By now, many will have seen the video of a Ukrainian drone dropping a small bomb through the sunscreen (!) of a car driven by Russian soldiers. Here's a short thread on how it was done (with thanks to @ian_matveev, on whose thread this is based). /1
For the attack, a modified VOG-17 grenade was used. A fin and a front part, created on a 3D printer, are added. The VOG-17 is a Soviet-era 30x120 mm fragmentation grenade with a claimed effective radius of 7m, covering an area of about 150 m². /2
It weighs about 350g (12.3oz) A hobbyist drone like a DJI Phantom 3 is easily capable of carrying one of these. As two grenades were used in this attack, it suggests that a bigger drone was used, two drones were used or the same drone was used to attack twice in succession. /3
The modifications to the grenade are simple, but as the video shows, they enable good aerodynamic performance and high accuracy. /4
The VOG-17 grenade itself contains only 36g (1.2oz) of explosive and can't seriously damage equipment. But there is a lot of such ammunition in Ukraine. It's usually fired from an AG-17 automatic grenade launcher, a Soviet equivalent of the US Mk 19. /5
Low-cost hobbyist drones armed with small modified grenades provide a cheap and effective weapon against individual soldiers. Factions in Syria and Iraq used them to some extent, but they've really come into their own in Ukraine. /6
But how do you destroy an armoured vehicle with an off-the-shelf drone? Ukraine appears to have been using a few different approaches. One of the most effective has been to repurpose the RKG-3, an old Soviet-era type of anti-tank grenade dating to 1950. /7
In 2020, Ukraine's PJSC Mayak Plant demonstrated a drone bomb conversion for the RKG-3 - attaching 3D-printed fins to convert it into the RKG-1600. It weighs about 1kg (2 lb), requiring the use of a larger drone. /8
During testing, drone pilots were able to hit a target 1m (3ft) in size from an altitude of 300m (900 ft). At that altitude the drone would have been virtually invisible and inaudible. /9
Another tactic appears to be the use of what are likely to be aerially-dropped mortar rounds - a very simple and cheap option, particularly against weakly armoured vehicles such as these Russian BMP-3s (with only about 10mm of top armour). /10
The effect of these can be seen in the video below. /11
The cost-effectiveness of these things is extraordinary. An octocopter drone costs maybe $10k, a Phantom 3 costs around $500. A mortar or RKG-1600 probably costs under $100. Each BMP-3 cost the Russians $796k. Add to that the potential cost of a lost crew. /12
You can bet that military strategists will be watching this with great interest. Drones are now able to effectively snipe soldiers and equipment with great precision, likely undetected, at any time of the day or night and in most weather conditions. /13
Even if you're camouflaged, bivouacked or behind the front lines, a drone armed with a small bomb could be overhead at any moment. Drone pilots are the new snipers of the 21st century, and are likely to be just as much feared by their targets. /end
An extra point about how effective those converted anti-tank grenades (RKG-1600) are: the most recent models of the base RKG-3 grenade can penetrate 220 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. That's more than enough to take out a tank, as this video shows:
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1/ Iran is using a unique type of loitering, self-targeting surface to air missile to shoot down US MQ-9 Reaper drones. 11 Reapers costing over $330 million have so far been reported destroyed in the war with Iran. ⬇️
2/ The "358" missile, also known by NATO as the SA-67 and in Yemen as the Saqr-1, is a unique type of surface-to-air missile that is launched with a rocket booster and then loiters in a target area using a turbojet engine, scanning with an infrared sensor for airborne targets.
3/ It appears to be capable of several modes, including the ability to attack ground targets as well. The missile is reported to be 2.75 meters long and is armed with a 10 kg proximity warhead, with a total weight of up to 50 kg when fully fueled, and a reported 100 km range.
1/ Fundraising for the Russian army has been declining steeply for some time, leaving soldiers without essential equipment and supplies. A Russian warblogger explains that it's because soldiers are now seen as being recruited from the ranks of Russia's unwanted underclasses. ⬇️
2/ Russia's professional army was decimated in the first months of the war in Ukraine. Losses were replaced by mobilising 300,000 men from September-October 2022 onwards. They were recruited from across society and were widely supported by the Russian public.
3/ The political costs of mobilisation were high, however, so the government turned instead to recruiting the marginalised and disadvantaged. This has included convicts, drug addicts, alcoholics, debtors, and poverty-stricken ethnic minorities from remote regions of Russia.
1/ Vladimir Putin's popularity ratings, as measured by a state-aligned pollster, are at their lowest point for years. Russian commentators blame the 'bad boyars' around Putin and say that "there's complete degradation all around" in Russia. ⬇️⬇️
2/ The pollster VTsIOM has recorded Putin's popularity at 32.1%, the lowest seen during the war so far (though still some way off his pre-war nadir of 24%, recorded in 2021). Russian bloggers are not surprised, though few blame Putin himself and instead blame his advisors:
3/ 'SHAKESPEARE' writes: "They say Putin's popularity rating has plummeted to a two-year low. It's not surprising after yesterday. It's just some shady crooks who want to take Telegram away from the people at any cost and are trying to push it through with his authority.
1/ Messages hacked from a Russian general's phone illustrate the sweeping scale of corruption at all levels of the Russian army. They highlight a top-to-bottom pyramid of extortion and bribery to obtain promotions and influence, plus scams and theft of military resources. ⬇️
2/ Last month, it emerged that gigabytes of messages spanning 2022-2024 had been obtained by Ukrainian sources from the phone of Major General Roman Demurchiev, most likely as the result of a successful hack.
3/ They have shed an unprecedentedly detailed look at the inner workings of the senior Russian officer corps, including Demurchiev's personal involvement in the torture, mutilation, and murder of Ukrainian POWs, as well as constant feuds between generals.
1/ Russia military policemen are engaged in another crackdown on privately owned vehicles operated by soldiers. Unfortunately for the soldiers, this is reported to be effectively lining them up for Ukrainian drone strikes. ⬇️
2/ The Military Automobile Inspectorate (VAI) and Military Police (VP) have made themselves hugely unpopular among Russian soldiers for their attempts to stop Russian soldiers using privately owned vehicles.
3/ According to Russian warbloggers, between 70-90% of vehicles used by the army in frontline areas are privately owned by soldiers, either purchased with their own money or provided as 'humanitarian aid' through donations from civilians and fundraisers.
1/ Iran's Kharg Island is reportedly under consideration as a target for capture by the Trump Administration. However, declassified US government documents show that the same thing was considered in 1979 but was rejected because it was too difficult and risky. ⬇️
2/ President Jimmy Carter and his National Security Council met in the afternoon of November 6, 1979 to discuss the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis. The discussion involved options for putting pressure on the Khomenei regime, including targeting Kharg Island.
3/ Kharg Island lies 25 km (16 miles) off the coast of Iran at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. It was built up as a deep water oil terminal in the 1960s, providing an ideal oil loading point for supertankers. 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through the island.