Much commentary about Gen Gerasimov’s presence in Ukraine & Russian military command. I wanted to open up the vault about his previous experience as a field commander and how that’s relevant too. (Below in Chechnya). /1
It’s surprising to many here in the west that someone of his rank would go to the front. There are larger issues and implications here at play about his visit, and I think @MarkHertling covered them well here /2
Gerasimov was a field commander in Chechnya and led combined arms armies and multiple military districts in his career. He is not what some would call a General Staff “arbat general” - a pejorative for staff officers with little field experience.He has been there a while though/3
Russian commanders do go to the front sometimes to … impose their personality… on problems to try to fix them. Demonstrated here by General Shamanov arguing and pointing in the second Chechen War (photo 1999-2001). Behind him is his subordinate, Valery Gerasimov. /4
In this documentary of the second Chechen war, title Настоящая война, Gerasimov is going over directives to subordinates, and later calling in strikes. I note in the documentary video, he is working/calling strikes while the others are standing around yelling curse words (/4)
How does this pertain to him visiting Ukraine? Suggests he probably needed to straighten things out and get a clear picture for himself. It doesn’t speak highly of trust and clear coms up and down the chain and that’s a larger discussion /5
But also he is a field commander by experience - he prefers to see the terrain and how things look for himself for this operation given the forces committed. He reportedly visited troops before this stated. He’s there because it’s his style AND because things aren’t going well /6
In sum, his purpose for traveling to Ukraine and what was said and done on that trip is unknown. That the Russians took the risk of him being targeted suggests things aren’t going to plan to the point where it needed his correction or at least supervision for next steps. /end
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Now that more Russian military personnel are moving into position near Ukraine, the Kremlin and military’s continued silence & disregard to their own troops and families is unsustainable and may backfire. Signs of early cracks and other considerations below: 👇(/1)
A majority of Russia’s professionally manned BTGs and soldiers are likely deploying near Ukraine or Belarus now, with no national address to the Russian people or little discernible info to soldiers’ families about why —other than training.(/2)
The MoD has pulled contract soldiers from all over Russia, conscripts cannot be used in a combat zone. So that’s a clue. Brass has a history of pressuring conscripts to sign contracts, that news tends to trickle out as it did in 2014/15. 3. apnews.com/article/356ae5…
On my mind: with half the Russian army deploying near Ukraine, there are few errant social media posts for such a large force. Whether this force is contract (or even conscript), little is coming from the families or remaining Russian NGOs. Silence is odd but many factors why 👇
Phone policy: The MOD has spent years cracking down on unauthorized soldier phone use, especially on deployments. I believe they recently offer their own MOD smart phones to certain groups, and encrypted phones to intel types (/2)
Law: foreign agent laws target and bully media, NGOs for several reasons, causing many to stop or reorient their activities (like committees of soldiers mothers).This matters b/c when conscripts are sent illegally into battle these locations are where the families can report (/3
MOD collegiums are not usually a forum for launching major updates. Mostly they are updates mil policy and modernization. Today's event was a little different and Putin again laid down his thinking on Ukraine. Storm clouds gather. My observations below (1/x).
1st: Putin's remarks are not new but lately but when you hear the tone and the alignment of forces behind it - it's an old pain & old frustration w/the security situation near Russia's border. Through his "doorstep" remarks he's all but saying he's unwilling to be cornered(2/x)
Shoygu's assessment that 120 American PMCs in Donetsk w/chemical weapons of some kind. Pardon my skepticism but don't Russian proxies and or Russian intel or others control that area? If so why would they NOT seize said actors for the PR alone? Unless it's a total canard. (3/x)
Lots to unpack from today’s Military Times interview - Ukrainian Military Intelligence assessment on Russian forces and what they might do. They predict a winter-spring offensive (/thread)
Ukrainian Intel predicts an offensive January and February. Some of the items on this map I am assuming are future assessment — for example multiple airborne forces in Belarus (/3)
I compared Russia’s new National Security Strategy with the 2015 NSS and other recent RS strategies.The new NSS incorporates familiar concepts. It reads as very closed off: more survivalist in tone and all refs to cooperation with the West were deleted. Observations below. /
There’s been some reorganization throughout, and IMO not to the betterment of the document. What’s new in the 2021 NSS: ✅ 2/
✅ New ‘bottom line up front’ paragraph that is perhaps a mission statement of sorts: Russia is a sovereign state that has resisted external pressure, economic resilience in the face of sanctions 3/
I’m not an Iran expert. But I am a military analyst. When I see the impact points of Iran’s strike on Asad air base, I don’t see purely symbolic strikes designed to avoid casualties, as some have speculated. The strikes appear to target the base’s military capability.
The missiles struck equipment and storage buildings on the infrastructure (populated) side of the base. The impacts *are not* scattershot across empty fields or airstrips on the southern side of the base (image from December)
There aren’t public U.S. confirmations about the number of Iranian missiles launched that failed to arrive on target. Without knowing where other missiles would have landed, it’s hard to assess the full targeting strategy.