What is the Russian "Party of War" like?
Who are the hawks of Russian elite and why do they push for more escalation? What motives them?
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Russian elite could be divided into three groups: the largest group "party of silence", a tiny "party of peace" - a number of Yeltsin-era oligarchs like Roman Abramovich, Oleg Deripaska, Mikhail Fridman and Vladimir Lisin and the most visible "party of war"
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Key figures of the party of war are: Ramzan #Kadyrov, Dmitry #Medvedev, Vyacheslav #Volodin, Dmitry #Rogozin, Andrey #Turchak, Alexei #Gromov and a few other.
This groups has no hierarchy, they are often act
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autonomously and at times are in conflict with each other; but they all push the same message and want to be heard by key listener - Vladimir Putin.
All of them have reached ceiling in their careers; they stopped climbing the ladder at some point and moved only horizontally.
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But they all have ambition to move further up, they have "nothing to lose" but only to gain from this war.
If war escalates, Putin will need to rely on them to help manage the system;
If the war stops because Russian army can't move further they won't suffer either;
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What is even more interesting - even if Putin dies tomorrow - Russian "Party of War" will have a chance to move up and gain from the moment. They can't lose.
What are their individual interest and motivations?
Read this Andrey Pertsev for @RiddleRussia ridl.io/en/what-is-the…
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Speculative thread on Russian military communication.
Why announce plans to create a land bridge to #Transnistria while most of your forces are not even there and are clearly set to encircle UA troops in around Kramatorsk area? Divert attention from where you actually attack?
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Everyone has jumped to discussing Russian "imminent" attack on "Odesa and Moldova" while just a couple of weeks ago Russian army has proved that it is incapable of doing just that. It can't fight multiple fronts at once. It has to regroup and attempt to take one at the max.
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Moreover, it kind of sounds dumb to announce exactly where you going to attack next BEFORE you've dealt with Ukrainian resistance in Donbas.
It seems clear that Russia has to change tactics from early March and thus would not be doing the same dance twice.
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Something about how persecution of Russian civil society works. Recently there was a publication about "British network of influence in Russia" in a freshly created "media" that looks a bit more complex then Prigozhin dumps.
A material is based on stolen documents of Moscow
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School of Political Studies seminars in Oxford for media. These documents could have been hacked
either from a participant or from someone within the organization.
What is curious though that whoever processed those documents added facts of biographies/data that
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either could have not been in those documents or are fake. For instance, @IrisovaOlga who was a speaker has few lines of bio added/links to profiles she doesn't have. And I was labelled as someone working for Navalny's now "illegal" organization FBK.
Naturally, the tone of
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Because of my dissertation I read a lot of Russian foreign policy writing. I think I would be ready to program an algorithm to write those texts pretty soon now. Especially when dealing with "world order".
A few simple steps for the most generic text:
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DOs 1. Assert the world order is changing/unipolar moment is gone/multipolarity is coming. 2. West is on historic decline/Asia is on the rise (mention China and India). 3. Proclaim that some new integration is due/old one boosted - BRICS, Greater Eurasia, Eurasian Union+
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4. Crucial point - this new world order desperately needs Russia (energy/security/diplomacy). 5. This new configuration is better because is it going to be more just/fair/balanced (if you're hip - you could mention western colonialism legacy here)
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The quest to define "what has just happened" and "why it is a new beginning for us" by Russian foreign policy community is on the rise.
Here is a take by Dmitry Trenin, following the lead of Fyodor Lukyanov.
I'll help translate/interpret his key points. Thread
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Thesis 1: this is not about Ukraine. This is a story of the changing world order, shifting power from the West to China/India and other non-Western world.
Thesis 2: With this war Russia has ended it's 300 year attempt to become part of Europe. But this Europe, he says was
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more a community of the West and Russia does not belong to it (mostly)
Thesis 3: Russia is a civilization of its own - European East/Orthodox East - along with Belarus, Serbia and Donbas, we are the heirs of Byzantine.
Thesis 4: Russia is not just a former European Empire.
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Over the course of last week we've seen media reports and statements from Russian officials that indicate that:
Russia is ready to drop "denazification" but it is the still the purpose of war;
It was about Donbas all along but Russia's bringing more troops to the war theater
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Russia is recognizing Zelesnky as the sovereign leader of Ukraine and that Ukraine is governed by a Nazi junta;
The negotiations are progressing but nothing of first importance is getting agreed upon.
There are at least several reasons for this ambiguity -
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A number of people that actually know what Russia's policy towards Ukraine now is is close to zero. Even Putin might have not decided what to do and is considering multiple options.
Several of Russian policy makers are attempting to get the most favorable outcomes for
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How does Russia foreign policy expert discourse evolve a month into this war?
"After this war is over it will lead to a more stable security system based on mutual animosity.
Now they fear us - it is as good as respect"
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Thesis one: prior to the war the West stopped believing that Russia would follow through on its threats. "Russia in decline" narrative began to take too much hold. By invading Ukraine we've proved that "we mean what we say". If they didn't fear us before, they fear us now.
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Thesis two: this war is West's fault and now we made them recognize that (Josep Borrell recognition that NATO expansion promise was a mistake). Thus now they would listen to us more cautiously. Time will pass and new geopolitical reality will take hold. Emotions will go
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