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Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 29

"I didn't break my oath. I swore to the Soviet Union — and Russia is its successor..."

Male. 59. Kyiv. Distributed Russian propaganda. Active in closed pro-russian online communities. This man lived among Ukrainians in 2024 — and was actively working against them.

Ukraine just presented the most forensically detailed portrait of who collaborators are. Every country bordering Russia needs to read key findings from this study.
🧵👇
#Ukraine #UAF #HybridWarfare

1/5

"I was well recruited. I only understood what happened when I was already in prison and read my own messages from the outside..."

Female. 37. Saleswoman. Odesa. Chatted in messengers with an FSB officer. Passed data on military movements through the city.

She wasn't a spy. She wasn't ideological. She was recruited so smoothly she didn't notice it happening.
That is precisely the point. Russia doesn't need fanatics. It needs ordinary people with an unguarded moment and an open phone.

#Ukraine #HybridWarfare #Disinformation

2/5

579 people are currently serving sentences in Ukraine for collaboration with the enemy.

Ukraine's Penitentiary Academy surveyed 100 convicted collaborators — 30 case files, 20 in-depth interviews, a control group of 50 ordinary citizens.

The analytical picture is sobering:
→ ~90% held Ukrainian citizenship
→ 72% male, average age 42–44
→ 82%+ had no higher education
→ ~70% were unemployed before arrest
→ Cases concentrated in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson — but researchers are explicit: collaboration has no fixed regional address.

The common denominator is not geography. It is a specific psychological profile: weak civic identity, low critical thinking, and decades of Russian narrative absorbed without resistance.
That profile exists in every post-Soviet society. Not just Ukraine.

#Ukraine #HybridWarfare #StopRussianAggression

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Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 29

🇸🇪🇺🇦 Putin wanted Sweden outside NATO. Today Sweden is sending Ukraine 36 fighter jets. The map keeps changing in the wrong direction for Moscow.

On May 28, leaders Volodymyr Zelensky @ZelenskyyUa and Ulf Kristersson @SwedishPM announced the agreement at Uppsala Air Base.

The terms:
— 16 Gripen C/D fighters transferred as bilateral aid
— Up to 20 Gripen E/F fighters to be purchased by Ukraine for €2.5 billion from the EU's Ukraine Support Loan
— First aircraft to arrive within the next 10 months
— Ukrainian pilots and technicians are already training on the platform

This is a serious combat air force, on a serious timeline.

Former Swedish Air Force pilot Jussi Halmetoja, with over 2,300 flight hours across 25 aircraft types including the Gripen, explained the platform's unique advantages to United24 @United24media.

Here's why Gripen — and why now. 🧵👇

1/5 — The missile that changes the geometry

The Gripen carries the European Meteor air-to-air missile — a weapon with a ramjet engine that keeps burning throughout flight, unlike conventional missiles whose starter engines stop once fuel is exhausted.

"You get significantly higher speed, significantly greater range, and significantly higher probability of interception," Halmetoja explained.

Effective range: 150–200 kilometres. That single capability changes the threat picture for every Russian aircraft operating along Ukraine's border.

The full weapons suite is broader still: the RBS-15 anti-ship missile (300 km range), short-range air-to-air weapons (25–40 km), and air-to-ground precision munitions. One platform. Three combat domains. Switchable in flight with a single button.

2/5 — Operates without infrastructure (this is the key)

This may be the single most important feature for Ukraine.

Gripen was designed during the Cold War to fight from dispersed locations across Sweden if Soviet missiles destroyed the air bases. The operational concept is exactly what Ukraine needs in 2026.

— Can take off and land on ordinary highways. No other fighter currently in production can do this.
— Refuel and rearm: 4–5 people, 10–15 minutes. The F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter require three to four times longer.
— Scramble time from a combat order: 5 minutes. If the pilot is already in the cockpit — under 1 minute.
Halmetoja on the operating environment:

"They work in snow, in mud, in cold, in rain, in darkness, under a tree, on a base, anywhere. You can use this aircraft day after day, week after week, and continue combat operations."

Russia targets Ukrainian airbases relentlessly. An aircraft that can operate from highways, with minimal support crews, and rearm in 15 minutes — is an aircraft that survives where others wouldn't.

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Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 25

The deep rear is gone. The middle is ow Ukraine’s hunting ground.

You've heard about FPV drones hitting Russian trenches. You've heard about deep strikes on Moscow refineries. There's a third category in between that is quietly becoming a game-changer — and it's reshaping how Ukraine dominates the war.

Here's what "middle-strike" means and why it matters. 🧵👇

1/8 — The missing middle of the battlefield

Most coverage of Ukraine's drone war focuses on two extremes.
At the tactical level: FPV drones, which transformed the front line, hunting targets within a few kilometres.
At the strategic level: deep-strike drones and missiles, which hit Russian refineries, airfields, and infrastructure hundreds or thousands of kilometres inside Russia.

Between them sat a gap. Middle-strike fills it — strike drones operating at operational depth, roughly 30 to 200 km from the front line.

This is the depth where Russia keeps much of the critical infrastructure that sustains its offensive: ammunition depots, command posts, supply routes, air defence systems, radars, and drone control points.

2/8 — Why this depth is decisive

Hitting targets at 30–200 km destroys something more valuable than any single vehicle: it destroys Russia's ability to function.

When Ukraine strikes ammunition depots, command posts, and supply routes at operational depth, it breaks the Russian army's ability to quickly move resources and sustain offensive operations.

An army cannot attack what it cannot supply. It cannot coordinate what it cannot command. Middle-strike targets the connective tissue between Russia's strategic rear and its front-line forces — and severing that tissue degrades everything downstream.

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Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 23

Russia turned occupied Starobilsk into a military hub. Now it hides behind the “civilians” it trapped there.

Russia says Ukraine struck “civilian infrastructure” in occupied Starobilsk. The story dominating Russian media this week leaves out one detail: what Starobilsk actually is.

Here is the full picture for anyone trying to understand what really happened.
🧵👇

1/8 — What set off the Russian campaign

For two days, the occupied town of Starobilsk has dominated Russian online media. The trigger: an aggressive Russian effort claiming Ukraine’s Defence Forces struck civilian objects there.

Putin and Russian propagandists revived their oldest refrain — the “Ukraine bombed Donbas for eight years” narrative they’ve recycled since 2014.

But there is a simple fact that has held true since 2014: Ukraine strikes only military infrastructure and objects used for military purposes. The Starobilsk story is no exception — and the details make that clear.

2/8 — What Ukraine actually hit

Ukraine’s General Staff @GeneralStaffUA confirmed that on the night of May 22, Ukrainian forces struck a series of Russian military targets near Starobilsk: an oil refinery, ammunition depots, air defence systems, command posts, enemy personnel — and one of the headquarters of the Russian unit “Rubicon.”

“Rubicon” is not a civilian organisation. It is a Russian military special unit officially named the “Centre for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.” Its operators regularly strike Ukrainian civilians and civilian objects.

In plain terms: Ukraine struck the headquarters of a Russian unit whose job is killing Ukrainian civilians with drones.

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Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 21

"The main gap Is no longer in ideas — it's in scaling." A Ukrainian DefTech expert explains where the real investment opportunity now lives.

Ukraine's defence-tech sector is the most dynamic in the world. The country has become what insiders call a "living polygon" for innovation. But more than four years into the full-scale war, the critical challenge has shifted — and what comes next determines whether Ukraine's wartime innovation becomes a long-term strategic asset.

Yana Shkvarovska — COO at @defencebuilder, one of Ukraine’s defence startup accelerators — spoke with ArmyInform about the structural state of Ukraine’s DefTech ecosystem.

Her assessment is essential reading for foreign defence specialists, investors and policymakers tracking where Ukraine’s defence innovation sector is heading.

🧵👇

1/8 — The new bottleneck: not ideas, but scaling

The most important insight from Shkvarovska’s interview is also the most counterintuitive for outside observers.

“By the fifth year of the full-scale war, we have to admit that the main gap is no longer a lack of ideas or technologies, but the ability to bring solutions to the level of systemic use.”

Ukraine has no shortage of innovative ideas. What it lacks — and what the international community most needs to help build — is the systemic infrastructure that can turn prototypes into reliably manufactured products that can be procured at scale, integrated into Defence Forces operations and exported to allies.

For investors, this is the inflection point. Ukrainian DefTech is no longer primarily a venture funding problem. It is an institutional infrastructure problem.

The companies that will shape the next decade of European defence are being built right now — and the ecosystem helping them mature is itself strategically important to understand.

2/8 — What the military actually asks for

Shkvarovska is specific about what Ukrainian military units are looking for in 2026 — and her assessment should be required reading for any DefTech founder.

“Military personnel formulate highly specific requests. They do not need innovation for the sake of innovation — they need reliable tools that work in real combat conditions, do not require lengthy training and can scale alongside operational demand.”

The three core operational requirements:

— Combat reliability — systems must work in actual battlefield conditions, not just on test ranges

— Minimal training overhead — operators must be able to use them without months of preparation

— Scalability — production capacity must grow alongside operational demand

This represents a fundamentally different procurement logic compared to what most NATO defence ministries currently apply.

Western procurement optimises for capability ceilings — what a system can theoretically achieve at peak performance. Ukrainian procurement optimises for operational throughput — what a system can reliably deliver at scale, under fire, in the hands of soldiers trained in weeks.

Institutions that internalise this distinction will be better positioned to procure effective defence technology over the next decade.

Read 9 tweets

Army Media 🇺🇦

@armyinformcomua

May 17

A year ago, Electronic Warfare meant jamming devices. Today it is a cloud-updated operating system. Why every Defence Ministry should be watching.

Ukraine’s electronic warfare industry has spent four years building the only system in the world tested against constant mass drone attack. Its CEOs are now describing the result with surprising candour.

Yaroslav Filimonov — CEO of one of Ukraine’s leading EW manufacturers — gave a detailed interview to ArmyInform on May 15. What he describes is not a snapshot of Ukrainian capability. It is the road every NATO defence ministry is about to have to travel — and Ukraine has already walked it. 🧵👇

1/9 — The shift: from devices to ecosystems

In 2022, Ukrainian EW meant individual jamming units distributed across the front. Operators called targets. Operators jammed targets. The system was a collection of tools.

By 2026, that picture has been replaced by something fundamentally different.

“We are now talking about a complex of electronic support that combines electronic intelligence and electronic warfare in a single system. The key achievement is the integration of three functions: detection, identification, and suppression of targets.”

The system intercepts the drone’s video feed during identification — meaning it can determine in seconds whether a UAV in the sky is Russian or Ukrainian before deciding whether to engage. Everything is managed through a centralised situational awareness server, allowing remote control of dozens of installations and over-the-air software updates.

EW has become an operating system. That single conceptual shift defines almost everything else.

2/9 — The kill chain compressed to seconds

The performance gain over previous architectures is concrete and operationally consequential.

In the old model, an EW intelligence operator manually relayed target parameters to an EW jamming operator. Minutes of communication delay between detection and response. Sometimes too many minutes.

The new architecture automates the handoff entirely.

“The system automatically determines signal parameters, calculates azimuth, suggests the optimal suppression tool, and activates the necessary antennas.”

The next step Filimonov describes is fully automated rotating antenna mechanisms that track targets through flight — extending the effective engagement range of directional EW antennas to 15 km and allowing destruction of drones long before they reach their objectives.

This is the doctrine NATO planners are now scrambling to develop. Ukraine is already deploying it.

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