It turned out the Russians refusal to use artillery on Ukrainian counter-attacks at Izyum had to do with a large set piece artillery barrage the Russians had planned to open their Donbas offensive across the entire front.
The logic chain of that thread fell apart on that point.
It also helped I had been tipped off about coming a coming article saying there was a Russian shortage in 160mm & 240mm mortar ammo because of the heavy use of those calibers in Syrian cities.
The article's...
3/
... publication was put off by the start of the Russian Donbas offensive.
You can now file this under "Trent Telenko can be wrong."
There were additional factors besides those two points that gave me a context to reach that conclusion.
4/
Back in late 2014 I joined a Ukrainian diaspora email list covering the Donbas war. At the time I was studying the 1945 artillery battle at Okinawa.
Weirdness popped out immediately looking at the artillery rocket impact pattern in Kramatorsk
The key to the map
o Green UXO duds,
o Red KIA/WIA
o Blue exploded, no casualties
Most of the rockets overshot the airfield.
Seven out of 41 rockets UXO is an 18% dud rate. 6/
This dud rate is better than the oldest Ex-Soviet stuff seen in Afghanistan (~30%), but not the less than 5% rate of duds seen in older Western ammo.
Acronyms:
UXO - unexploded ordnance
KIA - Killed in action
WIA - Wounded in action.
7/
A shell fuze is an explosive train from smaller to largest of a primer, a detonator and a booster charge meant to set off the main bursting charge of a shell
The photo clip to the right is from a youtube WW2 US Army training film
Note: Fuze =/= Fuse
8/
Generally, as artillery fuzes age, they get less reliable. This is because the chemicals in the Fuze's primer are the most unstable & subject to degrading over time.
Artillery ammunition of all sorts has a life span.
...over time as hot/cold cycles, humidity & trace contamination causes crystallization.
An 18% dud rate on Smerch rockets is a symptom of the aging of the primer in the rocket fuze, AKA a time expired munition.
10/
There were other indications of "time-ex" Russian artillery rocket munitions from the 2015 122mm Grad rocketing of Mariupol.
As rocket propellent ages, it generates marginally & unpredictably less thrust.
Mariupol's 'short' rocketing in the figure right below suggests that
11/
...happened in 2015.
US military practice is to treat solid rocket motors as a 10 year storage item requiring inspect/replace in a missile/rocket midlife depot level refresh
Demilitarizing artillery rockets & shells is an utter pain as it requires EPA regulatory permissions
12/
...for burning the explosives & propellants.
DCMA administers these 'demil' contracts, which is where much of the information I've related on 'time-ex' ammo came from.
Russia's wars in Chechnya & Syria and the 1980's Iraqi purchases of Soviet shells saw large amounts of 13/
Soviet Union's strategic reserve of artillery ammunition used up.
When the US Military overran Iraq in 2003. It found more artillery ammunition, mostly ex-Soviet, than in it's own war reserves.
These Iraqi munitions were destroyed in the US anti-IED campaign of 2004-2007.
14/
Now we get to the 1945 artillery fight at Okinawa.
The radar proximity "VT-Fuze" debuted for the first time in Pacific ground combat at Okinawa.
(I've posted a great deal about Okinawa, see below photos.) 15/
So what is this lack of Russian & Ukrainian airburst fuzing mean?
Good fuzing is expensive, requires high end manufacturing capability & quality control.
Russian artillery simply doesn't have either available.
See this time mortar fuze from Taiwan. 25/
The replacement of chemical percussion, mechanical, and electromechanical fuzing with pure electric-electronic fuzing for superior shell performance is a 21st Century trend Russia is ill prepared to follow.
Taiwan is just one example of this. 26/
This is a Romanian 120mm Mortar with PF-120 proximity fuze ARM shells.
Please carefully note the huge beaten ground caused by the shell fragments in the photo clips & video. 27/
The lack of Russian airburst shelling in Donbas utterly stands out when you look at the lay of the land after repeated shelling over time.
But the best way to upgrade Ukrainian artillery is going to be with NATO & other artillery fuzes to give Ukraine more airburst and other options versus Russia.
And the fuze that will help Ukraine the most is the ATK precision guidance kit fuzes for its incoming NATO 155mm
29/
The PGK turns ordinary 155mm shells into precision guided artillery projectiles (PGAP) at the cost of 10% of maximum range.
You can airlift 40 PGK for the weight of a single Excalibur guided artillery shell. 30/
The PGK requires minimal additional training to properly use and it will vastly reduce the required artillery shell tonnage for the same battlefield impact.
The only reason it cannot be used on current Ukrainian shells is they have the Russian 36mm fuze threads compared 31/
...to the 45mm used on NATO artillery shells.
So the UA would have to take 152mm and 203mm casings and machine out the threads to fit the PGK NATO fuse thread.
Ukraine has a plant in Sumy that manufactures 122mm, 152mm ammo, so this is not an unusual challenge for them.
32/
It is the little things in war that make all the difference.
Things like shell fuzes.
Why we have not seen the Western intelligence notice or Defense Departments & Defense Ministries to go there with upgrading Ukrainian artillery and mortar fuzes is a mystery...
33/
What is interesting for me is that the pre-2022 Western intelligence assessments of the Russian Army credited it with lots of tactical pipelines to move fuel.
Those would be far more useful in moving water than trucks...yet...where are they?
These pipelines seem to have fallen into that same logistical 'assume they exist but don't' black hole as Russian truck D-rings & pallets, tactical truck trailers, and Russia's "superior" tooth to tail ratio that acts more like 1863 Union Army where...
2/
..."every soldier is a logistical manual laborer when not in combat".
Water is heavy. Pipelines are more efficient that trucks. Yet all we are seeing is Russian water trucks?
Who stole the Russian Army tactical pipelines? Or were they nothing but disinformation?
3/3
While we are getting Western intelligence assessments that continue to point out Russia's vast increases in production of military materiel, especially tanks, IFVs and APCs (from the same people who claimed Russia would over run Ukraine in 3-to-5 days)
2/
...claiming Russia is "obviously winning."
We are at the same time seeing economic signs of Russian "End Run Production."
The Russian wartime economy is functioning hand to mouth with oil sales revenues because all of the foreign exchange reserves are spent or frozen.
3/
Given what happened to DoD procurement after the 2nd Clinton Adm. annihilation of military specifications, which killed the configuration mgt, systems engineering & production engineering disciplines in defense contractors.
I've written about this issue for seven years starting on the Chicagoboyz weblog with a post titled:
"The 737 MAX and the Death of MIL-STD-499A SYSTEM ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
March 24th, 2019"
2/
In 2020 I was talking how the decay of systems engineering skills are affecting US Navy nuclear sub safe programs due to the lack of good systems engineering talent in Defense contractors.
The snail like pace of Western military procurement versus the Ukrainian fielding of an all-aspect stealth shaped OWA drone in less than a couple of years is very noticeable.
On the morning of 20 July 2025, a AFGSC airman at Minot AFB took his M18, still inside it's issued holster; and placed it on a desk.
It then went off, struck him in chest, and killed him
AFGSC issued a halt order on 21 July 2025 for use of M17/18 Modular Handgun System.
1/
As an ex-DoD procurement official, that letter is a procurement killing hammer.
This is going to hit SIG Sauer like a moderate sized asteroid in terms of DCMA corrective actions requests or "CAR."
2/
This AFGSC halt use order letter will be grounds for a level three corrective action request (CAR).
A DCMA level III CAR is defined as follows:
"A Level III Corrective Action Request (CAR) issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is a serious action taken when there are significant contractual nonconformities.
It is directed to the supplier's top management and is just one step below the possibility of contract suspension or termination.
This type of CAR serves as a management tool to address critical issues that need immediate attention."
During WW2's combined bomber offensive, unitary incendiary bombs were found to be five times as effective as high explosive, mass for mass, at destroying buildings & structures.
But the bomber barons were hung up on the tonnage delivered, not their effects.
A single 100lb M47 bomb (left) was as effective as a M65 500lb general purpose HE bomb.
The Bomber Mafia in ETO fought incendiaries, as their bombers lacked the bomb station multiple release modifications for most of WW2, as the mass of bombs dropped was a 'success metric.'
2/
After the bomber barons -finally- surrendered to the realty of incendiaries operational effectiveness.
Avoiding any USAAF responsibility for the horror that was Dresden cemented the burying of the effectiveness of USAAF firebombs used in the ETO.