As a US intel analyst in the mid-2000s responsible for drafting and editing morning briefings, and more recently as an official sitting in on NATO morning briefings, I’d like to offer a few observations on the UK DI Ukraine updates 1/
On a personal note, despite wanting to follow in 007’s footsteps, my intel career was limited to sitting behind a desk assigned to a dead-end shift-work job in the Pentagon basement editing the morning intel brief. Luckily escaped this hell to do a War Studies PhD instead 2/
Editing intel for CJCS meant adhering to strict guidelines on terminology and punctuation, making every word count, etc. Regardless of the quality of the intel content (lots of funny business with Iraq stats), the slides were precise to a fault 3/
The following thread contains some observations about the content and style of the DI Ukraine update slides and what they reveal about the officials who draft them. The thread will try to do to these slides what @TrentTelenko does to RUS mil vehicle tires 4/
Notwithstanding the fact the DI slides are unclassified, or more probably were declassified as they contain intelligence judgements, that they should contain so many obvious mistakes is evidence of a major quality control problem. More on this shortly 5/
Having said that, DI slides are a breath of fresh air compared to NATO intel slides. With the latter, I was astonished to see slides briefed to the 4-stars where they literally got the country wrong. NATO quality control was non-existent 6/
Since the MoD started sharing the DI slides on 17 Feb, I have been an avid consumer. They have received a fair amount of media attention and I suspect this ‘success’ led to DI head General Sir James Hockenhull getting his fourth star and a posting to @UKStratCom 7/ 
I’ve heard of battlefield promotions but in this era of social media mil campaigning I suppose it was not too much to expect a promotion based on tweets (ok, there was probably more to it than that!). Pretty soon they will be awarding medals based on the # of RTs 8/ #radicalwar
For my analysis, I’ve collected all the intel update tweets posted up to (and including) 1 May. 9/
To begin, one can identify several policy changes, esp. w/ frequency and style. Some days only one update is posted. Other days, two or more. Time of day when they are posted has also evolved. Starting 13 March 'Intelligence Update' appears in yellow. Etc. 10/
Sometimes slides are posted first thing in the morning, around 7am, as well as around midnight. I'm somewhat confused about the utility of midnight posts. In early weeks they were posted in the afternoon or early evening. 11/
The amount of material contained on the slides varies, as does the font and size. In some cases, only a single bullet point (see below) is provided. At most, four bullet points. 12/
Regarding content, there is a limited amount of ‘strategic-level’ analysis. Also, much of what appears is reporting, not analysis. There is little (or no) information that couldn’t be found in @nytimes, @guardian, or a hundred other places on social media 13/
In terms of the quality of analysis the slides contain, I would definitely recommend @KofmanMichael, @LawDavF and countless others as being far superior to the DI analysis provided 14/
The selection of content is completely random. Sometimes the slide will cover several battlefronts, a single front, or even the home front. Some slides are used to debunk RUS disinformation. In others, a single service will dominate (see slide below for Air focus). 15/
In fairness, there are so many topics that could be covered and selection is always tricky (reluctance to discuss UKR strategy/ops in any detail somewhat understandable under circumstances though not ideal) 16/
Some topics aren't covered at all. Not a single mention of Zelenskiy. No reference to balance of forces. No casualty estimates. Nothing on UKR mobilization. Not much on possible conflict duration. No real analysis of ammunition expenditure rates and ability to resupply. 17/
Among the more surprising slides was this one dealing with Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. My compliments to the MoD lawyer who managed to slip that one in! 18/
And this one on Ukrainian agriculture no less. An important topic for sure but why DI is reporting this is anyone’s guess (answer may be Waterloo film ref), especially as there is no analysis of the military implications 19/
Here, two references to ‘President Putin’, whereas one would have been sufficient. And ‘making spreading’? Second bullet point also reads poorly. Many similar errors can be found in numerous other slides 20/
In this slide, my attention was drawn to the final line - ‘ability to strike Ukrainian and coastal targets’. Is the Black Sea Fleet attacking non-Ukrainian coastal targets? Or did they intend to say ‘Ukrainian coastal targets’? 21/
The individual preferences of the analysts or editors is also observable. In several slides, for instance, the ‘f’ in Russian Forces is inexplicably capitalized, whereas later the same day it will be in lower case 22/
In one instance, which in Rumsfeld’s Pentagon would have led to a sacking, the template used on 19 March had been discarded on 13 March. 19 March being a Saturday, perhaps a Reservist using the template from the previous weekend was responsible. Also, ‘Russian’ in 2nd bullet? 23/
As these slides are being publicized one would have hoped errors that might accidentally make it into a classified briefing would have been edited out prior to public release. Perhaps PR team afraid to edit DI slides 24/
Lots I haven't covered. And yes I was quite harsh! I look forward to views of @intstrategist @@Sandbagger_01 @warmatters End/
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