By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ Russian warbloggers are increasingly speculating about what will happen after the war ends and/or the fall of Putin. They predict chaos, disorderly struggles, repression, and not least their own violent elimination. ⬇️
2/ In a since-deleted post, Maxim Kalashnikov sees gloomy prospects ahead for Russia:
3/ “I believe that after the Transition (change of the central figure of power), as a result of this untriumphant war, a period of chaos and instability is inevitable.
No matter what “Sukharev conventions” are signed by the highest beau monde these days. What do I predict?
1/ After spending years demanding a full mobilisation, Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin has come to the realisation that it would now be pointless: Ukraine's swarms of drones are capable of destroying "any number of infantry", and Russia doesn't even have enough weapons to arm them. ⬇️
2/ A reader of his Telegram channel asks:
"Question: there's increasing talk of possible mobilisation—do you think the government will take such a step? And is mobilisation necessary under the current circumstances?"
To which Girkin replies:
3/ "Mobilisation was needed in the spring of 2022, the spring of 2023, the spring of 2024, and perhaps even the spring of 2025. Now, mobilisation is catastrophically late. Currently, mobilisation, as perceived by the majority of the population, will yield no results.
1/ Russian drone developers are complaining that because of bureaucratic restrictions, they are having to use firecrackers as the warheads on interceptor drones, or rely solely on kinetic methods instead of explosive warheads. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger 'UAV Developer' shows a photo of two firecrackers and asks:
"Do you know what this is?
It's the warhead of an interceptor drone."
3/ "While those Ukrainian drones are hitting a house in Yekaterinburg, smashing a landing craft in Crimea with shrapnel, and killing a dozen civilians along the way, the developers of interceptor drones are trying to somehow circumvent the restrictions of the mad printer…
1/ Ukrainian citizens are reportedly selling 'whitelisted' Starlink terminals to Russia, to enable the Russian army to get around the blocking of unauthorised Starlink terminals. The trade highlights how corruption in Ukraine is directly aiding Russia's war effort. ⬇️
2/ Russian forces in Ukraine used Starlink on a large scale for both battlefield communications and, increasingly, drone guidance. Since early February 2026, however, only whitelisted terminals – which can only be acquired with Ukrainian government permission – can be used.
3/ However, some in Ukraine appear to be helping Russia to circumvent these restrictions. So-called 'White Starlink' offers are proliferating on Telegram channels, offering whitelisted "Starlink for military and civilians in the new territories of the Russian Federation".
1/ Starving Russian soldiers in Ukraine have been eating their comrades and Ukrainians, according to intercepted Russian communications. Audio and photographic evidence indicates that several incidents of cannibalism likely occured in 2025. ⬇️
2/ The UK's Sunday Times newspaper has published evidence of what Ukrainian intelligence sources say were at least five instances where Russian soldiers were said by their fellow soldiers and commanders to have engaged in cannibalism.
3/ The evidence reportedly came to light from intercepted messages on Telegram, which has universally been used by the Russians for battlefield communications until it was recently blocked by the Russian government.
1/ Russia's attempts at import substitution have "completely failed" and the corrupt state procurement system is effectively killing off domestic factories, warns a Russian factory head. He says the system makes some rich, but will lead to a domestic economic collapse. ⬇️
2/ Kubanzheldormash JSC is a large engineering company in Southern Russia. It is one of the few domestic manufacturers of mechanised track tools for railway construction and maintenance, as well as agricultural machinery and hydraulic equipment.
3/ The company marks its 93rd anniversary this August, but it may be its last, warns company head Vyacheslav Yakovlev in a YouTube video.