What rhetoric Putin used in his speech is immaterial. If he didn’t declare war, or a general mobilisation, that’s what important. Without concrete steps to build a new force, Russia can’t fight a long war, and the clock starts ticking on the failure of their army in Ukraine
Just read this translation of Putin’s speech. Reaction—that’s it? Completely out of ideas. Either doesn’t now understand the reality of the situation in Ukraine, or wilfully ignoring it. meduza.io/en/feature/202…
Other thing to take from it—no attempt to set the stage for escalation. No call for the Russian people to make great sacrifice. Nothing at all really.
I see some people have asked about a secret mobilization. Maybe a extremely efficient system could do a partial one, but can’t imagine Putin’s regime pulling it off. You have to construct new or expanded facilities to begin with, hard to hide structures from eyes in the sky.
You will also need some serious, If secret, government planning. Good luck hiding all that chatter. Then you need to call up either all the reservists/new conscripts you want. That will defintely get out as many of these will be truly angry/scared.
Then you need to train them in all your new or expanded facilities. Then you have to equip the new forces, put them on very long, easy to see trains and deploy them to Ukraine. Remember the initial invasion took months.
Putin’s Russia doing this in secret? Good luck.
Final point. A general mobilisation is the ultimate test of a logistic system, and nothing in peace time can really prepare you for it. If you struggle doing the logistics for an army in being, it will be much worse when you try to dramatically expand that army. Logistics matter.
Here is the full text of Putin’s speech. kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Thought I would give you an example of how long, during wartime mobilisation, it took the US to put together an infantry division in World War II. By 1943, after serious teething problems had been corrected, it was a more than 46 week process to assemble a division from scratch.
Here is the chart. Everything pivoted around a D-Day, when the new soldiers were to have arrived and the training process was to start running (though not commence for 15 more days).
The Division commander and staff, first part of the process, arrived 44 days before D-Day (D-44 on the chart). That’s the top of the pyramid. Then over the coming weeks, most of the officers, enlisted cadre and trainers arrived).
The soldiers were to be mostly in place by D, but extra enlisted men could be accepted by D+10 (10 days later).
The training of the soldiers did not start in earnest until D+15, and would go on in three stages (Basic, unit, advanced combined arms) for a subsequent 38 weeks. So the whole process from first officers arriving to completion of training was 38 weeks plus 59 days of prep.
This was under wartime exigencies too when there was huge pressure to get units ready for the invasion of Europe. So almost a year from the first step to getting a unit fully trained. Generating a new army is not easy.
I know a lot of people say, doesn’t matter because Putin doesn’t care about his soldiers lives. That actually doesn’t matter in this. If he wants to try and salvage anything he actually needs a well trained and efficient military.
Ill prepared cannon fodder won’t last long against a combat experienced and increasingly well armed Ukraine. It’s a losing strategy. The only chance the Russians would have would be to try and do training properly. That takes time.
In the articles/tweets I wrote I assumed they could cut some corners which is why I was talking about a minimum of 9 months from the process beginning until training was over. But then you still have to deploy.

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More from @PhillipsPOBrien

May 10
Ukrainians still making Russian pilots nervous about flying, leaving their airspace contested. Seems like the Russians are continuing their flying behavior of flying in, dropping their ordnance and then getting out of Ukrainian air space asap.
Actually was sent a transcript of the full answer that the Pentagon spokesperson had to this question, it’s maybe the most illuminating answer I’ve seen about exactly how the Russians are and are not using AirPower. Thanks @PaulHandley2 Image
First off. Many Russian sorties, which are often used as an indication of Russian air power effectiveness, don’t involve flights over Ukraine at all, it’s Russian aircraft flying over Russia launching missiles. Highlighting a crucial bit. Image
Read 10 tweets
May 10
Read the Pentagon briefing from yesterday (transcript available), some interesting details provided, particularly on how the Ukrainian and Russian armies are behaving in the Donbas. Here’s the whole transcript. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
Russians are falling back on their ‘doctrine’, which is to blast an area with artillery before sending in artillery. Ukrainians, however, still have mobility, and now much more long range capability, and basically the Russians can’t advance much at all because of these. Image
The ability of the Ukrainians to maintain mobility right in front of the main Russian line of attack is exactly the thing that @edwardstrngr and I were talking about in this @TheAtlantic article. It’s why their ability to blunt Russian air power is so important.
Read 7 tweets
May 8
Ukraine war update, based on Russian losses (ukr claim). What might be happening and where its going. First, the big change over the last week has been the Ukrainians taking back territory around Kharkiv while Russians plod on in Donbas.
Here are @TheStudyofWar Kharkiv maps on April 30 and May 7. Russians being pushed back to Russian border north of Kharkiv and away to the east. Might be already out of artillery range of the city.
Situation in the Donbas pocket. A few Russian small gains, but also signs of a Ukrainian counterattack to the west of Izyum. Again, you can look at the maps. If Ukrainian counterattack around Izyum does threaten Russian supplies into the pocket, that is a real problem for Russia.
Read 18 tweets
May 7
This is really interesting, a military analyst on Russian TV pointing out all the problems with general mobilization. Basically Russia would struggle to make modern equipment on its own. Would take far too long.
Btw, he’s speaking the truth completely from any impartial point of view. A general mobilization is a recipe for getting a mass of poorly trained conscripts into action with old equipment….unless they want to wait a long time.
I tried to address similar points about the difficulty of equipping a force from general mobilisation in this article that was published earlier today in @spectator spectator.co.uk/article/is-put…
Read 4 tweets
May 7
@EuromaidanPress has just released its daily report for day 73 of the war. Has a statement from Ukrainian military intelligence that either cant be right, or the Russian Army is in dire straits, cant fight for more than a few weeks before failure. euromaidanpress.com/2022/05/07/rus…
Basically Ukrainian intelligence is saying that the Russians are rushing recruits into action after only 4 days of training, and they might even be conscripts. Here is the screenshot.
I would be surprised if things were quite that bad--but if true, this Russian army is in worse shape than I had imagined. If anyone can find more stories on this, please share. Its certainly something to watch.
Read 4 tweets
May 7
To put Russian tank losses in 72 days of fighting in Ukraine into perspective--if Ukrainian claims are at all close to being accurate, the Russians have lost as many tanks as the Germans lost on the ENTIRE Eastern Front during the summer campaign of 1943. Including Kursk, et al.
Maybe a better way to put the Ukrainian claims of Russian losses in context. During the first 12 days of the Battle of Kursk, when German losses were running at their highest, estimated Germans tank losses were between 25-350 (I have the citation in How the War was Won, p 310.
Oops, added up APC losses. Ukrainian claims of Russian tank losses in Ukraine during the most recent 12 days of the Battle of the Donbas (22 April-4May) are 238. So either at or just below German losses during the most intense period of the Battle of Kursk.
Read 8 tweets

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