When you look at a US Army MLRS or HIMARS launcher.
You see containerized pod six-packs with cranes built into the launcher and in the trucks that pick up & deliver them.
You see a persistent use of capital to replace labor for increased productivity per unit time.
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And please carefully note, this emphasis in the US Army predates Frederick Taylor's four principles of Scientific Management.
The M1819 Hall rifle & carbines built with interchangeable, mass produced, parts vastly reduced the number of trained artisans needed to build & 3/
...maintain its firearms.
The reason for the crane on the Uragan BM-27 & Smerch BM-30 reload trucks is their rockets were individually too darned big for a group of minimally trained & hungover conscripts move without damaging both the rocket & themselves. 4/
An apples to apples comparison of the US MLRS or HIMARS to the Smerch shows advantages for the US launchers.
1. Less manpower per launcher w/o a specialized reload vehicle 2. Faster reload time per launcher 3. More rockets can be fired per US Army MLRS or HIMARS per day. 5/
4. And all these labor saving devices built into MLRS & HIMARS launchers are easily trained at low risk.
The Twelve 300mm Smerch rockets need to be individually fused & armed. As does the 40 rockets of a 122mm rocket launcher. 6/
The US MLRS/HIMARS pod is factory loaded & sealed with all the fusing & arming being automated & remotely set via cab fire control computer.
Any US Army truck with a crane can lay out the pods for launchers to reload. No special rocket reload trucks are required. 7/
The US Army has always been short of people. The American Frontier & Congressional dislike of standing a standing army saw to that from the Revolution to WW2. 8/
WW2 conscription wasn't the answer to US Army manpower dreams. The USAAF & US Navy grabbed many of the best men and the needs of world wide logistics meant the US Army hit the wall of expansion in late 1942.
Mechanized logistics was the only way to move the mountains of 9/
supplies needed world wide.
And not just for itself, but for all the United Nations including Russia. 10/
In contrast, the Russian Army in all its incarnations until the late 1990's always acted as if "There's more conscripts where that came from, comrade."
While the nostalgia for the Red Army the Putin Regime had blinded it to the demographic realities 11/
...that the 21st Century Russian Army lacked the White Russian & Ukrainian manpower to replicate the Red Army.
The mechanized logistics pioneered in the West was simply applied to logistical issues beyond the capabilities of a mass of ill-trained conscripts. 12/
The fact that it took the Ukraine War for this gap in Russian logistical capability to be really NOTICED, let alone analyzed.
There has never been a real attempt at a comparative social history between the Russian and other Armies logistics.
It turned out the Russians refusal to use artillery on Ukrainian counter-attacks at Izyum had to do with a large set piece artillery barrage the Russians had planned to open their Donbas offensive across the entire front.
The logic chain of that thread fell apart on that point.
It also helped I had been tipped off about coming a coming article saying there was a Russian shortage in 160mm & 240mm mortar ammo because of the heavy use of those calibers in Syrian cities.
An Excalibur can be programed to land within 150 meters of friendly troops and has a multi-function fuze that can be programmed to explode in the air, once it hits a hard surface, or after it penetrates inside a target.
And the Excalibur projectile is compatible with the following 155mm guns
British AS-90 SPG,
Swedish Archer Artillery System,
South African G6 howitzer,
United States M198,
M777 Lightweight & M109A6 Paladin SP 155 mm howitzers, &
the German Panzerhaubitze 2000.
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Since most people are not old enough to remember. The meme shown below is normal for the US military procurement system.
Peacetime & wartime US procurement has this two faced Janus-like property. It will take years in peacetime & ordnance appears in weeks during a war.🧵 1/
The Phoenix Ghost is a quad-copter mixed with a winged lifting body with five cameras in several spectra that is radio-silent and can systematically map an area for up to six hours.
The story of the Desert Storm era GBU-28 5,000-pound (2,268 kg) class laser-guided "bunker busting" bomb is similar.
To get Iraqi bunkers too deep for 2000lb bombs, the Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York converted an 8-inch artillery gun barrel from deactivated...
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Russian combat & operational attrition of its tactical trucks has to be huge such that we are seeing Russian civilian vehicles in lieu of tactical trucks Mariupol.
There are huge economic implications here for the Russian economy.
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Civilian trucks taken from Russia & killed in Ukraine will not be there for the Russian economy.
Most Russian civilian trucks going to Ukraine simply won't be coming back because necessary spare parts are not in the Russian supply system.
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"However, Ukraine has no effective options to counter a prolonged Russian artillery offensive. This should trouble those who want to see Ukraine prevail as Russia can rely upon an extensive supply of artillery platforms and munitions that it...
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I simply didn't expect the LNR, DNR, & Russian Merc low standards of combat effectiveness to be the entire Russian Army level including the Regime Security units.
It isn't hard to run a truck around a motor pool once a month to see that they don't get sun bleached to death.
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Yet the Russian Army let that happen to $15 million anti-aircraft missile complexes.