What did Putin's "Victory Day" speech contain and what does it tell us?
There were some interesting take-aways, some good, some bad.
Here's what I saw in the film and the reports. A🧵 1/6
Many (me included) were wrong on predicting: 1. A declaration of victory (strategic, operation, or tactical). 2. A formal announcement of mobilization.
What wasn't said is important (especially #1) because intel said he had told his generals to produce a victory by 9 May. 2/
As a reminder, here what I thought were the early RU Strategic objectives:
-Execute regime change in Ukraine (replace Zelensky in Kyiv).
-Control Black/Azov Sea access
-Destroy Ukraine's army in the east
-Subjugate Ukraine's population
-Further Divide NATO & US 3/
And here are what I believe were the related initial Operational (military) Objectives:
-Main Effort (ME): Seize & secure Kyiv
-Secondary Effort (SE) 1: Attack to the East & West from Crimea; seize/secure Black/Azov Sea ports
-SE 2: Envelop/Annihilate UA in the Donbas 4/
Tactical Objectives:
-Seize Kyiv within 3 days
-Conduct large scale combined arms operations in N, E and S, with overwhelming land and air arms.
-Control Black/Azov Sea
-Secure all cities (then emplace govt supporting RU)
-Establish supply lines to support continued ops. 5/
Back to the speech.
It contained many of the old tropes/lies:
-NATO going to attack Crimea, Donbas, then Russia (a standard lie. I never heard a RU general ever say any of this...and it's counterfactual).
-Nazis are everywhere, but especially in Ukraine
-The west is weak 3/
What was NOT said, but observed:
-Troop & equipment parade seemed smaller
-No aircraft Z- pattern overflight ("bad weather;" skies were clear!); no "doomsday aircraft" (Putin's C2 bird)
-No GEN Gerasimov (rumored wounded at Izyum)
-Hammer & sickle flag behind Russian tricolor 4/
This is a unrefined analysis, but here's what I take from this:
1. Putin know he's losing: militarily, diplomatically, economically, informationally...it will get worse? 2. Putin can't spike the ball right now; he's looking for a way out? 3. RU domestic support teetering? 5/
The next few days are critical. Here's what I'm watching:
-Call for mob
-The NE Donbas fight, especially near Sieverondonestk/Popasna; the fight south of Izyum, & the fight over control of the Donets River bridges.
-The UA counterattack NE of Kharkiv
-Mariupol
-Logistics 6/6
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Having done a fair share of targeting of enemy forces during my career, I'm a bit baffled about the amount of coverage of the intelligence sharing that is going on between the US and Ukraine.
Here's why. Another 🧵 1/12
When conducting "targeting," there are three important elements to consider:
1). The collection of important intelligence
2). The "boarding" of the target (how to hit, where to hit, when to hit, defenses, etc.)
3). The enemy's ability to avoid being hit. 2/
Collection of intelligence comes in many ways:
-Overhead satellite imagery
-Collection of electronic signals
-Collection of human intelligence information
-"Patterns of life/movement"
-Enemy ability to defend itself
Many countries do intel collection & the US is great at it. 3/
“How to Sabotage your Russian Tank 101.” Dear Russian Soldiers, We understand some of you are sabotaging your tanks which means others may want to and do not know the best way. Here are some basic tips for how to render the T72 inoperable: 2/
1. Pour a lot of dirt, sand, or sugar into the fuel tanks to clog the lines. 2. Drain the oil in either the engine or transmission, and it will eventually burnout either system. 3. Since the T72 runs on a “Christie” track/suspension, it’s easier to sabotage the road wheels... 3/
I hesitated to comment on this @washingtonpost article, because I thought their use of "jack-in-the-box" description was inappropriate. But dozens of people have DM'd me asking "what do you think of this?"
A few weeks ago, as the "new phase" was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine.
We're very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening.
Let's review what we should see. 1/12
First, let's talk the Russian army (RU from here out).
RU has attempted to regenerate the forces mauled in the 1st phase. If they follow their doctrine, regeneration usually means new personnel, repair/exchange of equipment, resupply, rest & likely a lot of new leaders.
2/
Given the time & desire of Putin to have a May victory, it's likely little of that happened.
RU likely has either low-strength units, several units consolidated into one, or units poorly manned.
Reports indicate 2-man tank crews (3 needed) & BMP w/ few infantry in back. 3/
A few folks suggested I've been "bold" in some of my predictions accompanying the analysis I've provided on @CNN regarding this conflict.
Beyond tactical assessments, there are 2 primary reasons I've said Ukraine would win this fight.
Here's a short 🧵 on why I say this. 1/17
Reason 1:
Conventional joint & combined arms operations are hard. Real hard. Exceedingly hard.
Coordinating actions of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, air support, naval opns, amphibious landings, special opns & logistics support is tough. 2/
Doing so takes intense training of individuals in their specific skills, exercises that build the capabilities of interprofessional teams who pull theose skills together, the understanding of complex equipment & doctrine, communicating intent...and great leadership. 3/