By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ Could Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, be lying about the current level of recruitment to the Russian army? This appalling and unprecedented scenario is considered by Russian warbloggers, who smell a rat in his claims of success. ⬇️
2/ 'Artjockey' has spotted something odd about recent claims made by Medvedev, and suspects statistical cheating:
"The day before yesterday, Medvedev announced that the contract recruitment plan was being met, and that talk of mobilisation was an enemy plot."
3/ "He backed up his statement with statistics:
▪️ During the first 6 months [of 2026], “about” 200 thousand people and 16 thousand volunteers signed contracts;
▪️ Of these, 40,000 joined the unmanned systems forces.
1/ A massive new mobilisation in Russia this fall is increasingly being forecast by Russian warbloggers. They are, however, cautious about this prospect given the strains on the Russian economy and the chaos that accompanied the 2022 mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ 'DsHRG Rusich' comments:
3/ "We've already been mobilising (partially) since 2020. Another mass recruitment will most likely indeed happen, and it will probably happen after the Duma elections in September. Various crazy bans, internet restrictions, etc. are being prepared for this, among other things.
1/ With rumours of a new mobilisation in the fall sweeping the Russian blogosphere, one warblogger wonders: what's the point? He points out that the land that Russia has seized is essentially worthless, having been destroyed, depopulated, and strewn with mines. ⬇️
2/ Roman Alekhin probably isn't doing himself any favours (he's already been declared a 'foreign agent' by the Kremlin), but he is at least willing to go where other warbloggers haven't been willing, and question the purpose of continuing the war:
3/ "[Analyses] lead to one conclusion that could prevent a crisis or mitigate its impact: ending the conflict.
At the same time, depending on the conditions, ending the conflict could lead to different consequences.
1/ Russian online marketplaces are reportedly trying to discourage their sellers offering non-lethal military equipment, for which Ukraine has targeted them. According to one such seller, fees of as much as 60% are now being charged on such equipment by the marketplaces. ⬇️
2/ The 'Forge of Mordor' channel, which makes and sells equipment to soldiers, comments:
3/ "Everyone feels sorry for Wildberries, but in reality, they're doing the following:
- Banning the sale of weapon modifications (or rather, imposing an additional fine)
- Multiple increases in commissions for everything war-related.
1/ Another Wildberries warehouse is on fire, this time in Sarapul, after a Ukrainian drone strike. As the ongoing massacre of Wildberries facilities continues, Russian warbloggers are becoming steadily more irate about air defence failures. ⬇️
2/ 'Combat Reserve' is furious, pointing to the lack of willingness among commanders and officials to take responsibility (a long-running problem; see the thread below).
1/ Russia's mobile fire teams (MOGs), which are the backbone of its defences against Ukrainian drones, are poorly paid and lack the benefits given to soldiers. Despite the dangers – MOGs have been attacked – their members do not get the benefits or pay that soldiers receive. ⬇️
2/ The authorities in Krasnodar Krai have announced that they will form mobile fire teams from employees of critical infrastructure and enterprises in Kuban to protect these facilities.
3/ Workers will be able to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence, and a monthly salary of 50,000 rubles [$627] will be provided. Fire team members are guaranteed not to be deployed to Ukraine (though how iron-clad this guarantee really is remains to be seen).