"We will outlast them"
Once again I see this sentiment in Russian foreign policy commentary, with the conflict in the Middle East taking attention away from Ukraine and UAF failing to achieve success in its counteroffensive, "hope has returned to Moscow"
1/7 The idea that Russia can outlast Ukraine, the West and Europe has been circulating since the start of this war. From dull "Russians can tolerate anything and sacrifice everything for the Victory" to belief that Western support would be shaken by economic cost and volume
2/7

Few stats and fact about Russian "war emigration" to 🇬🇪
In the first wave - from March 22 to June 22, nearly 280k Russian entered Georgia, of which 42.5k remained in the country.
Biggest single wave in Sep 21-30 of 22 (mobilization wave), 80k got in of which 18k stayed
1/6 There are three types of Russians who now reside in Georgia:
1. Committed anti-war activists, journalists and NGO folk - use Georgia as operation base, work both on Russia and help Ukraine (mostly war refugees).
2. Economic immigrants - who don't want to be mobilized
2/6

First time in 30 years Russia is no longer operating with trade surplus.
That trade surplus in dollars and euros built Putin's system - enriched the elites and provided benefits and payments to most Russians.
1.5 years into this war it seems to be gone for good. How come?
1/10 What was shaking Russia's economy in the past: wars, protests? Not that much - biggest challenges came because of international economic problems in in 1998, 2009 and 2016.
In all other periods Russian exports exceed imports by a lot:
$ 45.7 billion in 1997−2001
2/10

Thread 1/9
What is happening with Russian political #immigration 1.5 years into the war? Where they are, what they do, how do they support, who do they donate to?
Few points based on a study with over 6,000 respondents 1. Lowest estimate of Russians that left since February of 2022 is 700k but could be up to 1 million.
2. Two biggest hubs of new emigration are Kazakhstan and Serbia. Entire EU received less immigrants than Israel (with around 47k)
2/9

A Russian case for using nuclear arms in Ukraine (and elsewhere in the West)
Karaganov in his latest article outlines Russia's mid-term strategy recommendations for stopping the West from wanting to support Ukraine
Thread 1/12 Karaganov claims that even a complete military victory of Russia in Ukraine won't prevent escalation of larger Russia - West confrontation.
He claims a minimal victory for Russia is "liberation" of territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.
2/12

What does it mean to oppose the war in Ukraine for Russians? Is it to wish Russia to be defeated in Ukraine? Is it to wish collapse of the state?
Does the support of the war mean that Russians endorse actual warfare or they just fear the defeat?
Thread 1/17 From the start - full disclosure, we can't give undisputed figures or claim there can't be surprises that various polls, studies and journalist investigations miss altogether.
But generally speaking it would seem that we have about 10%-15% of Russians that see the war
2/17

Wow. Russian MOD published a report on mobilisation in Russia and deleted it shortly after. But web archives still has it.
Key takeaways:
1/7

https://twitter.com/the_ins_ru/status/1664684480244613147

1. MOD was able to form 280 new unites with mobilized men.
2. Russian army is experiencing problems with "unpreparedness of part of society to perform military duties" and blames it on "the information pressure of the online blogging community"
2/7

Can Prigozhin have a political future in Russia? Can he unite the ultrapatriots and challenge Putin?
The short answer is: not likely at all.
Why?
1/11 Prigozhin has been highly critical of Russian MOD and arguably Putin himself. He is not the only one - another highly critical Russian combatant - Igor Strelkov/Girkin is no less critical.
Same as a group of various pro-war reporters and bloggers.
What kind of public
2/11

Highly speculative post about rumors on 🇷🇺🇺🇦peace negotiations configuration.
Yesterday one of Russia's chief propagandists Margarita Simoniyan proposed to "allow" Russia's frozen $300bln to be given to Ukraine as payment for territories that want to be with Russia or
Thread 1/8 as part of Russia's reparations for damages done during the war depending on where you sit.
There is a speculation that she's not just making this up - as the stuff she usually makes up is uber-patriotic and not about bargaining. What she refers to is allegedly discussed
2/8

How did Russian sinologists, foreign policy and military experts view the results of Xi's visit to Moscow?
I've looked into couple of dozen of expert articles and here are some main ideas.
In short: they've seen a lot.
Thread 1/8 For international observes it was mostly one-way with Russia accepting China's leadership/domination(@samagreene). Becoming vassal of China(@AlexGabuev) or simply Putin not getting what he wanted(@zakavkaza). Some like @IlyaMatveev_ argued it was Xi who is now dependent on
2/8

Why did Kremlin decide to invade Ukraine? Nearly a year since Russia's invasion this question continues to puzzle journalists and researchers alike. Especially given how this war is going.
Is Putin mad is not a rhetorical question.
Few thoughts and observations.
THREAD 1/18 First of all whoever says he or she knows what Putin thought, felt or what kind of drug he was taking the morning he decided to invade Ukraine is likely lying or is crazy. But we do know that only tiny group within Russian elites knew of this decision before it was announced
2/18

Few observations about how the war in Ukraine is changing Moscow's relationship with Russian regions.
1. The so-called administrative decentralization started during Covid. Moscow gave regions more responsibilities - we see continuation of that since the first months
1/5 of war. However, regions don't get more power or money.
2. Moscow is especially careful not to allow horizontal collaboration between heads of regions to the point that even little politicizing is treated as "treason". The bottom line, heads of state care even less
2/5

How does Russian foreign policy expert discourse change since February of 2022?
For one, there are less people trying to give a wholesome picture. The ones that have doubts remain in their niche "professional areas" of interest - or write in riddles.
The ones that do, tend to
1/6 use a certain set of trope no matter the circumstances.
Here are a few of them:
1. Entire world order is in chaos, we're witnessing "geopolitical earthquake". So it's not only about Russia-Ukraine; its all of the world.
2. Increase use of "value argument". Russia cuts ties
2/6

Will Russian oil survive under western embargo? Can Russia redirect 'most' of its energy exports to Asia and the South? Can cheap energy domestically help Russian economy?
Thread 1/8 For the first time in Russia's recent history we have mostly politically driven oil price reduction.
Urals prices plummeted from $ 75/barrel in November to $42 in December while Brent was priced almost twice as high.
So far, officially Russia expects about 8 trillion
2/8

Dmitry Trenin (former Carnegie Moscow head) recently published a short "Russia foreign policy in 2023" piece.
I have to say, I mostly agree with everything he has outlined as key areas of interest.
Few observations.
1/10 First of all, he claims that war in Ukraine will intensify and run the entire 2023 but this year will certainly define how this conflict ends.
I also agree with his claim that this year will further ensure EU's separation from Russia on all fronts
2/10

Alexei Kudrin, finance minister of the year(2010), Bolotnaya protestor for free elections, a guy who gave Putin a sofa for a few days in the 1990s is now switching jobs from being head of Audit Chamber to be the guy behind Russian Google. Why? Because Putin asked him to
1/8 Over the course of the past week, we've seen various comments regarding Kudrin's new job: from assumptions that this is the end of his path to theories that Putin will use him as a sparring partner for 2024 election or even that Kudrin will lead a new liberal spoiler party
2/8

Russia, opposition and "Marshall Plan for post-Putin Russia".
This seems like one of those big topics that get people going nuts on twitter. "How dare they".
I remember this idea going around as early as 2011 but there was always a big catch
Thread 1/10 First of all, we have to acknowledge that much of Russian pro-reform internal discussions now might sound as if we're still in pre-Feb 24 I get why outsiders let alone Ukrainians get furious over the idea of "some Russians asking for money while other Russians are killing"
2/10

Pertsev here details the short history of #Telegram and how Russia's war in Ukraine gave it second life.
Key takeaways:
Telegram is now the face of Russia's "party of war", many of most popular pro-war channels are affiliated with Prigozhin and other key "warlords"
1/6 They are the voice of hardliners and are given a pass to comment on all of the events without any filters - thus those channels are read by everyone cause they often give the most accurate report of the war.
Moreover, some telegram channels post are printed out for Putin
2/6

There is a very sensitive issue of dominating narratives that exists now - one is "Russia's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine and Ukraine's defense against a dictatorship that seeks to destroy its state and identity; an imperial Muscovy quest with 17th cen undertones"
1/17 Any attempt to challenge it with "Soviet legacy - multipolarity - NATO expansion" is to deny Ukraine agency and recognize de-facto that Russia has a right for what Putin calls "Russia's historic lands". These narratives are good for academic discussion, not for a policy one
2/17

Putin is ready to mobilize 300k now and another 300k later. This doesn't seem to be a matter of much risk for him given so far the domestic reaction (as long as not all of them come back dead).
Russian leadership still looks at Ukrainian consolidation realities as secondary
1/9 Clearly betting on the fact that no matter how many Ukrainians would be ready to fight if the state runs out of money and rockets, there would be no more Ukrainian advances.
So, Putin counts once again to make EU/US to run out of desire to spend billions on supporting
2/9

Pertsevian resolution on what this war has taught us about Putin's Russia - specifically on the myths that were created by Russia, Russians and the outside world. There are 5 big ones and Putin is demolishing all of them.
Thread 1/8 The first and most obvious one is the mighty army, "second army of world", "Europe's strongest". We have to acknowledge - it looked good on video and on drills that Shoigu was conducting especially vigorously since 2018.
The miscalculation here was in big part to revelation
2/8