Ukraine war update, based on Russian losses (ukr claim). What might be happening and where its going. First, the big change over the last week has been the Ukrainians taking back territory around Kharkiv while Russians plod on in Donbas.
Here are @TheStudyofWar Kharkiv maps on April 30 and May 7. Russians being pushed back to Russian border north of Kharkiv and away to the east. Might be already out of artillery range of the city.
Situation in the Donbas pocket. A few Russian small gains, but also signs of a Ukrainian counterattack to the west of Izyum. Again, you can look at the maps. If Ukrainian counterattack around Izyum does threaten Russian supplies into the pocket, that is a real problem for Russia.
No turning to Ukrainian claims of Russian losses. Btw, Im using these only as indications of how the war might be developing--Im not assuming they are exact. However Im assuming that if they are exaggerated, the rate of exaggeration is roughly equal.
Overall these claims indicate very intense combat since April 18 (when the battle started). Ive made a chart comparing daily loss rates to that point and after. What's important is even though the Russian Army is 1/4 to 1/3 smaller, loss claims are close to the same
In the case of tanks, even higher, raising from 14.3 before April 18 to 17.6 afterwards, a signifcant 25% increase in losses claimed from what would have to be a smaller force. Again, if these are indicators of combat intensity, such a pace cant be maintained for long.
Now breaking down by weapon types, particular focus on tanks and combined range weapons (Artiller/MLRS). They give an indication that the fighting has gone through a rather distinct progression.
In tank claims (now expressed in rolling 3-day averages with the date indicated the last day of the calculation, there was a very large increase in claimed losses up until 28 April and a steady decline since. Looks like extreme armor losses from April 25-30
These claims are double the average daily claim of the war, and considering that the Russian army is much smaller--indicates that this had to be some pretty intense, even close-quarter combat.
A very different pattern emerges for Ukr claims of range weapon destruction (Artillery and MLRS). That stays pretty stable until April 30, and then has a huge acceleration for 5 days (before tailing down).
Could indicate that the Russian armor forces burnt themselves out attacking in the Donbas, became more cautious (which fits with Pentagon intelligence) and the war turned more to range weaponry.
Also indicates, for a few days, an much greater effectiveness in Ukr abilities to take out Russian ranged weaponry. Could indicate proficiency in the new artillery and loitering munitions they are receiving. popularmechanics.com/military/weapo…
Interesting caveat to all of this, is that Russian APCs (and this includes all armored fighting vehicles) has remained remarkably constant. showing no distinct phases of combat.
Quick summation on looking at the claims.
1) Combat has been very intense since Apr 18 (really Apr 25) with very high losses claimed from a much smaller Russian forces.
2) There was a serious attempt by the Russians to advance from Apr 25 to May 1 if tank claims are considered.
3) After May 1, seems that the combat effort by the Ukrainians moved to employ ranged weapons to take out Russian ranged weapons.
4) Overall, this battle cant last much longer. These loss claims, even if reduced by one third, are not sustainable. The APC losses are also extreme.
Will try to update during the day.
To clarify on the averages, this is a daily average over the three days leading to that date, not the average over three days. For instance, Ukr claims of Russian tank losses on April 26-27-28 were 34-21-31. The daily avg over the three days was 28.6 (the peak avg)
Ukrainian claims for yesterday just appeared. Reinforces existing trends. Russian tank losses very low (8), and APCs also on the lower side (28), artillery/MLRS levelled off (7).

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More from @PhillipsPOBrien

May 10
Read the Pentagon briefing from yesterday (transcript available), some interesting details provided, particularly on how the Ukrainian and Russian armies are behaving in the Donbas. Here’s the whole transcript. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
Russians are falling back on their ‘doctrine’, which is to blast an area with artillery before sending in artillery. Ukrainians, however, still have mobility, and now much more long range capability, and basically the Russians can’t advance much at all because of these. Image
The ability of the Ukrainians to maintain mobility right in front of the main Russian line of attack is exactly the thing that @edwardstrngr and I were talking about in this @TheAtlantic article. It’s why their ability to blunt Russian air power is so important.
Read 7 tweets
May 9
What rhetoric Putin used in his speech is immaterial. If he didn’t declare war, or a general mobilisation, that’s what important. Without concrete steps to build a new force, Russia can’t fight a long war, and the clock starts ticking on the failure of their army in Ukraine
Just read this translation of Putin’s speech. Reaction—that’s it? Completely out of ideas. Either doesn’t now understand the reality of the situation in Ukraine, or wilfully ignoring it. meduza.io/en/feature/202…
Other thing to take from it—no attempt to set the stage for escalation. No call for the Russian people to make great sacrifice. Nothing at all really.
Read 18 tweets
May 7
This is really interesting, a military analyst on Russian TV pointing out all the problems with general mobilization. Basically Russia would struggle to make modern equipment on its own. Would take far too long.
Btw, he’s speaking the truth completely from any impartial point of view. A general mobilization is a recipe for getting a mass of poorly trained conscripts into action with old equipment….unless they want to wait a long time.
I tried to address similar points about the difficulty of equipping a force from general mobilisation in this article that was published earlier today in @spectator spectator.co.uk/article/is-put…
Read 4 tweets
May 7
@EuromaidanPress has just released its daily report for day 73 of the war. Has a statement from Ukrainian military intelligence that either cant be right, or the Russian Army is in dire straits, cant fight for more than a few weeks before failure. euromaidanpress.com/2022/05/07/rus…
Basically Ukrainian intelligence is saying that the Russians are rushing recruits into action after only 4 days of training, and they might even be conscripts. Here is the screenshot.
I would be surprised if things were quite that bad--but if true, this Russian army is in worse shape than I had imagined. If anyone can find more stories on this, please share. Its certainly something to watch.
Read 4 tweets
May 7
To put Russian tank losses in 72 days of fighting in Ukraine into perspective--if Ukrainian claims are at all close to being accurate, the Russians have lost as many tanks as the Germans lost on the ENTIRE Eastern Front during the summer campaign of 1943. Including Kursk, et al.
Maybe a better way to put the Ukrainian claims of Russian losses in context. During the first 12 days of the Battle of Kursk, when German losses were running at their highest, estimated Germans tank losses were between 25-350 (I have the citation in How the War was Won, p 310.
Oops, added up APC losses. Ukrainian claims of Russian tank losses in Ukraine during the most recent 12 days of the Battle of the Donbas (22 April-4May) are 238. So either at or just below German losses during the most intense period of the Battle of Kursk.
Read 8 tweets
May 7
This letter could be a very important development. First I’ve seen of members of congress, @tedlieu @AdamKinzinger @RepHoulahan that is well thought out and structured on AirPower. With all the focus on ground equipment, we can’t forget that the foundation of Ukrainian success…
Has been it’s ability to keep Russian AirPower at bay (much against expected wisdom). This has to continue for Ukraine to maintain its momentum, and yet it’s the one area where Ukraine seems to not be getting what it wants.
As the letter makes clear; Ukraine must get SAM systems of all types to keep the air war balanced. And, if you want to help Ukraine win, give it more offensive air assets such as fixed wing (F15 and F16), which it’s pilots can fly with training.
Read 6 tweets

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