This is a point worth examining. We have lots of stress on what if Russia goes for societal mobilization now (normally by the way by those who argued that Russia would conquer Ukraine quickly). However, societal mobilization is not easy under the best of conditions.
Still voices speak (without evidence) that Russia is some large military power that can almost dictate terms in Ukraine. This article in @guardian might be the worst. No evidence given on Russian strength, but an assumption Russia can fight a long war. theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
People seem to be forgetting that societal mobilization and long war has enormous political, economic and military risks for Russia. Its not just about calling soldiers to the ranks--its about training them and equipping them. Russia is not in the best position to do this at all.
Russia has no training system to handle some mass infusion of untrained personnel. They already have called up this year's normal conscript soldiers (Only 135k because of Russia's demographic crisis) and they are right now being trained. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
If they want to train more--they need to set up a training system first to handle more soldiers. This normally takes many months in an efficient system. Only once you have the training system, can you start actually creating your new army.
Just as an example, it takes the US in WWII, even with preparations under way. more than 6 months to start expanding significantly its pool of trained personnel. and its not til more than a year that the numbers really take off.
So the Russians need to train the trainers, then train the new soldiers. According to this @ISW report, Russian training takes somewhere between 3-6 months.
Here is the whole report--also points out that Russia is struggling with getting reserves. understandingwar.org/backgrounder/e…
So under exceptionally efficient systems, you might expect a large army expansion with well trained soldiers in 9 months. Could RUssia do that--doubtful. Probably poorly trained, unmotivated conscripts could be produced, but thats it.
Then you have to equip them. Again, all this blase talk about Russia going to full mobilization misses the fact that Russia is economically weak and now operating under sanctions. jpost.com/international/…
The Russians are already suffering shortfalls in replenishment. It would again take a very efficient and well planned economy to ramp up production under these sanctions. SO arming the new mass army with new weapons will be hard. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/s…
Sure, they can get all their oodles of equipment that has been sitting around in storage for years, not being maintained, etc. Their front line stuff has already shown weaknesses. Imagine what the second-line stuff is like
So Russian mobilization requires the establishment of a training system that doesnt exist and the growth of arms production that is being crippled. It would also require an admission by the Russian government that they are losing the war. Thats a political risk.
Is interesting to note that when they called up this year's conscripts, they said they would not be sent to Ukraine. There are stories of RUssian army recruitment stations being burned too. Will people actually want to fight and die in this war? Questionable.
And while the Russians are assembling this force of hastily untrained, not well equipped, and politically questionable conscripts to fight in a war that they have been calling a great success--the Ukrainians will be getting more and better equipment from NATO.
Ukraine is already upgrading its training and will beat the Russians to the punch by getting better prepared soldiers to the front lines months earlier--and thats if Russia acts now.
So understand Russian societal mobilization is not something that can be simply bandied about. It requires action and preparation that the Russian government is clearly reluctant to do. Stop talking about it like its easy and Russia is some large power. Neither is true.
And Russia has to start now. Waiting till May 9 is even too late. Ukraine has already started its societal mobilisation in training and equipment.
Interesting time reference by Pres Biden in the announcement of the massive $33billon aid package. Wants to make sure Ukraine has significant success within 5 months. Ie before Russia could do a wide scale mobilisation, were it so inclined.
Attaching this thread here, so you can see more about the package and the timing issue.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Phillips P. OBrien

Phillips P. OBrien Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @PhillipsPOBrien

Apr 28
Pentagon briefing today, a few interesting points on Russian logistics and AirPower, and the Battle of the Donbas. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
First, rather remarkable but 63 days into the war and fighting much closer to its supply dumps, the Russian army is still being severely limited by logistic problems. Progress forward is ‘incremental’ Image
Basically logistics problems alone (not including Ukrainian resistance) means Russian forces can only ‘sustain’ more than a few kilometres of progress a day. This is still extraordinarily little.
Read 9 tweets
Apr 26
Reopening this because Ukrainian claims of losses point to a significant increase in combat activity in the fighting (assuming mostly Donbas) which a major increase in destroyed Russian equipment.
Most recent update from Ukrainan armed forces has a major acceleration in Russian tank losses. In only two days claimed Russian losses in tanks has risen by 45 (873 to 918) and APCs has stayed steady at 70 (2238-2308).
Before two days ago the Ukrainians were claiming that the Russians are losing tanks at a rate of 14.5 a day, which has gone up by 50% the last two (to 22.5). Worth watching to see if the rate stays high as it gives an indication that the fight is increasing.
Read 5 tweets
Apr 26
If you want a concrete example of the failures of realism staring us straight in the face, it’s Germany. A country with all the economic and technological requisites to be an assertive regional power, yet which is paralysed by its own politics and traditions.
And btw Russia is just as great example of the failures of realism. A country that had no idea that it was not the great power it thought it was, and thus has embarked on this self destructive spiral that it needn’t have done.
I’m intrigued that people see these tweets as arguments that Germany and Russia should play certain roles. They really aren’t. They are examples of how a realist model of state behavior fails to take into account huge variance in policy choices. Ostensibly powerful states…
Read 4 tweets
Apr 25
A great thread by @EliotACohen , and pleased to see the praise for @edwardstrngr , who I really think people should follow.
But watch out criticising the Russian military analysts, they can denounce en masse, when reflection would be better.
And I’d like to add that @MarkHertling has been consistently excellent on getting to the reality of shortcomings in the Russian military and strengths in the Ukrainians.
I just came across @general_ben in the last few weeks and he has some great reflections on relations with Ukraine and what the war means so far for the US military.
Read 4 tweets
Apr 25
Worth noting how much US Defense secretary Austin is talking about Ukraine ‘winning’ the war during this visit.
Im no expert in body language but the interaction between @SecBlinken and @SecDef with their direct Ukrainian counterparts @DmytroKuleba and defense minister Reznikov (see @DefenceU ) seems extremely close, like they’ve been working very closely recently.
Well @oleksiireznikov the Ukrainian defense secretary also thinks the body language is meaningful.
Read 4 tweets
Apr 25
Interesting historical reflections on whether what we are seeing in the Donbas is more like WW1 or WW2. Might hazard a few guesses. It’s WW1 followed by WW2. Attrition and reduced mobility at first, until one side starts degrading too much and we see collapses.
We are now in a closer to WW1 stage. Little change in the front lines (which hasn’t moved much for more than a month). Seems to be regular attrition though. Where it’s not like WW1 is that the armies are much smaller. They can’t take attrition for that long.
Attrition will pick up too. Ukraine is getting more and more effective range weapons in artillery and UAVs, and Russia is rushing the defeated Kyiv forces back into battle, dispatching mercenaries, etc
Read 8 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(