. @KofmanMichael and I have a new piece out in @SurvivalEditors 👇

In it we argue that the operative factor in this war is attrition, inflicted primarily through artillery/strike drones, & consequently needs to be included in any theory of success.

tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10… While Western countries should continue to help Ukrainian forces improve their overall quality & their ability to scale up combined-arms operations, prevailing conditions in Ukraine still favor attritional & positional approaches rather than those suitable for maneuver warfare.

‘The western official says that a strategy of “active defence” — holding defensive lines but probing for weak spots to exploit coupled with long-range air strikes — would allow Ukraine to “build out its forces” this year…’ h/t @ChristopherJM

ft.com/content/d2f3b2… …and prepare for 2025, when a counteroffensive would have a better chance.’

‘Oleksandr Syrsky…suggested this week that the strategy does not amount to a drastic shift. “Our goals remain unchanged: holding our positions . . .exhausting the enemy by inflicting maximum losses.”’

My latest for @ForeignPolicy: 'What Ridley Scott’s ‘Napoleon’ Gets Wrong About War'

The film’s ideas have poisoned military thinking for centuries.
🧵👇 1/n

foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/02/nap… I’m just a defense analyst, so I’ll leave a proper critique of Ridley Scott’s new blockbuster biopic Napoleon to the many reviewers who have already disparaged it.
My perspective on Napoleon is a different one. 2/n

I just returned from another research trip to Ukraine with @KofmanMichael, @RALee85, & @konrad_muzyka. My colleagues and I gained lots of new insights into the current state of the war some of which we will share publicly in the near future. Here are a 5 quick thoughts: 1. Morale remains high, but exhaustion among troops & impact on attrition on materiel is visible. Defenses are holding while offensive operations continue along select parts of the front; innovative new tactical concepts are being tried out.

#New (short) 🧵: @konrad_muzyka, @RALee85, @KofmanMichael, & I just returned from another research trip in Ukraine. We gained lots of new insights into the current state of war some of which we will share publicly. Here are a few quick thoughts. 1. Morale remains high, but exhaustion among troops and impact on attrition on materiel is visible.
2. The importance of the FPV drone adaption battle and ability to scale FPV production for current & future military operations by both sides cannot be overstated.

I thought tanks were obsolete?

"Tanks, though increasingly vulnerable to drones, loitering munitions and modern anti-tank guided missiles, which strike from the top, remain the only platform on the battlefield combining mobility, protection and serious firepower." Similar to how the IDF fought initially in the 1973 War.

“They [Russians in Ukraine] fought there in a single-corps fashion, instead of using combined arms tactics,” says Brigadier General Hisham Ibrahim, commander of the IDF's Armoured Corps.

economist.com/briefing/2023/…

Any upcoming military operation will also for the first time test some of the core tenets of the IDFs new & much debated ‘Decisive Victory’ operational concept. The "Decisive Victory" concept has been specifically developed by the IDF over the past years to rapidly defeat “diffuse, rocket-based terror armies” (i.e Hamas & Hizbollah) Its success or failure can also perhaps teach other militaries much about the future of warfare.

#Neu: Österreich kauft 8 IRIS-T SLS/SLM Luftverteidigungssysteme. Eine Einheit/System besteht aus einer taktischen Einsatzzentrale, 3 Launcher mit jeweils 8 Lenkflugkörpern, einem Radarsystem und einer Materialerhaltungseinrichtung. Vier der Systeme sollen über eine kurze Reichweite (SLS, 15 bis 20 Kilometer) bzw. mittlerere Reichweite (SLM, 40 bis 50 Kilometer) verfügen. In Summe also werden 24 Raketenwerfer.
kleinezeitung.at/politik/innenp…

Must-read by @KofmanMichael & @RALee85 in @WarOnTheRocks on Ukraine's counteroffensive at three months.

"Ukraine’s offensive neither is over, nor has it failed."

warontherocks.com/2023/09/persev… "What the past 18 months of fighting illustrate is that Western nations need to develop a long-term plan to sustain and improve Ukraine’s war effort instead of pinning hopes on the next capability that will be introduced on the battlefield."

6 kurze Punkte zur 🇺🇦 Gegenoffensive:

1. Der mediale Fokus liegt zu sehr auf die einzelnen 🇷🇺Verteidigungslinien. Durchbrüche an einzelnen Stellen der diversen Linien mögen taktisch signifikant sein, haben aber wenig Aussagekraft bezüglich strategischer Erfolge. 2. Es war immer klar, dass früher oder später die 🇷🇺 Verteidigungslinien durchbrochen werden können. Die Frage war immer unter welchen Bedingungen, vor allem ob die Ukraine noch genügend Reserven haben wird um in den Bewegungskrieg überzugehen und tief in den Raum zu stoßen.

Good piece. The “engine driving the effort [breaching Russian layered defenses] are hundreds of small-scale assault groups, often just 8 to 10 soldiers, each tasked with attacking a single trench, tree line or house.” nytimes.com/2023/09/02/wor… “Before attacking Russians in a village, Ukrainians fight to control the elevated positions on the flanks, hoping to make the Russian positions untenable and limit the house-to-house fighting.”

Interesting article on Ukrainian special forces’ evolving operational concepts in the face of more effective Russian electronic warfare capabilities. Squares with some of the info we gathered last month. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/… Good tactical vignette: “The Russians were using the electronic warfare system to spoil the work of Ukraine’s satellite-guided rockets. The drone…crashed into one of the antennas, detonating on contact.”

New🧵: @konrad_muzyka , @RALee85 , @KofmanMichael,& I spent some time this month visiting the frontlines in Ukraine to gain new insights into the ongoing counteroffensive & the war overall. Here are some general observations. (Note: More detailed analysis will be coming out by all of us in the coming weeks.)

First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch).

New interview with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, the top officer in Ukraine’s armed forces. It contains interesting details on his relationship with 🇺🇸Gen. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the impact of Prigozhin's mutity on the counteroffensive etc.
washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/… "The questions that weigh on him daily: When will Ukraine’s Western partners provide the arms he needs...
Zaluzhny said he relays his concerns to Milley, whom he has grown to deeply admire and considers a friend, several times per week in conversations that can last hours..."

Interesting interview with the CEO of Rheinmetall:
"When it comes to tank ammunition, we have the largest production capacity in the world. There is no problem." Re: 155mm art. shells production: "We can currently produce 450,000 shots..per year..."
rnd.de/wirtschaft/rhe… "With the Spanish manufacturer Expal, which we would like to take over in the course of the summer, we intend to expand our joint capacity to up to 600,000 shots."

A few quick thoughts on the ongoing 🇺🇦 Ukrainian counteroffensive:

1.) From what I was able to observe over the last 72 hours, it appears that we have a entered the ‘’main phase’ of the counteroffensive, although the bulk of Ukrainian forces has not been committed AFAIK. 2.) It makes little sense to try to identify the main effort or multiple main axes of advance at this stage. The fog of war persists & both sides are conducting information warfare operations. So this is largely a pointless exercise.

My latest for @ForeignPolicy : Europe should bury its naïveté regarding Chinese military power, even if no Chinese missiles will likely rain down on Paris, London, or Berlin. foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/07/ger… Luftwaffe pilots, even retired ones who haven’t flown recently, could teach Chinese pilots about planning and executing effective suppression and destruction of enemy air defense (critical operations known by their military acronyms, SEAD & DEAD).

Ukrainian infantry kill chain in the trenches: “Kaban and Cadet were to shoot the S.P.G.-9 every hour until dawn. Kaban kept in his cargo pocket a digital tablet with several dozen targets flagged on a satellite map:…” This @NewYorker piece is a must-read.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/… “…Russian bunkers, trenches, and observation posts that had been identified by Ukrainian drones. ‘The key is regular strikes,’ the officer said. ‘It’s crawling with infantry over there.’ Both Kaban and Cadet were now smiling.”

My latest for @ForeignPolicy: The only practical policy to deter Russia once the hot phase of this war ends is to help turn Ukraine into a formidable military porcupine with hardened, lethal quills.
foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/22/ukr… As the ongoing war demonstrates, a porcupine defense strategy for Ukraine needs to acknowledge that any future war is likely to be similarly dominated by large-scale land battles, mutual attrition, and the need for lots of firepower and protection from it.

On May 21/22 1809, the French are defeated by the Austrians under Archduke Charles at Aspern-Essling near Vienna.

It marks the 1st serious military defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in his career.

( Some French history books refer to the battle as a a draw.) #TodayInHistory The Austrians would be crushed a few weeks later at the Battle of Wagram. The 1809 campaign launched by Austria shows the dangers of going to war with an army in the middle of org./tact. reforms & disagreements among senior political/military leaders at the grand strategy level.

Interesting new report: "Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles & command & control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems in July 2022." rusi.org/explore-our-re… "This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire."