When you look at a US Army MLRS or HIMARS launcher.
You see containerized pod six-packs with cranes built into the launcher and in the trucks that pick up & deliver them.
You see a persistent use of capital to replace labor for increased productivity per unit time.
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And please carefully note, this emphasis in the US Army predates Frederick Taylor's four principles of Scientific Management.
The M1819 Hall rifle & carbines built with interchangeable, mass produced, parts vastly reduced the number of trained artisans needed to build & 3/
...maintain its firearms.
The reason for the crane on the Uragan BM-27 & Smerch BM-30 reload trucks is their rockets were individually too darned big for a group of minimally trained & hungover conscripts move without damaging both the rocket & themselves. 4/
An apples to apples comparison of the US MLRS or HIMARS to the Smerch shows advantages for the US launchers.
1. Less manpower per launcher w/o a specialized reload vehicle 2. Faster reload time per launcher 3. More rockets can be fired per US Army MLRS or HIMARS per day. 5/
4. And all these labor saving devices built into MLRS & HIMARS launchers are easily trained at low risk.
The Twelve 300mm Smerch rockets need to be individually fused & armed. As does the 40 rockets of a 122mm rocket launcher. 6/
The US MLRS/HIMARS pod is factory loaded & sealed with all the fusing & arming being automated & remotely set via cab fire control computer.
Any US Army truck with a crane can lay out the pods for launchers to reload. No special rocket reload trucks are required. 7/
The US Army has always been short of people. The American Frontier & Congressional dislike of standing a standing army saw to that from the Revolution to WW2. 8/
WW2 conscription wasn't the answer to US Army manpower dreams. The USAAF & US Navy grabbed many of the best men and the needs of world wide logistics meant the US Army hit the wall of expansion in late 1942.
Mechanized logistics was the only way to move the mountains of 9/
supplies needed world wide.
And not just for itself, but for all the United Nations including Russia. 10/
In contrast, the Russian Army in all its incarnations until the late 1990's always acted as if "There's more conscripts where that came from, comrade."
While the nostalgia for the Red Army the Putin Regime had blinded it to the demographic realities 11/
...that the 21st Century Russian Army lacked the White Russian & Ukrainian manpower to replicate the Red Army.
The mechanized logistics pioneered in the West was simply applied to logistical issues beyond the capabilities of a mass of ill-trained conscripts. 12/
The fact that it took the Ukraine War for this gap in Russian logistical capability to be really NOTICED, let alone analyzed.
There has never been a real attempt at a comparative social history between the Russian and other Armies logistics.
The additional accumulated damage - beyond revisits to already damaged refineries - to the Russian power grid and POL supply chain in the next two months may speed this up to four months, to late November 2026, AKA just in Time for the US elections.
Russia lost 83 power 2/7
...sub-stations since 1 July 2026 in occupied Ukraine.
Russia will have to strip its own unique power grid to replace these losses, shutting down supply in "less significant" parts of Russia.
This 2023 post is where I posed the question of how large Russian riverine/littoral/brown water logistical efforts were to support Russian occupation forces in southern Ukraine. 3/
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."
We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵
The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.
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The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the slaughter of 12 ships of a 16 ship Imperial Japanese convoy of eight IJA freighters and eight IJN destroyers moving 6,900 IJA troops.
Tipped off by IJN seaplane deployments & radio intercepts, only 2,700 IJA troops arrived w/o weapons or ammo.
3/
I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:
"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:
Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
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2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).