If you've been following the war with even a modicum of interest, by now you've heard a lot about the vaunted Russian artillery. It's possible you're wondering why and how Russia's artillery might be better than competitors. Let's take a look. (1/N)
Let's start by thinking about what sort of problem Russian military planners might be trying to solve. In this case, we have to start with the US Air Force. It's good. Very good. Going back to WW2, America has fielded exceptionally powerful air assets. (2/N)
So how might Russian planners prepare for this? Risking everything on wrestling air superiority away from the USAF is a dangerous plan. The Russian Air Force is good, but this is still a big gamble. So, you must build a military that can function without air superiority. (3/N)
The way you do this is by fielding more and better anti air defenses and artillery. The AA turns your army into a porcupine that can ward off air attack, and artillery lets you apply firepower without using lots of aircraft. Russia accordingly excels in these systems. (4/N)
Russian anti-air weaponry is exceptional. From the S-400 (a world class long range system that shot down a Ukrainian jet from 150 km away early in the war) to point defense systems like the Pantsir. But that's not the subject of this thread. Let's talk artillery. (5/N)
Remember what we said about planning for a war where you may not have control of the air. That means Russian ground forces need to be able to dish out massive punishment on their own. Russian army units have both a higher concentration of artillery, and longer ranges. (6/N)
We can use an American brigade as a baseline for this. An American armored brigade will have a single artillery battalion equipped with 18 "Paladin" howitzers, to support a cav squadron and 3 combined arms battalions. This is a unit heavy in armored vehicles and infantry. (7/N)
In contrast, a typical Russian brigade will be equipped with 54 artillery pieces - quite literally three times that of an American brigade. This is a unit with fewer infantry but more big guns (more about the types of weapon in a moment). (8/N)
Now, it's important to remember the air power aspect of all this. America fully expects to control the air and deliver firepower that way. Just look at what American air power did to Iraq. Russian brigades are instead built to deliver punishment independent of air assets. (9/N)
Let's look at some of the weapons that Russia uses. First, we have the 2S19 Msta. This is a 152 mm howitzer that is corollary to America's 155 mm Paladin. It has a firing range of about 25 km, slightly outranging the Paladin. A Russian brigade will have 36 of these! (10/N)
Russia also fields the "Tornado" family of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). There are a few variants, but the G version, for example, can fire 40 122 mm rockets up to 40 km. Another variant fires heavier 300 mm rockets. A typical brigade has 18 Tornados. (11/N)
The Tornado is the newest and best Russian MLRS system, but the army also fields other rocket systems like the BM-21 Grad and the BM-30 Smerch. (12/N)
So to recap, the Russian army deploys artillery with three times the density of an equivalent American formation, and their weapons have a range advantage. It's all about firepower. (13/N)
Russia isn't fighting the American army, and God willing they never will. However, American doctrine is the starting point for western militaries and Ukraine is operating at a similarly huge artillery disadvantage, but without the air superiority that America can count on. (14/N)
Russia is fighting this war the way they plan to. They are pummeling Ukraine with ground based firepower at various operational depths, with brigade fires on the local battlefield and Kalibrs doing damage deep in the country. (15/N)
Ultimately, when able, Russian troops would prefer not to overrun Ukrainian positions with tanks and infantry. They would instead like to fix Ukrainian units in place and destroy them with their overwhelming fires. This is what we're seeing in the Donbas. (16/N)
Addendum: a nice graphic from 2019. Forces have been reallocated so this is no longer a representation of facts on the ground, but it illustrates how much more artillery heavy Russian forces are than NATO competitors.
@MoonofA Notes the toll this artillery edge is taking on Ukrainian infantry.
“Our warfighters are unleashing maximum lethality by land, sea, and air. No tepid rules of engagement, no legal niceties, and no mercy. Operation Rape Gorilla is designed with one goal in mind: kill to win by going beast mode.”
“Fighters of Operations Group North are developing offensive actions in seven occupied settlements. Precision munitions were used to strike rear area objects of the VSU. Combat groups advanced 1.13 km in the direction of Lyman.”
“We are striking the Zionist entity with new weapons that the west has never comprehended. These insolent dogs will feel the boot. Phase 9 of Operation Righteous Promise 4 is underway.”
Japanese Infantry was the best in the world if you overlook them losing in essentially every situation where they weren’t fighting Chinese conscripts, and yes their Navy “ruled the pacific” until it got blown up six months into the war. Other than that, yes. Sure.
Since lots of people are arguing with this, let’s unpack the topic a bit.
Japan had very competent surface forces, naval aviation that was by far the best in the world until midway, and land forces with a huge appetite for operational risks and aggression. That goes a long way.
On the particular subject of the Japanese infantry, people confuse the operational successes for exceptional infantry forces, which is a mistake. The broad pattern you see from the Japanese across many decades is sweeping offensive successes that churn up huge casualties.
The adage that an attacking force requires a 3:1 superiority over the defense has become so ubiquitous and frequently repeated that it has become an implicit “rule” of analysis. The problem is that it’s not true, and nobody seems to know where it comes from.
The actual source of the ratio is a 1991 manual from the US Army CGSC, which simply said: “Historical experience has shown that a defender has approximately a 50-50 probability of successfully defeating an attacking force approximately three times his equivalent strength.”
The idea there was to establish rules of thumb for desirable force ratios in different situations. For example, 1:6 for delaying defense, 1:1 for local counterattack, 18:1 for penetration to depth, etc.
I was thinking recently about the similarities between contemporary NATO and the cloaked imperialism of Athens. It’s not a perfect parallel, obviously, but the similarities are quite strong.
Like NATO, the Delian League was formed as a defensive alliance against a hostile foreign power, with the Persian Empire as a stand in for the USSR.
Polities in Northern Greece, fearing that Sparta’s strategic standoff in the Peloponnese would render them an unreliable protector, formed the Delian League to wage a continuation war against Persia.
Agincourt is among the most famous medieval battles, immortalized in Shakespeare's Henry V. It's also badly understood and usually gets the cursory treatment that you see in threads like this, where it becomes mainly a story about mud. (1)
The popular story is essentially that the French made a foolish charge across a muddy field, which bogged them down and allowed them to be picked apart by the English. This was played up to comedic proportions in Netflix's "The King". (2)
Agincourt is in fact a very interesting engagement for reasons that having nothing to do with mud, and its doubtful whether the wet ground actually made a decisive impact on the battle. Rather, Agincourt is a highly instructive lesson in battlefield geometry. (3)
This is a slop post, but there's a broader problem with the way people try to score cheap points by pointing out things like the life expectancy issue, the HIV rate, alcoholism, etc. These issues are very telling as to why Russians feel the way they do about Putin and the USSR.
Westerners broadly misunderstand how the collapse of the USSR was experienced in places like Russia and Ukraine. The implosion of the Soviet economy was not a pleasant experience in any way, and the country did not make a clean transition, either politically or economically.
All the generally understood problems with the Soviet planned economy were true. Soviet central planning was more wasteful, less dynamic, less innovative, and created less wealth than western market economies. All that being said, the system largely "worked."