Been wondering why the stories of US intelligence helping the Ukrainians target Russian generals and warships have been appearing, clearly based on information passed on from US intelligence sources. Here is the one about the US helping to sink the Moskva. nytimes.com/2022/05/05/us/…
The best explanation is in this story as well. Basically the leaks are deliberate US attempts to let Putin know that the ‘weight’ of the US and NATO are behind Ukraine. Iot, a deliberate warning to Russia not to escalate.
It’s certainly an escalation of a type by the Biden Administration, which indicates, one assumes, that they believe the Russians really are not likely to escalate themselves to tactical nukes. They are certainly giving Putin an argument to escalate were he so inclined.
Fits a pattern. For all the Russian talk about using nukes, etc, they have been given a number of major opportunities to justify to their own people the need for such escalation, but far normally respond by trying to downplay or ignore these opportunities.
If the Russians don’t start making a major deal of one of the most well known papers in the US saying that the US government is deliberately assisting the killing of Russian generals or the sinking of Russian warships, it’s probably safe to conclude Putin doesn’t want escalation.
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Ukraine war update, based on Russian losses (ukr claim). What might be happening and where its going. First, the big change over the last week has been the Ukrainians taking back territory around Kharkiv while Russians plod on in Donbas.
Here are @TheStudyofWar Kharkiv maps on April 30 and May 7. Russians being pushed back to Russian border north of Kharkiv and away to the east. Might be already out of artillery range of the city.
Situation in the Donbas pocket. A few Russian small gains, but also signs of a Ukrainian counterattack to the west of Izyum. Again, you can look at the maps. If Ukrainian counterattack around Izyum does threaten Russian supplies into the pocket, that is a real problem for Russia.
This is really interesting, a military analyst on Russian TV pointing out all the problems with general mobilization. Basically Russia would struggle to make modern equipment on its own. Would take far too long.
Btw, he’s speaking the truth completely from any impartial point of view. A general mobilization is a recipe for getting a mass of poorly trained conscripts into action with old equipment….unless they want to wait a long time.
I tried to address similar points about the difficulty of equipping a force from general mobilisation in this article that was published earlier today in @spectatorspectator.co.uk/article/is-put…
@EuromaidanPress has just released its daily report for day 73 of the war. Has a statement from Ukrainian military intelligence that either cant be right, or the Russian Army is in dire straits, cant fight for more than a few weeks before failure. euromaidanpress.com/2022/05/07/rus…
Basically Ukrainian intelligence is saying that the Russians are rushing recruits into action after only 4 days of training, and they might even be conscripts. Here is the screenshot.
I would be surprised if things were quite that bad--but if true, this Russian army is in worse shape than I had imagined. If anyone can find more stories on this, please share. Its certainly something to watch.
To put Russian tank losses in 72 days of fighting in Ukraine into perspective--if Ukrainian claims are at all close to being accurate, the Russians have lost as many tanks as the Germans lost on the ENTIRE Eastern Front during the summer campaign of 1943. Including Kursk, et al.
Maybe a better way to put the Ukrainian claims of Russian losses in context. During the first 12 days of the Battle of Kursk, when German losses were running at their highest, estimated Germans tank losses were between 25-350 (I have the citation in How the War was Won, p 310.
Oops, added up APC losses. Ukrainian claims of Russian tank losses in Ukraine during the most recent 12 days of the Battle of the Donbas (22 April-4May) are 238. So either at or just below German losses during the most intense period of the Battle of Kursk.
This letter could be a very important development. First I’ve seen of members of congress, @tedlieu@AdamKinzinger@RepHoulahan that is well thought out and structured on AirPower. With all the focus on ground equipment, we can’t forget that the foundation of Ukrainian success…
Has been it’s ability to keep Russian AirPower at bay (much against expected wisdom). This has to continue for Ukraine to maintain its momentum, and yet it’s the one area where Ukraine seems to not be getting what it wants.
As the letter makes clear; Ukraine must get SAM systems of all types to keep the air war balanced. And, if you want to help Ukraine win, give it more offensive air assets such as fixed wing (F15 and F16), which it’s pilots can fly with training.
@KyivIndependent has published its most detailed story so far about the Battle of the Donbas and it’s really thorough. What’s really interesting is they give more glimpses than we normally get of Ukrainian tactics and advantages.
Such as their mobile defense operations, (when they pulled back and why).
And really interestingly, they claim Ukraine is winning the UAV war both in their observation of the Russians and, crucially, in limiting Russian artillery observation of Ukrainian positions, thus limiting what should be one of Russias big advantages (lots of artillery)