By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ A Russian convict soldier has described the gruelling and deadly experience of serving in a 'Storm V' assault unit, from initial training, to facing swarms of Ukrainian drones, and being the only survivor of a bloody battle against dug-in and determined Ukrainian forces. ⬇️
2/ Russian warblogger 'Maxim Kalashnikov' publishes the account of a Storm V soldier of his acquaintance:
"We weren't trained for long. At the Markovka training ground, the instructors, tired of repeating the same thing over and over again, don't care how you're trained."
3/ "The main thing for them is that there are no injuries or accidental hits on their own during shooting. However, these were rare. What did they teach us? Who knows? How did they teach us? Not at all from the point of view of survivability and combat effectiveness.
1/ Russians who were mobilised in 2022-23 and have survived to the present day may not live much longer, as they are reportedly being formed into assault squads, where they will likely be sent to their deaths. This is forecast to lead to a bribery bonanza for commanders. ⬇️
2/ The 'Vault 8' Telegram channel reports:
"Bad news is coming from two directions—the "North" group and Zaporizhzhia."
3/ "There, the threat of "[sign a] contract or [go to an] assault" for mobilised soldiers has shifted to shady tactics: removing mobilised soldiers from the unit's roster and preparing them for transfer.
1/ Civilians under Russian occupation in the Luhansk region are starving and dying of cold because of a breakdown in essential services under the 'Luhansk People's Republic' (LPR), according to a complaint by a Russian warblogger. ⬇️
2/ A significant number of Ukrainians – many of them elderly people, who grew up under the Soviet Union and often still hold pro-Russian views – still live in the frontline Svatove and Kreminna districts. However, they now have no electricity and conditions are reportedly dire.
3/ 'Veterans' Notes' warns that the region faces 'mass casualties' among the civilian population – who are now regarded by the occupation authorities as Russian citizens – if urgent action is not taken to restore power:
1/ The new US National Security Strategy blames 'undemocratic' European governments for failing to make peace with Russia, takes a pro-Russian position on NATO, reflects white nationalist views on European demographics, and pledges overt support for far-right parties. ⬇️
2/ While the strategy states that "it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine", it says that "the Trump Administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war…
3/ …perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition."
(This is likely a reference to European regulation of social media and the 2024 annulment of the Romanian election due to Russian interference.)
1/ A group of Russian soldiers say their commanders are "simply driving us to the slaughter" after extorting and brutally beating them: "There's no support, no air force, nothing. You just stomp along and die." They are all now listed as missing in action. ⬇️
2/ The men are from the 328th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment (military unit 01011), which is currently fighting in the Zaporizhzhia region. Heavy fighting is ongoing south of Zaporizhzhia city, where the Russians are trying to open the route to the north.
3/ The soldiers say that they "encountered abusive practices—money collection—and we refused. Yet another money collection. They started collecting money for some company needs, from us, the soldiers. We refused to contribute. The next day, they came and beat us."
1/ An apparent attack on a 'shadow fleet' tanker off the coast of Senegal means that Ukraine may now be able to attack Russian interests worldwide, says Russian war correspondent Alexander Kots. He calls it a new and threatening phase in the war. ⬇️
2/ Kots, who writes for Komsomolskaya Prava, has asked how Russia should respond to the severe damage suffered on 27 November by the oil tanker Mersin. Its Turkish owners report that the vessel was hit by four external explosions while it was in the eastern Atlantic Ocean.
3/ The crew is reportedly safe, but videos show the vessel down by the stern after the engine room flooded. The incident is strikingly similar to the confirmed Ukrainian attacks on 28 November against two oil tankers which were travelling to Russian Black Sea ports.