Thread by @MarkHertling

A few folks suggested I've been "bold" in some of my predictions accompanying the analysis I've provided on @CNN regarding this conflict.

Beyond tactical assessments, there are 2 primary reasons I've said Ukraine would win this fight.

Here's a short 🧵 on why I say this. 1/17

Reason 1:

Conventional joint & combined arms operations are hard. Real hard. Exceedingly hard.

Coordinating actions of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, air support, naval opns, amphibious landings, special opns & logistics support is tough. 2/

Doing so takes intense training of individuals in their specific skills, exercises that build the capabilities of interprofessional teams who pull theose skills together, the understanding of complex equipment & doctrine, communicating intent...and great leadership. 3/

It also takes a vision, planning, exercises, and supervised execution using a transformational (versus transactional) leadership approach.All this takes time, determination, & repetitious training.

But all of this develops develops teamwork, trust, loyalty, & camaraderie.

4/

Good militaries understand all this, and good military leaders ensure it happens. Nations rely on leaders to ensure this exists for when the nation is threatened.

Less-than-good militaries put conscripts under arms, field equipment with inherent faults & allow corruption. 5/

Any good military (or former military) leader can see all these things when assessing militaries. It's not that hard if one has experience "in the arena."

But the 2d reason I've been bold is because I had the chance to see how seemingly small things contribute to big failure.6/

Two vignettes:

Right after giving up command of Tank Brigade as a young colonel, I was assigned as the Commander of the Operations Group (COG, @OPSGRP_NTC) at our Army's National Training Center (NTC, @NTC_UPDATE)

At the NTC, we trained large units to prepare for combat. 7/

As a Brigade Commander, I thought I was pretty good. But in training other Brigades, I realized just how much I didn't know.

When units train at the NTC (and our other training sites), they fight mock battles against a tough opposing force for a couple of weeks. 8/

Every 24-48 hours, there's a "pause" in the operations with an "after action review" (AAR) showing the good & bad things the unit's doing.

Good units polish their good things, fix their bad things, and the battle resumes.

After 3 weeks units & their leaders are darned good. 9/

Not-so-good units don't accept critiques, don't fix broken processes, repeatedly allow small issues to turn into big problems, and don't reflect on their own leadership failures.

After a few months on the Ops Group team, anyone can quickly tell good from bad units. 10/

Beyond differentiating from good & bad units, or how tactics should be applied in successful maneuvers, the NTC Ops Group teams can almost always predict the results of any of the "mock battles" that are part of the scenario, before they even take place. 11/

A few years after serving at the NTC, and after a combat tour, I was assigned as a new Brigadier General to command the Army's European training center at Grafenwoehr Germany.

They have a center similar to NTC, called the Joint Multinational Training Center @HohenfelsJMRC 12/

There, US & their allies train young soldiers, develop sergeants as leaders, exercise large formations in combined arms operations at the small unit level.

UA trained there & soon had their own training center at Yavoriv (@JMTG_Ukraine)

UA had great soldiers & good units.13/

The few times I observed the RU army in training & exercises, or talked to their leaders, they didn't seem to be "good units."

Comparing the 2 armies-even w/ seemingly different quantity of equipment-the expectations seemed obvious. 14/

The "next phase" of this illegal invasion will soon play out in E & S Ukraine.

The already exhibited RU organizational issues-lack of manpower in regenerated units, poor equipment, dysfunctional logistics, horrible leadership & low soldier morale-will only grow. 15/

The UA will face challenges, too. Large scale conventional combined arms operations are even more difficult than less grand tactical fights we've seen so far.

Managing logistics across long spaces & incorporation of new, western-provided equipment will also prove challenging.16/

But I'll again be bold in saying Ukraine will persevere.

I hope that isn't seen as hubris, it's just an assessment based on my bias about who will best face the challenges of combined arms warfare & which is the learning Army.

@SecDef implied the same thing yesterday. 17/17