It is 64 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today, an examination of the implications of Gerasimov ‘taking charge’ of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 1/20
2/20 There are unconfirmed reports that General Gerasimov has moved to Ukraine and may be taking overall command of the Russian campaign. This is still in the realm of speculation. Therefore lets use this thread as a bit of a thought experiment.
3/20 General Gerasimov is the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. He was appointed to this position by President Putin in November 2012.
4/20 Why is the chief Russian military commander taking over what is essentially a theatre command? If confirmed, this would be a significant intervention, probably directed by Putin, and may see a change in how Russian operations are planned and executed.
5/20 It is very unusual for the most senior military leader of a nation to ‘step down’ and assume an operational command. It is an indicator that Putin is running out of options for his Ukraine special operation. There are also some interesting strategic and operational impacts.
6/20 Strategic impacts. Who replaces him? Gerasimov has led the Russian military in their reforms for the past decade. He also commands the day to day running of the entire military, including strategic forces. It is not a position that should be left unfilled for long.
7/20 If Gerasimov goes to Ukraine, and no-one replaces him, who will oversee overall Russian military operations and development in short term, as well as any mobilisation?
8/20 Does it mean Russian military strategy will improve, or get even worse? Despite the mythic status of Gerasimov before the war, the performance of the Russian military he oversees – strategic to tactical – has been quite sub-par. realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/…
9/20 And not only has it been ineffective on the battlefield, but the atrocities also it has committed – city destruction, deliberate targeting of civilians, torture and murder – are indicative of a corrupt professional ethos. Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for this.
10/20 Finally, what does this mean about Putin’s mindset? Has he lost faith in Gerasimov?
11/20 In WW2, General MacArthur appointed UA Army General Robert Eichelberger to command US forces at Buna. Before departing, Eichelberger was told "Bob, I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive." Has Gerasimov been given a similar directive by Putin?
12/20 Or has both Putin and Defence Minister Shoigu set up Gerasimov as the fall guy for any Russian failure in the war?
13/20 Operational impacts. It appears, if Gerasimov’s appointment is confirmed, to place General Dvornikov’s appointment in a new light. Perhaps Gerasimov might be the overall joint commander, with Dvornikov assuming the function of land component commander.
14/20 Perhaps General Dvornikov has not proved the competent joint commander the Russian hoped for, or has not met strategic timelines for success.
15/20 Gerasimov is renowned as a military theorist. Despite the fact that his ideas are yet to be proven on the battlefield in Ukraine, perhaps Gerasimov might bring an improved level of joint planning and execution to Russian operations. Its a big maybe.
16/20 To do this, Gerasimov would need a joint planning staff. He will need more than a couple of command vehicles, an aide-de-camp and a secure satellite phone if he is to exert real command authority over Russian operations in Ukraine.
17/20 Good generals can generally be found in only a couple of places on the battlefield: at the location of most danger and the location of most opportunity. They do this so they can best marshal resources to support the commander on the ground, and to provide leadership.
18/20 Gerasimov would be going to the Russian Army’s place of most danger & opportunity. Most dangerous because a loss in the east would probably see a long pause in operations for the Russians to regenerate forces & rethink strategy. And would have a political impact for Putin.
19/20 And it is the place of most opportunity because it is probably the only location where Russia has any chance of an operational breakthrough that could allow them to tell their citizens (and their international friends) that the Russian military was successful in Ukraine.
20/20 Gerasimov, until recently, was seen as one of the better Russian theorists of the modern era. However, his reforms have not resulted in battlefield success. It is unlikely his presence on the battlefield, in charge of a tactically mediocre Russian force, will change things.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In the past few days, speculation about a potential ‘Ukraine solution’ from the incoming Trump administration has accelerated. Here, I examine possible components of this, or other, 'peace plans' for #Ukraine. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
2/ A report in The Telegraph describes an evolved plan that includes a buffer zone, freezing the conflict, Russia retaining currently held territory, ‘pumping Ukraine full of US weapons’ to deter Russia and deferring Ukraine’s NATO membership for years.
3/ It is timely to examine some of the components of these plans, and the issues they might contain. We can only explore potential components because there is not yet an endorsed Trump plan for Ukraine. And, unfortunately, nor is there a U.S. strategy for #Ukraine produced by the Biden administration in the past 3 years.
It has become increasingly likely that North Korean combat troops will appear in #Ukraine soon. While there remain many unknowns on this subject, the deployment of North Korean troops raises many different potential issues for Russia, Ukraine and NATO. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
2/ On 13 October, President Zelenskyy announced the anticipated deployment of North Korea troops’ to Ukraine. In the past 48 hours, the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, described how “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation.”
3/ The most obvious challenge for Russia in the deployment of North Korean troops for combat operations will be at the tactical level. There will be a communication gap between soldiers and commanders who speak two different languages. It is very unlikely that most North Korean troops speak Russian - and vice versa. While translators will be helpful, this kind of communication gap can, and will, be a problem during combat operations.
President Zelenskyy has presented his Victory Plan to the Ukrainian parliament. It has 5 elements: Ukraine to join NATO; defense, including long-range strikes; deterring Russian aggression; economic development; and, and post-war security structures. 1/5 🧵 🇺🇦 kyivindependent.com/zelensky-victo…
2/ Apparently there are also three classified elements of the Victory Plan. These will be briefed separately to lawmakers. They were probably briefed to foreign leaders during Zelenskyy’s recent trip to the UK, France, Italy and Germany.
3/ Zelenskyy has also been invited to present his Victory Plan at an EU summit this week. kyivpost.com/post/40589
China has commenced #JointSword2024B. In the past day, 153 PLA aircraft & 14 PLAN ships operated around Taiwan. 111 aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. This is a record high in PLA activity. What might the People’s Liberation Army be seeking to achieve, and what might Western intelligence agencies might learn? 1/8 🧵
2/ Just last week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave an address on 10 October that included a statement that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president would be to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty."
3/ After the speech by the President of Taiwan, the predictable Chinese Communist Party response arrived. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that Lai had tried to “sell the fallacy of Taiwan independence,” and accused him of a “pernicious intention to escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait for political gain.”
The Australian senate recently released a report into support for #Ukraine. Overall, this is a quality report that describes many of Ukraine’s needs as well as Australia’s capacity to assist. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Support in the Australian community for Ukraine remains very high. As the 2024 Lowy Poll found:
“Australian public support for assisting Ukraine remains high. The vast majority of Australians (86%) continue to support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’, steady from 2023. Eight in ten (80%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’, down four points from last year. Three-quarters (74%) support ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’, steady on last year.”
3/ Australia can certainly afford to provide more support. As the Kiel Institute tracker finds, Australia is a laggard in terms of the percentage of GDP spent on #Ukraine assistance.
This week’s strikes on Russian munitions storage facilities are part of the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike campaign. Long-range strike has been an important strategic adaptation for the Ukrainians since 2022. There is much other nations can learn from this. 1/17 🧵
2/ To inform this exploration of lessons, we need to understand the components and functions of the Ukrainian strike complex.
3/ There are five key components to Ukraine’s strike complex. The first is Reconnaissance and surveillance. The mensuration of targets is an important part of any strike system. You cannot strike what you cannot find or target accurately. The Ukrainians have become adept at this during the war. However, it is more than just access to commercial satellite date.