🧵 Starting a thread of random books that I like and recommend that people might find interesting. This is comprehensive look at how the Soviet Union’s unparalleled systems and rules of state secrecy shaped the powers of the state. Harrison frames secrecy as the pivot of a tradeoff which gave the USSR a high degree of security at the expense of state capacity.

The problem with bluffing is getting called. Nothing about this threat even makes sense. If you think that Ukraine is worth fighting a war with Russia, you wouldn't set some weird redline where you pledge to intervene *after* Ukraine has been defeated.

A quick note on combat engineering: Over the last few months, we started to hear Ukraine talk about ramping up the construction of fortifications as they faced a pivot to a strategic defense, in some cases specifically calling for a corollary to Russia's "Surovikin Line." This will likely be very difficult for Ukraine, for a few reasons. At the core is the dearth of dedicated combat engineering in the AFU, in contrast to the Russian Armed Forces.

Americans bragging about lend-lease always strikes me as rather funny, because you're basically taking pride in the fact that FDR was a naïve idiot with a communist-compromised administration who gave away hundreds of billions worth of equipment for free. In real time, American officialdom and army leadership was actually extraordinarily upset about FDR's profligate generosity, when he started shipping off American readiness stocks while they were trying to prepare for war.

At the moment, Russia is grinding forward almost everywhere on the front, creating a bit of ambiguity as to their intentions. The overall operational trajectory in Donetsk Oblast, however, is fairly clear. With Marinka captured, they will advance up the N15 line to Kurakhove. (1) Kurakhove as an important center of support for Ugledar - artillery based in this area was critical in helping Ukraine hold Ugledar last year. Advancing up this line puts Ulgedar into a severe salient. (2)

Thread: Manpower and Force Generation Choices

The ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza have resurrected debates around old concepts like mobilization and force structure. A few years ago, these were just esoteric topics for military historians to chew on, but now they are back. (1) Force generation and structure seem like a simple question of demographics - a question only of squeezing fighting aged males out of the population pyramid and getting them into uniform. It *feels* like all that should matter is the overall size and age of the population. (2)

Think about the fact that Putin got indicted by the International Criminal Court for evacuating children out of active combat zones, but Israel basically has a blank check to bomb civilian areas with impunity. Complaining about the hypocrisy of such institutions is always lame. The "Rules Based Order" doesn't exist to be an impartial agent of the law, it exists to enhance the power of the Atlantic bloc. "Hypocrisy" as such isn't a bug, but a feature.

US deterrence is based on so-called "tripwire forces" - the idea that American forces can be forward deployed around the world, and a serious attack on these forces can bring the whole US military apparatus down on your head.

https://twitter.com/KanekoaTheGreat/status/1717072618053107761

The problem is that if someone thinks you're bluffing and they call you on it, the entire system of deterrence falls apart unless you respond. That's been the basis of America's limited ("proportional") actions in the Middle East over the years.

The widespread perception in the non-western world that the US Military and the IDF are paper tigers is just as delusional as the belief that the United States is an unbeatable force without rival. Unfortunately, the simultaneous existence of these myths is a recipe for conflict. The Cold War was strangely stable because both the USSR and the USA took each other seriously as competent military powers and understood what a war would mean. Tragically today we have an unstable admixture of hubris and contempt.

Thread: Russia, Ukraine, and NATO's doctrinal reversal

Ever since the Ukrainians began their counteroffensive in the south, a theme has emerged; namely, that the Russians are fighting in a manner eerily similar to that dictated by NATO's late cold-war doctrine. (1) Let's start by going back to some very rudimentary basics. In warfare, there are really two types of combat assets: maneuver elements and fires. Coordinating the interplay of various maneuver assets and ranged fires is the foundational task of military operations. (2)

Britain wants to openly send personnel to Ukraine to provide training and support. They are almost certainly going to die.

dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1… And no, there will not be an Article 5 invocation after their facilities inevitably get smacked by the VKS.

On this day in 1683, a combined Polish-German army defeats the Ottomans at the Battle of Vienna. The city had been besieged by the Ottoman force for two months when the Christian relief force arrived. The battle is famous as the scene of the largest cavalry charge in history. After an indecisive infantry engagement, the Christian leaders ordered a massed cavalry charge of nearly 18,000 horsemen, led by the Polish king and his heavy lancers - the famous "winged hussars". The charge broke the Ottoman formation and forced a full retreat.

There are lots of people suggesting that the war in Ukraine proves we've returned to a WW1 style of warfare where attacking successfully is almost impossible, and that this makes future wars less likely due to the poor odds of success.

I actually think the opposite is true. (1) The ostentatious failure of Ukraine's counteroffensive (and Russia's own slow advance in other parts of the Donbas) proves that advancing on a 21st century army fighting from a prepared position with adequate ISR and fires will be an extremely difficult task. (2)

This is an extremely bad joke, but let's talk about why. Poland is very excited about these enormous orders that they are putting together, but they are completely out of proportion to both Poland's capabilities and the production capacity of the west.

https://twitter.com/d_foubert/status/1674363432886235136

We can come at this from a few different angles, but Poland's population is a good starting point. If Poland is serious about maintaining a ~1,500 tank army, the manpower requirements are going to be on the order of 5-600,000 men.

The new demographic data from China is really grim stuff. The 0-5 population is barely half the 10-15 population. Looks like they officially missed the boat to stabilize the demographics. The problem for China is that the population drops significantly below the mid-30's (meaning there are lots more people in their late 30's than in their late 20's). That larger population is now aging out of their 30's without having had many kids.

Everyone's been focused on Ukraine's attacks in the south, but Russia is really pushing out of Kreminna - VDV are on scene. It looks like they will try to liquidate the Siversk salient by cutting off the lines of supply over the Donets river.

https://twitter.com/GeromanAT/status/1671976894109982727?s=20

They are trying to cleanse the forest belt on the north shore of the river and reach Grygorivka - if they succeed, Bilagorivka will be cut off from the rear and will fall relatively easily.

The same is true at a larger scale for Siversk - if they reach Dibrova, it falls.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Another Dam Update

Since it has now been a full week since the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed, there is more information presenting itself that gives us some clues as to the responsible party and the intent behind its demise. After hoarding and releasing a huge amount of water from upstream reservoirs in the immediate aftermath of the Kakhovka Dam's death, Ukraine is now retaining water at the upstream Dnipro dam. Video from the past week shows that the gates are shut.

This article by ret. Gen. Hodges has a lot of the usual pathologies, but it makes a very presumptive claim that Ukraine will at some point launch a multi-brigade attack, when we have seen no evidence that AFU command and control is capable of this.

cepa.org/article/think-… Ukraine has fought most of this war with piecemeal company-sized actions. The ~150 vehicle groupings that we saw last week were pretty much the biggest strike packages that they've ever managed to put together.

A close up of a destroyed Leopard and several Bradleys. So, a note about this. I have said at other times that pictures of destroyed tanks are not ipso facto evidence of defeat. That is still true. Tanks are a consumption item that you should expect to lose at a steady clip in high intensity combat.

Thread: The Battle of the Bulge and the Limits of Combat Power

The Ukrainian offensive is just beginning and will take many weeks to sort itself out fully. Perhaps we can relax and have some fun - and how better than to talk about military history? (1) The "Battle of the Bulge" is one of the most famous battles in modern American history. Fought in the winter of 1944, this marked Nazi Germany's last strategic offensive in the west. It was cinematic and bold - and it was a great triumph of American operational elan. (2)

There is a large battle underway along the contact line south of Orikhiv. This is not a probe, it is not reconnaissance in force - the AFU is attacking in force attempting to breach towards Tokmak. HIMARs is active on the Ukrainian side. Russian air assets are airborne. I would be hesitant about taking any specific reports at face value overnight. Rumors are going to circulate at high speed, but it is a night battle and the fighting is intense.