It is too early for a real "lessons learned," but this latest Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown a lot of things which impact the modeling & design of post-WW2 mechanized combat wargames, thread🧵
The three things that have jumped out for me are the following:
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1. The complete lack of mechanized logistics in the Russian Army 2. The horrible vulnerability of Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles compared to equivalent Western vehicles 3. The arrival of small drones in the artillery spotting role as armored vehicle killers
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...in the 21st century.
The Russian Army's complete lack of forklifts, pallets, and containerized logistics is an 80 odd year, class based, complete miss by Western intelligence that impacts the designs of all Cold War era war games because of the mirror imaging of Western
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...mechanized logistics upon all the Soviet invasion of Europe war games.
They are all wrong because they greatly overestimate the ability of the Russian Army to move the tonnages of artillery ammunition built into the combat ratings of Soviet/Russian Army units. You
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...would need some sort of logistical modifier of every Soviet & Russian combat unit in every military scenario to reflect this.
Regards the 2nd point, the Soviet/Russian vehicles don't seem to have gotten the "1973 Arab-Israeli War AFV design memo." 5/
The design feedback from the 1973 war has dominated US & other Western tank/AFV designs in the decades after with ammo stowed behind armored doors and blow out panels to vent explosions.
The Bradley and other Western infantry fighting vehicles are much more heavily armored than the BMD/BMP/BTR designs because of the 1973 war and loose far fewer soldier per fair hit than Russian IFV's.
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The two parts of this seems to be the Arabs didn't own the battlefields for the Russians to examine their vehicles and Russian racism against Arabs while using their kit.
It really wasn't until 1982 that the Russians had enough input from destroyed vehicles in
Afghanistan to begin the '1973 redesign' cycle, and the Soviet collapse of 1989-1991 aborted this effort. All Russia had was its existing AFV fleet to update.
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There hasn't been enough income for a completely new Tank/AFV design until the Armata, which finally separated the tank main gun ammo from the crew.
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Last, the use of small drones with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) has humbugged a lot of the predictions of GPS jamming because the Ukrainians take their artillery gun and target reference point locations prior to the arrival of Russian armored columns with
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...GNSS jammers. The drones call off "Vehicles at TRP #1, fire now" and 120mm Mortar and 122mm/152mm gun shells land on top of road bound Russian AFV's in the pre-arranged kills zones. 12/
German implementation of the cancelled US Army Crusader SP gun specifications.
The Ukraine War has demonstrated the utter military bankruptcy of the Crusader's cancellation by Sec. Def. Rumsfeld. 14/
We have not seen enough actions by loitering drones in the Ukraine war to draw any real conclusions, but I think the 2020 Azeri-Armenian War need to be examined more closely from the air defense point of view. 15/
In particular the Russian strengths look wrong given what we have now "learned" in Ukraine.
Russian divisional unit counters that have spent a turn or two not moving get their full strength side. Otherwise they get their weaker side.
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These counters could shoot, then move, reflecting a set piece attack.
However, they could not move, then shoot.
That is, moving to engage in combat results in the lower flipped side combat strengths as you move into combat because of the lack of artillery ammo.
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A Russian division on it's lower side is eliminated from play at the first casualty.
Smaller Russian tactical units would be one sided & also eliminated at the first casualty.
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Because NATO logistical advantages were growing over the Cold War because its mechanized logistics were getting better with computer inventory software.
NATO units would have their full value shooting or moving, and only taking casualties will see counters
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...flipped to show step losses.
And NATO tactical units, of which there would be more & smaller units, would be two sided.
Let's see what the Twitter wargaming community thinks of this.
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This video from @RALee85 of a Russian Army Grad & 152mm battery firing on Mariupol is a wonderful opportunity for a comparative logistics 🧵thread on rocket artillery ammunition.
Playing stupid games gets stupid rewards thoughts🧵
Picketing SCOTUS justices at home is a good way to get such picketing declared a "Federal terrorist offense with Criminal & Civil RICO liability" by that majority of the SCOTUS at their 1st available opportunity🤦♂️👇 1/
The real legacy of "Roe v Wade" is that it made constitutional law whatever five life-time appointees to the SCOTUS said it was on any particular day and utterly politicised the Supreme Court.
If the SCOTUS is political.
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It is time for the Supreme Court to face national retention elections.
I'd make the election parallel the Presidential electoral college in that electoral college style representation would force the justices to consider regional & urban/rural interests in all their decisions
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@MarcVitale4 It is easy for Boris Johnson's government to look like strategic giants when they are dealing with pygmies.
The De-escalation faction around NSC Advisor Sullivan and Sec State Blinken has its roots the Obama Administration's national security team of NSC Advisor Susan Rice &
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Their thing was also the "Pivot to China" which has dominated Obama, Trump & the Biden Administrations.
The Obama/Biden de-escalation faction really wanted to get Putin on-side in a showdown with Xi's China. Ukraine's refusal to lay down and die for Putin
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What we now know as the 'De-escalation faction' was pushing for a Jerry Pournelle-esque 'co-dominium' with Russia versus China with the E.U.'s role being to economically bind Russia to the West.
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