The narrative that NATO training is the main cause for Ukraine's mil. performance says perhaps more about our own perceptions of the (inflated) military value of special operations forces (where a lot of training efforts went into) than broader mil. reality.
US/NATO training certainly is playing an important role in many ways. E.g., I do think mission command executed by more junior officers the first couple of days of the war played a very important role at the tactical level in coordinating tactical retreats/overall defense.
One reason why some analysts (including myself) underestimated the combat effectiveness of the UAF is what @Jack_Watling points out re. NCO corps: the UAF were in the middle of substantial & incomplete mil. reforms usually...
...not a good position to be in when fighting a major military power even when your force has substantial combat experience.
*Our inflated perceptions of the military value of special operations forces relative to regular forces.
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"Taiwan is supposed to receive 250 Stinger surface-to-air missiles in phased shipments by March 2026. But 'there is certainly a risk of a delay in this year's deliveries due to changes in the international situation,' a 🇹🇼Ministry of National Defense official told reporters."
The ministry reported a similar holdup...for M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. The island was to receive 40 of the artillery units between 2023 & 2025, but 🇺🇸 informed 🇹🇼 that delivery will be postponed to 2026 at the earliest due to "tight" production in the US.
Z.b. “With current casualty and major equipment loss rates continuing, my guess is that Russia will not have the ability to take this fight into June,” habe ich @joshuakeating letzte Woche erklärt. grid.news/story/global/2…
“If the war goes on with casualty rates similar to the first weeks of the war, Russia will need a longer operational pause in June and July, while reserves are being mobilized and additional reservists called up."
Diese Gefechtspause kann/muss die Ukraine militärisch nutzen.
Zur militärischen Sinnhaftigkeit von der Lieferung schwerer Waffen an die Ukraine:
1. Die Lieferung von zusätzlichen Kampf/Schützenpanzern, Panzerhaubitzen, Flugabwehrsysteme etc. ermöglicht es der 🇺🇦 operative Reserven zu ( eine Art "Frontfeuerwehr") zu bilden.
2. Die "Frontfeuerwehr" ( in der Stärke mehrerer Panzerbrigaden jede taktisch gut positioniert) kann bei Durchbrüchen die Frontlinie stabilisieren in dem sie effektiv Gegenstösse durchführt und im besten Fall russische Truppen selbst einkesselt.
3. Diese operativen mechanisierten Reserven können auch zusammengezogen werden ("massiert" werden) um russische Stellungen anzugreifen, zu durchbrechen, sowie im besten Fall die gesamte 🇷🇺Frontlinie zurückzuwerfen.
-🇷🇺 forces are slowly advancing in Popasna
-🇷🇺 forces continue to attack 🇺🇦 defensive positions in vicinity Avdiivka (unsuccessful thus far)
- 🇷🇺 forces are advancing northwest of Staromlynivka towards Temyrivka
- The 🇺🇦Azovstal defensive perimeter remains intact in Mariupol.
- Around 500 fighters (🇺🇦Border Guards/National Police) have reportedly been all successfully evacuated to Azovstal Plant from another part of the city.
Quick update on the military situation in Ukraine (Donbas) on April 20:
- 🇷🇺 long-range fires & probing attacks continue
- 🇷🇺 forces have reached outskirts of Lozove
- 🇷🇺 forces have taken control of Kreminna & are pushing toward Zarichne and Torske