Will provide an update on the Battle of the Donbas later, but reading between the lines of the Ukrainian military communique this morning, does really seem that Russian forward movement is bogging down and the Russians are almost scared to advance. kmu.gov.ua/en/news/operat…
Struck by this paragraph near the end. Ukrainians seem mostly to be hitting Russian artillery, not many tanks at all. Plus shall we say a little confidence about repelling the Russian assaults. Remember, the Battle supposedly started 2 weeks ago.
If the Ukrainians destroyed 17 artillery systems (very large amount) and only 2
Tanks (seems very small), it could indicate that the fight was mostly ranged engagements with few Russian advances where tanks have been exposed.
OK, we have today's Ukrainian claims of Russian equipment losses. Ive updated the chart (2-day intervals) to show how these have progressed. Tanks still considerably down from the peak of the first phase of the Battle of the Donbas, APCs on the rise again.
Confirms that starting a few days ago the combat intensity in the region levelled off or started decreasing (this figure covers all of Ukraine btw, though Russian offensive action is mostly focussed on the Donbas). This is confirms the pessimistic assumptions of Russian tactics.
On April 17, before the battle started. I wondered if what we would see, in Putin's deluded haste to declare a victory on May 9th, was some drip feeding of Russian formations into action when they were ready. If anything, this analysis was too kind.
What we see is lots of little attacks up and down the line--little effective coordination, no sense of an overall priority. The map of the Donbas is basically little eruptions of Russian efforts, with only fractional gains.
The next drip-feed Russian attack might come from the south of the Donbas, BTGs sent from Mariupol. Doubt they will be terribly effective having experienced that campaign for weeks. Seems the Russians are again moving troops around like its a war game.
So we have a levelling off or decreasing of combat intensity. Russians still making lots of little attacks, but with little gains, still suffering significant losses and the Ukrainians showing increasing proficiency with ranged weapons (and attacks in Russia itself)
Info for the Battle of the Donbas. Pentagon saying that either Russian troops or Russian commanders are basically unwilling to act aggressively because of fear of casualties. Russian troops have been in theatre for 2 months. Many Russian forces should be close to breaking
And sounds like no new Russian forces coming in. If this is true and the cupboard is basically bare (few new Russian reinforcements coming ) than the Battle of the Donbas really is just another operation to wreck the Russian army. Battle of Kyiv mark 2.
A truly confused story that can’t separate what the Russian military is unable to do from what it’s choosing to do. Claims that Putin is showing ‘restraint’ in his war with Ukraine. What restraint? . nytimes.com/2022/05/03/wor…
Claims the Russians are not bombing logistics and cities as much as they could. The authors say that some is incompetence, but that some of it is Putin being restrained. Who is their main source? Putin apologist Dmitri Trenin who basically whitewashes Russian military failure
According to Trenin, Russia is only fighting with “less than half strength”. You know what’s missing? Not a single mention of Ukrainian anti-air planning, which has been superb throughout. The article acts like Russia should be able to bomb what they want, when they want.
Been wondering about this U.K. MOD intelligence update, as it’s not really intelligence it’s more an attempted explanation for why the Russians have been so poor, and perhaps a justification for many years of overestimating Russian capabilities.
First it glosses over the reality that increased military spending by Putin’s state (doubling of budget) does not seem to have made the difference many assumed. Regardless of failures in planning and execution, much of the material produced seems underwhelming.
Plus the money seems to be inefficiently spent (corruption) and targeted as glamorous pieces of equipment while ignoring basics such as logistics. Ie, the Russian military before it invaded wasn’t nearly as powerful as portrayed.
Todays update on claimed Russians losses by the Ukrainians again points to a levelling off or decreasing of combat intensity. 18 more Russian tanks destroyed and 26 APC. Otoh a relatively high number of artillery systems (much higher than daily average) at 15.
So seems to support the idea that the Russians are being very cautious in trying to move forward (exhausted, worn out) and the Ukrainians are engaged more with ranged weaponry.
This tweet got some real pushback on my Twitter feed; though not sure why. Much of it seems common sense. The Russians have shown themselves to be much weaker than many expected. As such we should all keep making the systems now to help them win.
However to then go ahead and spend lots of money on systems for the future without taking time learn the lessons of this war is wasteful and knee-jerk. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is already asking many important questions about military development.
For AirPower: for instance, much needs to be digested. Should the push to unmanned vehicles be pushed even further? What is the proper mix of anti-air capabilities? How should air be integrated best with ground and sea?
The increase of Ukrainian attacks in Russia, now evident, show actually how reluctant the Russian government is to fully mobilise or escalate up the NBC chain. There was lots of talk early in the war about the Russians staging a false flag operation to justify escalation
The idea was they would need an incident. Well, that seems now unnecessary. The Ukrainians are blowing up vital facilities in a large Russian more than 350k people (Belogorod)
Battle of the Donbas seems to be already have turned into a battle of attrition that holds out almost no possibility of a major Russian victory and more likely will peter out in the next week or so because of unsustainable losses.
Lets look at losses. Using claimed Ukrainian losses of Russian equipment as a gauge of combat intensity, it seems that the last 10 days have seen a major increase of fighting with much heavier losses being suffered (presumably by both sides).
I made this chart showing cjlaimed losses over 2 day periods between 14 April and just released information for today. Losses really leapt up after 18 April when the Battle was said to have started. The rise in tank loss rates was approx double and in APC losses more than 75%