How to Keep a Drone Alive: a thread. While the loss rate of UAVs in Ukraine - on both sides - is very high, it doesn’t have to be this way. Making UAVs survivable, however, comes with some trade-offs and support requirements. 1/20 What is downing UAVs?
1) Jamming and hijacking of their control frequencies.
2) Denial of satellite navigation.
3) Saturation of their electronics.
4) Shoot downs.
2/20

Numbers in War: a thread. I wanted to write this because it highlights some significant dilemmas in writing about ongoing conflict, and can hopefully help readers interpret and properly use reports. 1/17 Today my colleague Nick Reynolds and I published ‘Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine rusi.org/explore-our-re… In which we report that the AFU are losing 10,000 UAVs a month. 2/17

I was asked to write a piece today on the challenges in ramping up munitions production in @NATO for @Telegraph. Unfortunately it had a very misleading headline added to it which needs clarification: telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/02/1… 1/5 NATO has munitions stocks which will last some months. However, because of various challenges in expanding manufacture, a decision to increase production will see a lag before output increases. The decision needs to be made now therefore, otherwise we will get into trouble. 2/5

There has been a lot of discussion around the effects of winter on operations. I thought I’d outline a couple of aspects of winter fighting that are both critical and often under appreciated. BLUF: Winter will likely favour the Ukrainian military. 1/17 A lot of discussion has revolved around the question of mud and tanks. We’ll circle back to this but fundamentally it is not significant. The real impact of winter is on infantry, secondly on logistics, and the impact on logistics has a secondary effect on military vehicles. 2/17

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence; @Justin_Br0nk with Nick Reynolds and myself assess the stages of Russia's air and strike campaigns against Ukraine. rusi.org/explore-our-re… BLUF 1/17 Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 2/17

Thread on Methodologies for Assessment. There are a few different kinds of assessment that often get compared on social media when they aren’t necessarily comparable. For those who don’t work in the field, I thought I’d outline a couple of them and the challenges involved. 1/22 When reading any assessment ask why the assessment is useful to a decision maker. The first kind of assessment is prediction. “x is highly likely/likely/unlikely to happen”. This assessment flags a problem the decision maker is going to have to contend with 2/22

So, I got some things wrong in June and figured it is worth outlining why and how it changes analysis for the conflict. In short, the Russians have less ammunition than colleagues and I thought. Have to be wary jumping to opposite conclusion however. reuters.com/world/russia-i… 1/15 In June we were looking at the weaknesses in the Russian military (what could be targeted). Ammo was an obvious tactical target as it required fewer strikes than the guns. We outlined this publicly here: static.rusi.org/special-report…, 2/15

Lots of debate about whether something is an offensive. I think there has been some confusion because the military use some ordinary terms to have specific technical definitions and it can lead to mil and non-mil statements no lining up exactly. Short thread outlining some 1/10 TACTICAL: A military action conducted using the resources organic to a military unit. Thus, a company attack is a tactical action by a company. A Brigade attack means an attack conducted with the organic assets of a brigade. Highest tactical echelon is Corps or CAA in Russia 2/10

SPECIAL REPORT - Silicone Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia's War Machine. First in a line of work at @RUSI_org to deconstruct Russia's weapons and the covert supply chains that enable their manufacture. rusi.org/explore-our-re… This study includes assessments of 27 Russian weapons systems including its missiles, rockets, communications, navigational equipment, EW complexes and SIGINT systems. All critically dependent upon western manufactured components. There is more to come.

The @amnesty report demonstrates a weak understanding of the laws of armed conflict, no understanding of military operations, and indulges in insinuations without supplying supporting evidence. 1/4 It is not a violation of IHL for Ukrainian military personnel to situate themselves in the terrain they are tasked to defend rather than in some random piece of adjacent woodland where they can be bypassed. 2/4

Seen a few takes recently arguing that Russian weapons don’t work well. Having spent time inside a number of Russian manufactured systems I thought I’d address why I think there is often a gap between Russian weapons on paper versus their performance in the field. 1/25 There are two primary problems with Russian weapons: integration and cognitive load. To begin with integration, a few years ago some Mi-24s allocated to ISAF were undergoing maintenance. It was found that some of the bolts holding the tail rotor in place had cracks in them. 2/25

I'd agree the UAF took the importance of NCO's to heart but Brig Gen Hilbert is I think mistaken that the Ukrainian military had built an effective NCO corps by the time the war started. Important not to draw false lessons. Some observations... 1/13

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1521870171073351682

Just before the conflict Nick Reynolds and I had long interviews ranging from junior enlisted on the line of contact to the deputy chair of the national security and defence council about the structure, planning, and preparations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 2/13

This is a really important and nuanced issue. I fully agree with @PhillipsPOBrien that jumping to conclusions about capability priorities would be unwise. I do think a number of @NATO members need to increase defence spending though, despite Russia's performance in Ukraine 1/14

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1521390660863025152

On not jumping to conclusions: we have a very fragmentary data set. Some weapons systems that are conducive to being filmed (ATGMs) are massively represented. Other systems like artillery are becoming more prevelant bc of UAV footage, but still under represented. But... 2/14

SPECIAL REPORT - Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion - Nick Reynolds and I publish a study for @RUSI_org of how Russian plans in Ukraine are evolving. Top line: Russia is trying to prepare for a protracted conflict. rusi.org/explore-our-re… Key Points... 1/5 Almost all of Russia's precision munitions, cruise and ballistic missiles, communications, and electronic warfare systems rely on western made critical components. Russia is actively trying to safeguard its supply chains from sanctions. 2/5

On Bucha: after my last meeting in Ukraine I was walking to the car when a senior Ukrainian security official, flanked by two General Officers grabbed my arm and said "by the way; the Russians have moved a unit onto the Belarusian axis who will lead the killings." 1/4. Anyone saying that Bucha is the result of brutalisation or rogue behaviour is wrong. This was the plan. It was pre-meditated. It is consistent with Russian methods in Chechnya. And if the Russian military had been more successful there would have been many more towns like it. 2/4

We are headed towards a siege of Kyiv. For those looking for preparations for military resistance, @SpencerGuard is the person to follow. On the non-mil side I am deeply concerned about the impending rise in civilian casualties. Some thoughts on how to prepare 1/15.

https://twitter.com/SpencerGuard/status/1497583307504046087

1 - WATER - while the mains still work fill every vesel. Fill your bath. Fill pots and pans. Heavy plastic bags. Condoms hold a surprising amount. Be creative. Water will be needed by medics, for fire fighting, and for drinking. And people will need lots of it. 2/15.

A quick note on the written statement on Ajax published today as to why resolving the vibration issue is and will continue to be difficult questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statem… I'm not an expert on armoured vehicle design, but I know several people who are. They tell me... 1/12 Vibration in an armoured vehicle is not something you can get rid of. Lots of heavy components moving quickly vibrate. However, across a system these vibrations will interact differently at different speeds as different components move at different rates. 2/12

A thought on the incident off Crimea yesterday. I won't comment on the dynamics with Russia because that's already been well covered by colleagues including @KeirGiles and @MarkGaleotti. But a point on credibility and the media. 1/ There are lots of reasons why @DefenceHQ can't play it straight all the time in public statements. While HMG has more credibility than the Russian Government, yesterday could easily have turned into a 'we said, they said' narrative if it weren't for @bealejonathan's reporting 2/

There is often a peculiar deference that military personnel express for academic writing, as though it were a mystical art. I figured it might be interesting for folks to read about the process, and what it takes to produce good writing.
1) It is a team sport
2) Practice

https://twitter.com/PyriteAdvisor/status/1383299578791796737

Writing is a team sport. It is about communication. If someone reads your work and misses the point, it is probably because you didn't express it clearly. So, getting honest feedback before publication is vital.