Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
@edwardstrngr
Apr 29, 2022 • 15 tweets • 5 min read • Read on X
A few thoughts triggered by the prevalence of heuristics - instinctive, learned responses - especially w.r.t. assumptions of mass and might. Principally the enduring assumption that Russia has latent capital reserves of mass it can 'liquidise' into combat power. 1/15
The FT published a 'long read' that demonstrates such thinking, citing "western officials" who reveal that Russia will get its act together militarily when it fights "as they were trained to fight". This is a heuristic response. So can Russia do that? 2/15
ft.com/content/f299cb…
It is increasingly difficult to see Russia being able to mobilise a large reserve much within a year. So its troops in the Donbas are what it has. (There are lessons here for general assumptions on generating mass: if even Russia cannot...) 3/15
Most estimates place >80K RUS troops in BTGs against >40K UKR in good defensive positions. This is not a good ratio for any attacking force - even with firepower. But can it 'fight like its doctrine' under its new, centralised commander: Dvornikov? 4/15
foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/12/rus…
My own experience makes me sceptical that he & it can. 5Eyes Generals will admit only the US Army can train effectively at Corps or Army level - and it is complicated, hard, and needs repeated exercising to master. Mark Hertling gives a flavour: 5/15
Also, Dvornikov will need to build a C2 apparatus for his new, huge, command. How will he fuse the previous regional C2? Will he take the southern command and expand it to sit above, or build anew? How will he train the staff for it? 6/15
And that decades old, corrupt & bankrupt RUS military culture is not going to change overnight. Yes, the Darwinian instinct will teach the BTGs how to be less vulnerable, but don't expect great flourishes of manouevre warfare. 7/15
And then there is the logistics. Fast armoured warfare relies on equal dash from the loggies. We just don't see it. And every mile further into UKR territory is another vulnerability from extension, and exposure to a hostile pop'n. 8/15
defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
Russia is caught between needing a lightning offensive campaign to achieve a bold victory, and not being able or capable enough to risk its remaining force in such a move. It has neither the assumed mass of the East nor the skill of the West. 9/15
So when you see maps with dramatic, pincing arrows suggesting RUS' next move, think on what each of those easy to draw symbols means in all-arms manoeuvre, logistic support, and then holding the territory taken. 10/15
UKR must work out how much ground it is willing to trade while writing down RUS through attrition. Some assess UKR now has more tanks. But it needs more long-range artillery, and a CONOPs for going on the offensive eventually with smaller numbers. 11/15
telegraph.co.uk/world-news/202…
Which is why the Biden administrations announcement of $33Bn is so significant. It has bought time for UKR to work out what its modern CONOPs and theory of victory looks like, as long as it can contain current RUS pressure. 12/15
Two things remain. The threat of nuclear weapons should retain its awe. But proper statecraft can manage this as long as NATO does not get directly involved, ie the escalation remains sub-strategic. See @LawDavF below: 13/15
samf.substack.com/p/escalators-a… https://t.co/MJbgjpttaD
And to best do that NATO must ensure it does not get directly involved, where a route to an existential rationale for RUS is easier to draw. Our rhetoric on these two points needs to be careful and deliberate. 14/15
But my overall conclusion has not changed. There is no room for complacency, but a well-sustained UKR can prevail and defeat the invasion of its territory. It is in everyone's interests that it does, and the US has just put down a big bet. 15/15

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
　

Keep Current with Edward Stringer🇺🇦

Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @edwardstrngr

Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
Feb 5, 2023
An interesting read - but there are other factors. I took Air Defence of the UK as the subject for a research piece and argument made at the RAF’s Basic Staff Course at Bracknell jn 1997. The core theme is still valid - over optimistic assumptions that become unaffordable. 1/5
The RAF took AD seriously. The plan was multi-layered and had modern C2 at its core: IUKADGE, Improved UK Air Defence Ground Environment. Fed by many radars and AWACS it would control long, medium and short range fighters and medium and short range SAMs. F2, F4, Eurofighter… 2/5
…Hawk, replacement Bloodhound and Rapier. And linked RN AD frigates. But there was a lot of inherent British exceptionalism. NIMWACS for example. And as each exceptional product over-ran and each budget cut hit, the system was iteratively pruned back, almost to its roots. 3/5
Read 5 tweets
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
Oct 3, 2022
Recent events demand an update on my last major thread, which was based on this paper for @Policy_Exchange titled: Staying power - How Ukraine can Prevail Tactically and Strategically. I shall use that simple formula to assess how things stand today.
policyexchange.org.uk/staying-power-…
The paper reduces to: tactically, the nation that evolves its war-fighting concepts better and faster (conceptual component), and has the strong national resolve to win (moral component), can prevail over a nation with nominally larger forces (physical component).
UKR has demonstrated the validity of that. The Kharkiv thrust revealed superb operational art - using a strong offensive in the South to fix RUS forces while probing for weak areas elsewhere and then striking fast to cause a localised Russian collapse.
economist.com/europe/2022/09…
Read 25 tweets
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
Sep 1, 2022
There Is something important here for Western forces to consider: have we become too procedural and safety oriented? Run a thought experiment:
1/4 nytimes.com/2022/08/28/us/…
Imagine taking a bunch of our bright young troops and removing their usual kit. You send them to the training area via the ring-road with a credit card and task them to buy commercial drones. They are to use commercial IT and geospatial Int only. Could they rig an ISTAR system?
Could they integrate it with regular kit? Of course - our brightest would love the challenge. But could we then test it on exercise? What if a drone crashed? Could we use it on a live-fire Ex? It would be difficult to sign off such an exercise. We stick to what is cleared. 3/4
Read 4 tweets
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
May 31, 2022
Previously I asked whether we were seeing a split between 'Old' and 'New' Europe in their approach to Russia. Recent events in the Donbas allow us to view that through the lens of strategic 'staying power'. 1/22
Staying power requires a long-term view, to not knee-jerk to the vicissitudes of the current tactical battle. There is no campaign I have been involved in that has not swung to and fro tactically, and taken longer than expected: GW1, Libya, Kosovo... 2/22
samf.substack.com/p/how-long-wil…
This always leads many commentators of all stripes to lament, quite quickly, that initiative has been lost. This is usually assumed to be permanent. But the battlefield is not where wars are decided, it is where relative national power is revealed. 3/22
Read 23 tweets
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
May 16, 2022
Isaiah Berlin's famous essay on the Hedgehog and the Fox might provide a way to look at the benefits of SWE and FIN in NATO. In Defence terms they are Hedgehogs and know one big thing - coping with Russia. The foxes such as US/UK are more generalist. 1/11
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hedge…
First, inputs and outputs. SWE spends $7.2Bn, FIN $5.8Bn. But both have sophisticated concepts of Total Defence, mobilising society, using reserves, and, unlike RUS, do so within a democracy that regularly tests and audits the strategy and plans. 2/11
FIN has 235K reserves who are trained, equipped and exercised. It has the biggest artillery force in W. Europe. Its pensions don't count in its 2%, nor does its elite Border Guards. After many centuries and wars its intelligence take on RUS is superb. 3/11
foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/wha…
Read 12 tweets
Edward Stringer🇺🇦 Profile picture
Apr 21, 2022
Some thoughts on the air war over Ukraine and its implications for air forces in general. I caveat all by stating that we don't know very much about UKR tactics, and if we did we wouldn't want to be too descriptive. But we can pick out some essential observations. 1/11
The first point is that in the eighth week of this war the Russian Air Force (VKS) still shows no sign of running a campaign to gain air superiority. Given the advantages it has in the 'physical component' of air combat power this is truly remarkable. So it probably cannot. 2/11
And that means that the Russian army cannot discount air attack at any time, and UKR can plan to make use of the air environment. This could prove to be the factor that tips the balance in effective overall combat power, and it arises... 3/11
Read 11 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

Send Email!

:(