I'd agree the UAF took the importance of NCO's to heart but Brig Gen Hilbert is I think mistaken that the Ukrainian military had built an effective NCO corps by the time the war started. Important not to draw false lessons. Some observations... 1/13
Just before the conflict Nick Reynolds and I had long interviews ranging from junior enlisted on the line of contact to the deputy chair of the national security and defence council about the structure, planning, and preparations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 2/13
We haven't published a lot of the material because much of it could have been useful to the Russians just prior to the invasion. However, I heard very consistent messages on NCOs and junior leadership from all ranks. 3/13
While the UAF aspired to have a professional NCO corps it was very nascent. There was not a strong PME structure for their NCOs. Nor was the exact role of these personnel consistent across formations given a lack of institutional culture. 4/13
Furthermore, before the conflict the UAF had significant retention problems, especially among enlisted personnel who had received specialist training, which included many junior NCOs. However... 5/13
What the Ukrainians did have was a large body of older troops who had experienced fighting in 2014/2015 - and in some cases going back to Afghanistan - who were serving across all ranks. If you went to UAF units you would find 20 year olds and 40 years at the same rank. 6/13
In addition, because of the retention problem, and therefore training more specialists than normal, there was a large body of experienced military personnel in civilian roles who could be mobilised. 7/13
Another aspect to this was that commanders kept rollerdexes of old comrades with specialist skills in areas like signals and logs and when their unit was rotated into the JFO - for example - would call them up and issue short term contracts. 8/13
So in many respects, roles that in a NATO military would be the preserve of a long service NCO were actually being filled by very motivated and experienced short-notice reservists (without said reservist being afflicted by stupid quantities of pointless paperwork). 9/13
The result however is that UAF units have lots of very experienced troops serving next to and at the same rank as newly mobilised troops, and this is not concentrated in a few formations but actually distributed across a lot of the force. 10/13
The UAF were enthusisatic about training provided by the US, UK and Canada (and it was a package at ascending echelons so the aid by these three countries can't really be separated out). But the Ukrainians entered this war at the beginning of reforming the force. 11/13
There is a false narrative that UAF success is because of NATO training. NATO training helped. But in many ways the 'eight years' that Brig Gen Hilbert speaks of both shows how much impact training can have, and how much more could have been achieved. 12/13
There is an interesting lesson here about avoiding self-replication when providing training. The Ukrainian model has proven successful, but resembles Finland's approach more than the US. NATO should be cautious about telling Finns about 'best practice' if it joins. 13/13
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This is a really important and nuanced issue. I fully agree with @PhillipsPOBrien that jumping to conclusions about capability priorities would be unwise. I do think a number of @NATO members need to increase defence spending though, despite Russia's performance in Ukraine 1/14
On not jumping to conclusions: we have a very fragmentary data set. Some weapons systems that are conducive to being filmed (ATGMs) are massively represented. Other systems like artillery are becoming more prevelant bc of UAV footage, but still under represented. But... 2/14
The bigger issue is that footage of single engagements does not show how weapons are being used in combination or the shapig that produces those engagements. Having dug into a couple of cases the initial hypothesis has often differed from the outcome. Good OA takes time. 3/14
SPECIAL REPORT - Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion - Nick Reynolds and I publish a study for @RUSI_org of how Russian plans in Ukraine are evolving. Top line: Russia is trying to prepare for a protracted conflict. rusi.org/explore-our-re… Key Points... 1/5
Almost all of Russia's precision munitions, cruise and ballistic missiles, communications, and electronic warfare systems rely on western made critical components. Russia is actively trying to safeguard its supply chains from sanctions. 2/5
The Russian government is escalating its rhetoric, preparing its domestic population for moving the economy onto a war footing and enabling the mobilisation of reserves and retention of conscripts. This carries significant risks if Russian operations continue to fail. 3/5
On Bucha: after my last meeting in Ukraine I was walking to the car when a senior Ukrainian security official, flanked by two General Officers grabbed my arm and said "by the way; the Russians have moved a unit onto the Belarusian axis who will lead the killings." 1/4.
Anyone saying that Bucha is the result of brutalisation or rogue behaviour is wrong. This was the plan. It was pre-meditated. It is consistent with Russian methods in Chechnya. And if the Russian military had been more successful there would have been many more towns like it. 2/4
This context - in which the Ukrainians knew that there were troops preparing to perpetrate acts like this, with the Kremlin describing Ukrainian identity as an accident of history - also explains why Ukrainian resistence has been so fierce. They see the stakes as existential. 3/4
We are headed towards a siege of Kyiv. For those looking for preparations for military resistance, @SpencerGuard is the person to follow. On the non-mil side I am deeply concerned about the impending rise in civilian casualties. Some thoughts on how to prepare 1/15.
1 - WATER - while the mains still work fill every vesel. Fill your bath. Fill pots and pans. Heavy plastic bags. Condoms hold a surprising amount. Be creative. Water will be needed by medics, for fire fighting, and for drinking. And people will need lots of it. 2/15.
2 - FOOD - authorities should have been stockpiling high calorie non-perishable food. They probably haven't. Get all you can. Inventory what you have. Cook and freeze perishables while you have power. Pack in cold place with ice (make ice). Start limiting consumption now. 3/15.
A quick note on the written statement on Ajax published today as to why resolving the vibration issue is and will continue to be difficult questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statem… I'm not an expert on armoured vehicle design, but I know several people who are. They tell me... 1/12
Vibration in an armoured vehicle is not something you can get rid of. Lots of heavy components moving quickly vibrate. However, across a system these vibrations will interact differently at different speeds as different components move at different rates. 2/12
At some speeds some component's vibrations will cancel one another out. At other speeds they will magnify one another. Where in the vehilce vibration is most intense changes at different speeds. 3/12
A thought on the incident off Crimea yesterday. I won't comment on the dynamics with Russia because that's already been well covered by colleagues including @KeirGiles and @MarkGaleotti. But a point on credibility and the media. 1/
There are lots of reasons why @DefenceHQ can't play it straight all the time in public statements. While HMG has more credibility than the Russian Government, yesterday could easily have turned into a 'we said, they said' narrative if it weren't for @bealejonathan's reporting 2/
Now @bealejonathan certainly gets under the skin of quite a few people in defence. But when it mattered what we needed was someone with a reputation for being independent, critical, and accurate. We didn't need someone who was 'on side'. 3/