By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ A shadow war is being fought over the Russian army's access to Starlink. The Russians face a constant battle with Starlink itself and Ukrainian hackers deactivating their terminals, and obstruction from the Russian customs service holding up grey imports of Starlink devices.⬇️
2/ Starlink is banned from being exported to Russia, but can be obtained unofficially through grey imports from Central Asia and China. Most Starlink terminals used by Russian forces are obtained by volunteers and shipped across Russia's southern land borders.
3/ However, they are vulnerable to disruption by Starlink itself, which periodically disables terminals located in Russian-held territory, they are targeted by hackers, and the very slow and cumbersome Russian customs process holds up imports for long periods.
1/ When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the town of Irpin, just west of Kyiv, was the closest that Russia reached to the capital. Its soldiers targeted Christian facilities in the town, destroying buildings and burning Ukrainian-language Bibles in the street. ⬇️
2/ One of the buildings targeted by the Russians was the Field Ministries Training Centre of @MissionEurasia, an international Christian organisation based in Wheaton, Illinois. The group trains missionaries throughout the former Soviet Union and provides humanitarian aid.
3/ After the Russian army reached Irpin on 6 March 2022, the Mission Eurasia training centre was reportedly taken over by Russian special forces, who used it as a barracks and stacked Bibles to barricade windows.
1/ 790 Russian soldiers from a single unit have died at Pokrovsk, according to a Russian combat medic, with another 900 having deserted according to leaked figures. Another soldier from the same unit says that losses are running at 80-90%. ⬇️
2/ The unnamed medic says that she is serving with the 39th Separate Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade (military unit 35390) at Pokrovsk. She describes how she was on the front line with "young guys" aged 19 or 20:
3/ "They were running around, and we had dugouts, I think. And I say No, no, fuck that. They ran, in short, into a Ukrainian minefield and it just tore them apart. Well, it's not like they were 200, dead, none of them died. Well, they were just blown up really badly.
1/ How does a false report that Kupyansk has been captured by Russia come to be delivered on camera to Vladimir Putin? A Russian warblogger blames a military reporting process that prizes low-value metrics, rewards blind optimism, and eliminates nuance. ⬇️
"The transfer of operational information from the bottom up in the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Armed Forces is accompanied by a consistent transformation of the initial data as it moves up the chain of command."
3/ "This process is not a system, but an established practice and is based on stable semantic and organisational mechanisms.
At the level of a motorised rifle/airborne/assault platoon, initial observations are recorded in formulations that imply the completion of the action.
1/ A sign of how things are now on the Russian front lines: Russian volunteers declare success after raising enough money to buy a truckload of body bags. ⬇️
2/ From the 'Good staff' Telegram channel:
"Our next item to collect is body bags for our fallen comrades.
As hard as it is for us, and it's always hard for me to write about it, the guys have an urgent need for them."
3/ "It would be great to buy 1,000 of them. They're giving us that amount at 171 rubles each...
Friends, remember we started a fundraiser for bags for our fallen comrades.
We managed to collect and purchase 500 bags. The bags were purchased and delivered to the guys.
1/ Ukraine's audacious attack today on a Russian submarine at anchor in Novorossiysk has prompted anger and derision from Russian warbloggers. One complains: "I don't have the strength to comment on this anal fucking anymore." ⬇️
2/ Anatoly Shariy comments that the attack on the submarine Varshavyanka is "totally mindblowing." "Is Novorossiysk missing a submarine?" he asks sarcastically.
'Military Informant' comments gloomily that the damage is likely to be severe:
3/ "It appears the unmanned surface vehicle (USV) [sic, actually an unmanned underwater vehicle, UUV] struck near the Varshavyanka's stern, where the vertical and aft horizontal rudders, as well as the propeller, are located."