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) RIM-162 Block II - $1,490,000 per missile.
SM-3 -$12,510,000 for the Block IB, and $28,700,000 for the Block IIA 2/
So:
120 SM-2 * $2.53 million = $303.6 million
80 SM-6 * $4.27 million = $341.6 million
12 ESSM (guess) = $17.88 million
6 SM-3 IB (guess) * $12.51 million = $75 million
2 SM-3 IIA (guess) * $28.7 million = $57.4 million