By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the expectation that it would be a quick intervention lasting only a few weeks. Its soldiers went to war lacking a wide range of what turned out to be essential skills. ⬇️
2/ 'Vault No. 8', a serving Russian soldier warblogging on Telegram, recalls the lack of preparedness for an extended conflict among pre-war contract (professional) soldiers when the invasion was launched on 24 February 2022:
3/ "1. Level of training.
According to the regular personnel themselves, they were proficient with the weapons and equipment assigned to them—they could repair and operate them. At the level of training they had.
1/ Russia appears all but certain to fully block Telegram on 1 April 2026, on the grounds that it promotes frauds, disinformation, and violence. The Russian army has many similar problems; one Russian warblogger asks if the government should consider blocking the army instead. ⬇️
2/ Svatoslav Golikov writes:
"In the light of Roskomnadzor's latest attack on Telegram, it's time to explore some new ideas.
Let me remind you of a recent TASS report (I quote):
"Telegram blocked over 235,000 channels in one day, but the problem is systemic.
3/ "Deputy Anton Nemkin expressed this opinion in a conversation with TASS:
'But let's call things by their proper names: if the number of blocked communities is in the millions, then the problem is not isolated, but systemic.'
1/ The AI boom is leading to drastically higher prices and possible shortages of the Chinese-made fibre-optic cables used by many Russian kamikaze drones. Prices have nearly quadrupled due to a massive increase in demand for fibre optics by data centres. ⬇️
2/ According to Russian media reports, Russian buyers are having to pay between 2.5 to 4 times more for fibre optic cable per kilometre than last year. By 2025, Russia was purchasing about 10.5% of all fibre optic cable produced globally – equivalent to 60 million kilometres.
3/ Russia is entirely dependent on Chinese fibre optic manufacturers. Its only domestic fibre optic manufacturer, JSC Optic Fiber Systems in Saransk, was destroyed by Ukrainian drone strikes in April-May 2025.
1/ Former Russian foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin is very gloomy about Russia's prospects after four years of full-scale war in Ukraine. He criticises the country's "feudal-capitalist regime of revenge" and asks whether Vladimir Putin will "lead it to its decline". ⬇️
2/ Writing on his Telegram channel, Demurin – whose views reflect an ultra-nationalist constituency that has been disappointed by Putin's perceived lacklustre approach to the war – is explicitly critical of Putin's leadership:
3/ "On the fourth anniversary of the launch of the Special Military Operation, I have nothing inspiring to say. The reshaping of Ukraine along Nazi and anti-Russian lines, its militarisation, and the NATO takeover of its territory and political space required a rebuff—that's…
1/ Russian warbloggers continue to reflect on the war in Ukraine entering its fifth year. The 'hurrah-patriotism' of 2022 is now long gone and the mood is bleak. Nikita Tretyakov says there is "nothing left to hope for; all hopes and illusions have been shattered". ⬇️
2/ In comments that illustrate the political dangers which the Putin regime will face when the war ends, Tretyakov – a mobilised paratrooper, military correspondent, and volunteer – writes on his Telegram channel:
3/ "Four years of war is a monstrously long and daunting time. As culture and history have taught us, such an anniversary demands some analysis, conclusions, and a summing up of interim results...
1/ Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin is marking the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – after eight years of war in Donbas, which he did much to start – but he isn't celebrating. He sees a "bleak" outlook of mutual exhaustion, caused by poor leadership. ⬇️
2/ Girkin writes from the prison where he is now half-way through a sentence for "inciting extremism" (i.e. criticising the Russian government's mismanagement of the war):
3/ "Today officially marks the fourth anniversary of the start of the Special Military Operation (although according to some sources, it began two days earlier, but was announced to begin on 24 February 2022).
We arrived at this significant date with extremely negative results.