When you look at a US Army MLRS or HIMARS launcher.
You see containerized pod six-packs with cranes built into the launcher and in the trucks that pick up & deliver them.
You see a persistent use of capital to replace labor for increased productivity per unit time.
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And please carefully note, this emphasis in the US Army predates Frederick Taylor's four principles of Scientific Management.
The M1819 Hall rifle & carbines built with interchangeable, mass produced, parts vastly reduced the number of trained artisans needed to build & 3/
...maintain its firearms.
The reason for the crane on the Uragan BM-27 & Smerch BM-30 reload trucks is their rockets were individually too darned big for a group of minimally trained & hungover conscripts move without damaging both the rocket & themselves. 4/
An apples to apples comparison of the US MLRS or HIMARS to the Smerch shows advantages for the US launchers.
1. Less manpower per launcher w/o a specialized reload vehicle 2. Faster reload time per launcher 3. More rockets can be fired per US Army MLRS or HIMARS per day. 5/
4. And all these labor saving devices built into MLRS & HIMARS launchers are easily trained at low risk.
The Twelve 300mm Smerch rockets need to be individually fused & armed. As does the 40 rockets of a 122mm rocket launcher. 6/
The US MLRS/HIMARS pod is factory loaded & sealed with all the fusing & arming being automated & remotely set via cab fire control computer.
Any US Army truck with a crane can lay out the pods for launchers to reload. No special rocket reload trucks are required. 7/
The US Army has always been short of people. The American Frontier & Congressional dislike of standing a standing army saw to that from the Revolution to WW2. 8/
WW2 conscription wasn't the answer to US Army manpower dreams. The USAAF & US Navy grabbed many of the best men and the needs of world wide logistics meant the US Army hit the wall of expansion in late 1942.
Mechanized logistics was the only way to move the mountains of 9/
supplies needed world wide.
And not just for itself, but for all the United Nations including Russia. 10/
In contrast, the Russian Army in all its incarnations until the late 1990's always acted as if "There's more conscripts where that came from, comrade."
While the nostalgia for the Red Army the Putin Regime had blinded it to the demographic realities 11/
...that the 21st Century Russian Army lacked the White Russian & Ukrainian manpower to replicate the Red Army.
The mechanized logistics pioneered in the West was simply applied to logistical issues beyond the capabilities of a mass of ill-trained conscripts. 12/
The fact that it took the Ukraine War for this gap in Russian logistical capability to be really NOTICED, let alone analyzed.
There has never been a real attempt at a comparative social history between the Russian and other Armies logistics.
This Ukrainian fiber optic FPV drone attack underlines that 20th century style tactical truck based logistics are obsolete in the age of mass, cheap, 50 km FPV drones.
Drones costing less than $2,000 are killing trucks costing over $150,000.
The issue of Western truck production versus drone production is stark
Ukraine in 2025 is making ~12,000 FPV and grenade dropping class small drones a month.
The peak annual US Army FMTV production was in 2005 for a total of 8,168 trucks.
Those trucks are 20 years old.
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21st Century truck logistics in the age of 50 km unjammable fiber optic guided FPV drones requires systematic combat service support engineering to build vehicle "net tunnels" to protect from powered and persistent drones.
Injection molding gets you a lot of one thing cheaply. Think lots of fiber optic guided FPV drones, which are immune to radio jamming.
3D/AM allows a lot of modifications to meet the changing requirements of war. Think rapidly evolving Ukrainian interceptor drone designs.
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The issue for Ukraine versus Russia is Ukraine has to more widely disperse its industrial base because Russia has a bigger cruise and 500 km(+) ballistic missile production base.
Ukraine's need to disperse production and evolve drones means 3D/AM is a better industrial fit.
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The Coyote I was a propeller interceptor like the Ukrainian FPV's, but it wasn't "enough" for the higher end drone threat like the TB-2 Bayraktar.
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So the US military abandoned kinetic solutions the lower end drone threat.
And it has to pretend that high power microwave weapons and jamming will be the answer to fiber optic guided FPV's at weed height and grenade dropping drones behind tree lines.
The arrival of the Ukrainian Gogol-M, a 20-foot span fixed-wing aerial drone mothership, with over a 200km radius of action while carrying a payload of two 30km ranged attack drones under its wings, underlines the impact of low level airspace as a drone "avenue of approach."
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The Gogol-M flys low and slow, below ground based radar coverage like a helicopter.
It opens up headquarters, ground & air logistics in the operational depths to artificial intelligence aided FPV drone attacks.
This is the main example of one of the most unprofessional delusions held by the US Navalist wing of the F-35 Big/Expensive/Few platform and missile cult.
Russian fiber optic FPV's have a range of 50km - over the horizon!
Drones simply don't have ground line of sight issues like soldiers do.
Drones can see in more of the electromagnetic spectrum than humans.
And the US Army refuses to buy enough small drones (1 m +) to train their troops to survive on the drone dominated battlefield.🤢🤮
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"Just send a drone" is the proper tactic for almost everything a 21st century infantryman does from patrolling, raiding enemy positions, sniping and setting up forward observation posts.
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