"[Ein Ölembargo] ist überfällig und nötig. [...] Die geplante schrittweise Einführung bis zum Jahresende ist aber nicht ambitioniert genug. Wenn man die Einnahmequellen für Putins Kriegsmaschinerie effektiv treffen will, muss das Embargo wesentlich schneller greifen."
"Obwohl das Ölembargo auch den Maschinen- und Anlagenbau indirekt weiter belasten wird, sieht der VDMA angesichts des aggressiven und menschenverachtenden Verhaltens Russlands in der Ukraine keine Alternative zu einer weiteren Verschärfung der Sanktionen."
Where does this "production multiplier" of 5 come from?
From an important paper on supply chain disruptions after Fukushima by Vasco Carvalho, Makoto Nirei, Yukiko Saito & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi @QJEHarvard which indeed finds substantial amplification.
We asked Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi & Vasco Carvalho what they thought of the @tom_krebs_ calculation. Here is what they said:
"We ourselves would not use that Japan- and earthquake-specific number as a starting point for a quantitative assessment of energy disruptions in Europe."
@fromTGA mentions our paper "It would cost a lot, maybe 2-3% of GDP, but it’s doable"
@W_Schmidt_ then says a few things we would like to react to.
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Some of these statements are either misleading or plainly wrong.
More importantly though @W_Schmidt_ simply dismisses a whole body of work that concludes: economic costs of an embargo would be substantial (eg jobs would be lost) but not catastrophic.
First, in its literal interpretation, the sentence "there is no German chemical industry" is demonstrably false.
Anyone can see for themselves by simply reading our paper and I'm sure @tom_krebs_ was aware of this.
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Now if you read @tom_krebs_ article in more detail, that's not actually what he means.
Instead his criticism is that we use a common elasticity of substitution for household consumption ("turn down heating") and different sectors in industry ("cracking furnaces").
Will: Is [continuing to buy Russian energy] really your answer to people dying in Ukraine?
Scholz: Three answers. The first is: because of our precise sanctions, which are also aimed at the Russian central bank, Putin cannot do anything with the money he has in his accounts[...]
That is: we have made sure that the several hundred billion already stored in these accounts cannot be used at all, so it is very unlikely that this connection even exists, because this applies to any new income in just the same way as for income that has already been earned ...
Thanks for the thread @ChristianKopf. But why would you deliberately ignore our main macro analysis using the @DBaqaee-Farhi model which addresses some of your criticisms and features exactly the types of production chains that people are worried about in popular debate?