So, I'm increasingly seeing stories like this one, together with takes from foreign policy analysts along the lines of "the West lacks a strategy for deterring Russia." (You know who you are.)
First of all, Russia's economy is NOT back on its feet. The ruble is back on its feet, yes. But the ruble isn't the economy -- and the ruble is only back on its feet because it's being propped up by massive capital controls and $50.1 billion of reserves spent since the war began.
Second of all, no Western policymaker or serious analyst expected a massive immediate impact on the economy. We knew that they had reserves (even if we could freeze half of them) and that those reserves would last them some time.
CBR Chief Nabiullina believes the sh*t will begin to hit the fan towards the third quarter of 2022, and I'm inclined to believe her.
So, the damage to the Russian economy is real, even if it's not immediately preventing Muscovites from sitting in cafés. Putin has spent 20+ years building sound fiscal and monetary policies. It will take more than a couple of months to undo that. Venezuela wasn't built in a day.
Third of all, the long-term damage is even greater. And it's not just about the lack of investment and the fact that Russian companies will have to work with subpar resources at inflated prices.
Per Russia's own border guards, 3.8 million people have left the country since the war began. Now, that's down to Putin as much as it is to sanctions, but that's a hit to productivity right now and growth potential down the line.
Fourth of all, one thing we're not paying attention to is the degree to which Russia has outsourced its pain -- at least in the short-ish run -- to Belarus and Kazakhstan, its two key trading partners in the Eurasian Economic Union.
While the Russian ruble is up 12% vs the dollar since the start of the war, the Belarusian ruble is down 24% vs USD and an even more massive 32% vs the Russian currency. The IMF is projecting the Belarusian economy to contract by 6.4% this year. imf.org/en/Countries/B…
The Kazakh tenge, meanwhile, is down 3% vs the dollar and 13% vs the Russian ruble -- though the IMF is projecting growth there of 2.3% (anemic given where oil prices are right now). imf.org/en/Countries/K…
In other words, Russia is sustaining itself by impoverishing its closest allies. How sustainable is that?
And fifth of all -- and this is the part that really bugs me -- these sanctions were never designed to deter Russia. They were designed to punish Russia, but not to deter it.
Why was punishment the goal, rather than deterrence? Because if Putin was working with any logical cost-benefit framework, this war would never have happened. Ergo, you're not going to get him to back off by increasing the costs.
Punishment, by contrast, was meant to help Russia lose the war it had chosen to fight, but sapping it of money and morale, but starving the war machine and the economy that feeds that machine. That was always going to be a gradual endeavor, and the verdict is still out.
Folks, we played this game with the post-Crimea sanctions, the post-MH17 sanctions, the post-Skripal sanctions: they were imposed for specific reasons, about which pundits and others quickly forgot, and then started measuring effectiveness by totally different yardsticks.
Now, I'm not here to say that sanctions are always or even often effective. They most often aren't, even if there isn't often a better alternative -- and doing nothing is usually worse. I'm just here to call for honest analysis and a bit or memory (or at least Googling).
And if we're honest, then we have to acknowledge that these sanctions were meant to cause significant medium and long-term pain, and they're doing that. Calling them a failure because Muscovites can still go out for coffee is just dumb.
And no, I have nothing better to do on a Friday evening than to tweet about ostensibly smart people being dumb. (Again, you know who you are.)
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Time, I think, to revisit the question of Russian opinion on the war, given some recent developments. TL;DR: There's evidence that the initial 'rally around the flag' may be fading.
The place to start, I think, is the fact that the Russian MoD finally admitted on Friday that there had been ONE confirmed fatality from the sinking of the Moskva.
This is a really important question, and it's worth a mini-thread to address it. In a nutshell: you need to think about public opinion a bit differently.
In most democratic contexts, we tend to think of public opinion as something that reflects divisions in society on a given topic -- say, Brexit, or abortion, or welfare policy.
We think of it that way in part because we live in political systems that make it legitimate to have opinions on both sides of most divides. But that's not how authoritarianism works.
Because the world clearly needs yet another 🧵 about whether Russians really support the war - and because I'm probably the only one left who hasn't commented on that @levada_ru poll showing 81% support - here's my take: Yes, but.
If you haven't seen the poll, the details are below. In a nutshell, @levada_ru's numbers show 81% support, highest among those aged 55+ (86%), lowest among those aged 18-24 (71%). levada.ru/2022/03/31/kon…
To be honest - and I've hesitated to write about this, out of respect for my friends at @levada_ru - I would not have published this survey. Not because the results are unpleasant (though they are), but because they are impossible to interpret.
It is excellent news that the British government has finally resolved to get out of the way and begin to allow the country to provide the support -- including shelter here in the UK -- for Ukrainian refugees that millions of Brits are aching to provide.
This isn't done yet. As @sundersays lays out, the gov't still hasn't said exactly how this is going to work, and there's tons of room for this to go wrong.
The public will have to keep enormous pressure @ukhomeoffice and @pritipatel if Ukrainians are to avoid the hostile environment that afflicts every other entrant to the UK.
Longer answer: What you think you know is probably wrong.
(A quick 🧵)
If you're following the news, you've probably seen polls suggesting that ~60% of Russians support the war. That's problematic, for a number of reasons, which I'll try to explain here.
First things first: there's an excellent piece on this in @meduzaproject by @abessudnv (in Russian).