GEN Valery Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces & First Deputy Defence Minister by Putin on 9 November 2012.
In other words, he has been the counterpart of our Chairman of the Joint Staff for 10 years!
The #1 guy in RU's military. 2/
Since 2012, he has engaged with our CJCS, Generals' Dempsey, GEN Dunford, & - for the last 4 years - GEN Milley.
He is linked with Russia's "Gerasimov Doctrine," & he was likely the 'brainchild" of the original operation against Ukraine.
He was Putin's "main man." 3/
A few weeks ago, Putin named Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov (the "butcher") the new commander of the Ukrainian theater of operation. He called Gerasimov back to Moscow.
Good call having a "theater commander."
Last week, rumor has Gerasimov in Izyum.
My reaction: WTF? 4/
This would be the equivalent of placing GEN Milley in charge of a tactical battle in a small sector under the operational command of, say, GEN Wolters of EUCOM.
Embarrassing for the senior dude (Gerasimov); awkward for the junior dude (Dvornikov).
And who's in Moscow? 5/
What makes it worse...apparently (if reports are correct) *someone* (Gerasimov?) decided to have a battlefield "huddle" on the front lines near the intense fight occurring near Izyum.
Not a smart "general officer" move. 6/
Then...to make it even worse...it appears RU is still having Command, Control, Communication & Intelligence (C3I) issues.
Russia is having a very hard time overcoming their reliance on overt hierarchical command structure. 7/
As I've said on @CNN & in these tweets, Ukraine's Army has been learning the concept of "mission command" during training w/ US and NATO forces over the last few years.
Mission command is tough, the US military struggles with it at times, but it's required! 8/
It dates back to Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War.
It was called "Auftragstaktik." It described how subordinates took action in the absence of orders ...actions that support intent.
Mission command comes from that. 9/
US doctrine defines MISSION COMMAND as "the exercise of authority & direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile & adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."
Long sentence. 10/
Our doctrine teaches commanders & subordinates to build battlefield relationships centered upon seven principles of mission command:
Competence
Mutual trust
Shared understanding
Commander's intent
Mission orders
Disciplined initiative
Risk acceptance with mitigation. 11/
Additionally, leader development requires commanders "build their bench."
That is, ensure they take time in ensuring their are those on their team who can "take over" if someone is killed or injured on the battlefield.
(See Mel Gibson's scene in "We Were Soldiers....") 12/
From my limited observations of the Russian Army, they have no clue how to do this.
At the senior, middle, or junior level.
The result is indiscipline and chaos when someone is killed or injured and removed from the field. 13/
Ukraine's army has transformed in the last 15 years.
They realize casualties occur on the battlefield, and junior leaders step up to maintain the initiative.
This is another area where the UA outshines the Russian army. 14/
A final thought.
This morning I saw people discussing on the internet how some of these "tips" on twitter provides Russian info that would help them "fix" their mistakes.
Yeah, that won't happen. Their culture is flawed.
So don't worry about "tips." 15/15
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I hesitated to comment on this @washingtonpost article, because I thought their use of "jack-in-the-box" description was inappropriate. But dozens of people have DM'd me asking "what do you think of this?"
A few weeks ago, as the "new phase" was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine.
We're very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening.
Let's review what we should see. 1/12
First, let's talk the Russian army (RU from here out).
RU has attempted to regenerate the forces mauled in the 1st phase. If they follow their doctrine, regeneration usually means new personnel, repair/exchange of equipment, resupply, rest & likely a lot of new leaders.
2/
Given the time & desire of Putin to have a May victory, it's likely little of that happened.
RU likely has either low-strength units, several units consolidated into one, or units poorly manned.
Reports indicate 2-man tank crews (3 needed) & BMP w/ few infantry in back. 3/
A few folks suggested I've been "bold" in some of my predictions accompanying the analysis I've provided on @CNN regarding this conflict.
Beyond tactical assessments, there are 2 primary reasons I've said Ukraine would win this fight.
Here's a short 🧵 on why I say this. 1/17
Reason 1:
Conventional joint & combined arms operations are hard. Real hard. Exceedingly hard.
Coordinating actions of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, air support, naval opns, amphibious landings, special opns & logistics support is tough. 2/
Doing so takes intense training of individuals in their specific skills, exercises that build the capabilities of interprofessional teams who pull theose skills together, the understanding of complex equipment & doctrine, communicating intent...and great leadership. 3/
In India, Boris Johnson was asked if RU "could win the war" in UKR.
He answered "look, it is a realistic possibility."
One must consider the "context" of the remark before judging...but...
In my view, Putin has already lost, strategically.
Here's why. 1/4
-Putin is now seen as a war criminal, a global pariah. He will never stand on a world stage again.
-RU Army has proven to be inept & have repeatedly violated the law of land warfare.
-RU did not achieved any original war aims/strategic objectives
-RU economy is in tatters.
2/4
-The people of UKR will NEVER be subjugated...and UKR will NEVER be successfully occupied.
-UKR's govt has emerged as a modern nation-state & will be a future key leader in Europe.
-@NATO is united & will become even stronger
-The US has reemerged as a world leader 3/4
How 'bout a 🧵on the artillery sent to Ukraine, as the narrative is bouncing between "this is pretty good," to "it's still not enough," to "NATO/US needs to do more!"
The devil is in the details.
(As a former tanker I'm not an expert on arty, but I've used it in combat) 1/10
1st, the towed artillery.
There are 2 types. I don't know how many of each are being sent but here are some details.
The older models are the "M198" (cannon-cockers say "M-one-niner-eight"). Produced in 1969, it's a good cannon.
Range 14-30 km, depending on the round. 2/
The new models are the M777 ("M-triple 7" in cannon-cocker speak).
A great system.
Half the weight of the M198, due to titanium construction. Uses a digital fire-control system that provides navigation, pointing & self-location.
.@jimsciutto provided tapes of alleged conversations between Russian soldiers to @donlemon at the start of his show tonight.
In listening, I thought of 2 things: 1. There is no trust between leaders & led in the Russian Army...that will contribute to their defeat. 1/3
2. Schofield's definition of discipline-which cadets learns their 1st week at West Point-remains relevant to combat leaders in any army, but it doesn't seem important in Russia.
That "definition" was provided by MG Schofield in 1879:
2/3
"The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more like to destroy than to make an army."
Every fighting force requires trust between leaders & led. 3/3