After I posted the artillery logistics thread,🧵 I visited a Twitter space and it was pointed out that the Russian Army wouldn't necessarily use airburst shelling in urban area.
The Russian Army had really some good reasons to do so, like this👇👇 1/
This brings up an important point about modern intelligence analysis.
Just because you might have a both good & correct explanation for the Russians not using airburst artillery to clear roof tops of Ukrainian missile teams like:
"Russia can't do combined arms."
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Doesn't rule out other good & correct explanations at the same time.
"Russia can't do combined arms." can be joined with all of the following:
o Russia can't produce airburst fuzes
o Russian soldiers aren't trained to use airburst artillery
o Russian logistics didn't bring airburst fuzes
o Russian airburst fuzes don't work
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Each of those good & correct explanations have different fault trees leading into different parts of the Russian military system.
Jumping at "Russia can't do combined arms" as the "One True Shiny Thing" precludes exploring all other fault trees.
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This "Shiney Thing, Not Everything" analysis of intelligence is the heart of the "Directed Cognition" error leading to that infamous Pentagon '96 hours Ukraine will fall to Russia' computer model.'
Artificially closing you mind to all the other possibilities which may be
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...simultaneously true blinds the intelligence analyst to wider & more important truths.
The "Russia can't do combined arms" only worldview simply won't let you see the endemic corruption of the Russian Gangster Kleptocracy that following all the other fault trees
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...to their logical conclusions & then comparing notes on them would do.
The "It's a lower collection priority" is an excuse, not a reality.
Somehow, for 80-years, the manual labor centric Russian artillery logistics system never made it to the consciousness of Western
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...military intelligence in February 2022.
This despite people like US Army officer Ralph Peters writing a very successful popular fiction book on the Red Army called "RED ARMY" in 1989 pointing out that exact fact.
The reality of "Directed Cognition" in Western professional intelligence is the "direction" comes from political leaders indicating what it is they want to hear.
Then you see the senior intelligence officials playing 'client' to their political 'patron' via bending their
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...organizations resources & promotion incentives to 'approved narratives' at the expense of a "stare you in the eyes and slap your face with a fresh caught salmon" truth.
This was how we got 80 years of missing Russian Army manual labor logistics and now not seeing gaps in
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...Russian Army Artillery capability, specifically the lack of airburst artillery, after two months of combat.
When political leadership wants narrative and not intelligence.
Mirror imaging & group think simply fills in the data where the narrative says not to look.
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It turned out the Russians refusal to use artillery on Ukrainian counter-attacks at Izyum had to do with a large set piece artillery barrage the Russians had planned to open their Donbas offensive across the entire front.
The logic chain of that thread fell apart on that point.
It also helped I had been tipped off about coming a coming article saying there was a Russian shortage in 160mm & 240mm mortar ammo because of the heavy use of those calibers in Syrian cities.
An Excalibur can be programed to land within 150 meters of friendly troops and has a multi-function fuze that can be programmed to explode in the air, once it hits a hard surface, or after it penetrates inside a target.
And the Excalibur projectile is compatible with the following 155mm guns
British AS-90 SPG,
Swedish Archer Artillery System,
South African G6 howitzer,
United States M198,
M777 Lightweight & M109A6 Paladin SP 155 mm howitzers, &
the German Panzerhaubitze 2000.
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Since most people are not old enough to remember. The meme shown below is normal for the US military procurement system.
Peacetime & wartime US procurement has this two faced Janus-like property. It will take years in peacetime & ordnance appears in weeks during a war.🧵 1/
The Phoenix Ghost is a quad-copter mixed with a winged lifting body with five cameras in several spectra that is radio-silent and can systematically map an area for up to six hours.
The story of the Desert Storm era GBU-28 5,000-pound (2,268 kg) class laser-guided "bunker busting" bomb is similar.
To get Iraqi bunkers too deep for 2000lb bombs, the Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York converted an 8-inch artillery gun barrel from deactivated...
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Russian combat & operational attrition of its tactical trucks has to be huge such that we are seeing Russian civilian vehicles in lieu of tactical trucks Mariupol.
There are huge economic implications here for the Russian economy.
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Civilian trucks taken from Russia & killed in Ukraine will not be there for the Russian economy.
Most Russian civilian trucks going to Ukraine simply won't be coming back because necessary spare parts are not in the Russian supply system.
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