This is going to be a long thread🧵 on Ukraine's unique 21st century fighting style based on Uber style C3I software, why Western intelligence is plug ignorant of it due to CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm, & the implications of SpaceX's Starlink satcom for the future...
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...of warfare & politics. This is going to be a wild thread, so buckle up.
First we need to talk about Ukraine's "GIS Art for Artillery" software package written by Yaroslav Sherstyuk.
Sherstyuk's software package is reminiscent Uber or Lyft's taxi software in that assigns targets to the nearest gun, mortar, rocket launcher, Aerosvidzka drone or SF team.
...or Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).
The 2009 AFATDS transitioned from a Sun Microsystems SPARC computer running the Linux kernel to a version based on laptop computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system.
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GIS Art for Artillery, or "GIS Art" for short, isn't the 1950's "Star" style Mainframe-terminal (TACFIRE) or Mainframe-Minicomputer-terminal (AFTADS) ported over to laptops.
It is a true distributed software environment that reduced request for fire to trigger pull from 5/
...20 minutes to 30 seconds.
By comparison, the US Army did that call to trigger pull in 5 minutes in WW2, 15 minutes in Vietnam and one hour currently.
No, that isn't a typo.
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The increased US Army time 'from call to trigger pull' has to do trying to prevent friendly fire plus the inclusion of JAG officers in Division artillery fire control centers doing rules of engagement/collateral damage vetting of calls for fire.
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In 2006, when US Army Special Forces task force hunting high value targets was given direct access to an MLRS battery with GMLRS rockets - without a JAG officer poisoned chain of command - got it back down to Vietnam 15-minute levels in Iraq, thanks to the Blue Force Tracker. 8/
This didn't last long with the Obama Administration thanks to Taliban high value targets using their own kids as human shields followed by cellphone photos of dead kids.
Then everything went back to the JAG officer game & the Special Forces started buying loitering drones.
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Returning to the "GIS Arta" app, (GIS meaning geospatial) it has evolved into a multi-profile command and control system that can process data from drones, smartphones, rangefinders and commercial satellite images.
The biggest being that with a good SATCOM link Ukrainian high command could nominate targets in the the "GIS Arta" app to the nearest fire support, drone or convoy hunter killer teams throughout the entire Ukrainian battle space without tipping local units
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...to intelligence sources & methods.
Western Intelligence is either ignorant or discounts the "GIS Arta" app because of a CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm December 22, 2016 article claiming the Russians hacked "GIS Arta." 12/ docs.voanews.eu/en-US/2017/03/…
And that the "Fancy Bear" group used the same hacking method to to get into the DNC.
The problem is that hacking of the "GIS Arta" app CROWDSTRIKE claimed never happened.
I knew that CrowdStrike co-founder Dimiti Alperovitc was lying at the time because of a summer 2015 OSINT investigation I did of the strange Ukrainian artillery concentrations hitting DNR forces in Donbas.
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The Ukrainian Army seemed to be using older Soviet-era ground surveillance radars to guide its deep artillery strikes.
Russian video's sent by the Donbas War list-admin showed a UA artillery strike missing a Russian convoy in a classic centroid error of an older radar 15/
...that has two targets close together at extreme range and sees them as a single target.
The video showed a large convoy on the right and UA artillery strikes to the left of them.
[Note: The infographic shows chaff pulling a 'radar centroid' off of a jet]
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The video then pans a little and shows a second road further left with a convoy of vehicles on it.
Both roads seemed to be approaching a fork out of camera view.
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I asked the list-admin about it & specifically if a ARK-1 RICE BAG radar could pull that off.
I was told 'No, the most likely Ukrainian sensor directing the artillery fire was a Su-24MR FENCER E M-101 Shtik side looking aerial radar (SLAR)'
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The radar centroid error I described was spot-on for 1985 Soviet era kit.
The Su-24MR FENCER E had long range air to ground data links, but directing artillery with it implied some distinctly non-Soviet era command and control doctrine.
There was also the fact the barrage
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...looked wrong. And by looked wrong I mean it was all landing in one spot with explosions indicating shells from radically different azimuths.
It was kinda, sorta, a time on target (TOT) from lots of individual guns.
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Usually Russian doctrine artillery batteries fire a "battery solution" and the barrage lands in the pattern of the ground formation of the firing guns.
A TOT from several Russian gun batteries would cover a significant area.
So the Ukrainians were doing something else.
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I systematically searched through Donbas artillery videos of UA artillery strikes & photos of UA artillery positions (single guns).
The thing that stood out was the timing of the barrages, the tightness of the barrages and the variability of the shell bursts.
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UA artillery were not firing as batteries. They were firing as individual guns and launchers, then displacing immediately.
Multiple individual guns & mortars of different calibers were shooting dispersed across a large area at the same target in the TOT manner.
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Given the following:
1. A radar or laser range finder equipped forward observer with a GPS unit,
2. A gun with a digital radio, digital artillery fire control computer and a GPS unit, and
3. A digital internet data link radio communications tying them together.
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It then becomes relatively easy to program a multi-gun, multi-ammunition caliber time on target from whatever guns are in range. You can even call down multiple TOT barrages in a short amount of time using different guns for each barrage-strike on the same target.
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That meant Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing battery shoots.
They were seeing lots of individual guns across the front, with multiple trajectories, shooting less than three shells, at the same or different targets, across a whole front.
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That was why the Russians were not killing a lot of UA towed artillery with counter-battery in the Summer of 2015 onward.
Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing "worthwhile" battery sized targets for MLRS shoots.
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It also made Russian airpower much less effective in the counterbattery role when it showed up.
What cost Ukraine it's towed 122mm guns wasn't destruction by counter battery. It was abandonment when the Debaltsevo pocket fell.
...the DoD and Western three letter intelligence agencies generally.
SpaceX has handily defeated the strongest cyber & jamming attacks the Russian Federation can assemble.
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In addition, one of the lesser known features of SpaceX's Starlink internet service, point to point email service for Starlink users encrypted and not using any ground infrastructure whatsoever, has aided Ukrainian military units behind Russian lines to communicate
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...with minimal electronic signature for Russian direction finding to exploit.
Effectively Starlink gave Ukraine the military space telecommunications bandwidth of the United States with zero investment in satellite infrastructure before the war.
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Ukraine's 'GIS Art for Artillery' app combined with Starlink actually gives the Ukrainian military measurably better than US Military standard artillery command and control.
The Ukraine War is the first Starlink War & the side with Starlink is beating the side without.
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There are a lot of implications in that thought.
Now comes the kicker. When the lasercom equipped SpaceX Gen 1.5 & 2.0 satellites come on-line.
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The ability to move huge amounts of bandwidth with zero ground based infrastructure will utterly subvert the ability of national governments & corporations to block or surveil Starlink communications.
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The only way the US Government will be able to monitor Starlink communications is with @elonmusk active cooperation.
The power shift involved in that fact is...profound...and something for another thread
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Meanwhile, a whole lot of very powerful people are going to have to rethink their place in the world as the Starlink juggernaut remakes the world by helping Ukraine win "The 1st Starlink War."
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On the morning of 20 July 2025, a AFGSC airman at Minot AFB took his M18, still inside it's issued holster; and placed it on a desk.
It then went off, struck him in chest, and killed him
AFGSC issued a halt order on 21 July 2025 for use of M17/18 Modular Handgun System.
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As an ex-DoD procurement official, that letter is a procurement killing hammer.
This is going to hit SIG Sauer like a moderate sized asteroid in terms of DCMA corrective actions requests or "CAR."
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This AFGSC halt use order letter will be grounds for a level three corrective action request (CAR).
A DCMA level III CAR is defined as follows:
"A Level III Corrective Action Request (CAR) issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is a serious action taken when there are significant contractual nonconformities.
It is directed to the supplier's top management and is just one step below the possibility of contract suspension or termination.
This type of CAR serves as a management tool to address critical issues that need immediate attention."
"Russian aircraft manufacturers have failed to create analogues of foreign bearings and electronic components for aircraft, said Anatoly Gaydansky, CEO of Aerocomposite."
Also applies to railway cassette bearings for Russian wagons and locomotives.
Russian Railway🧵 1/
Low friction roller bearings are a major technological strength of the West.
They are the difference between Rolls Royce jet engines lasting thousands of hours and Russian or Chinese jet engines lasting half as long.
Rail roller bearings are different in their application
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...but the computer control software for SKF & Amsted co-production machine tooling that Russia used is proprietary. That software left Russia in April/May 2022.
Russian rail system has been doing the whole 'just in time' inventory game
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The following is a serialized post from Strategypage -dot- com on the disastrously bad US Navy leadership decisions on fleet maintenance & where they have left US National Security.
"Surface Forces: USN Maintenance Mess
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July 11, 2025: The U.S. Navy is no longer able to maintain or repair its ships. In an earlier economy move, all the navy ship repair and maintenance facilities were sold off. The worst aspect of this was the loss of skilled shipyard workers. ...
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... The older ones were retiring and the navy did little to recruit and train replacements. Now, as the United States strives to expand its navy and repair and upgrade current ships, it finds that the resources are lacking. There are no easy solutions.
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This Ukrainian fiber optic FPV drone attack underlines that 20th century style tactical truck based logistics are obsolete in the age of mass, cheap, 50 km FPV drones.
Drones costing less than $2,000 are killing trucks costing over $150,000.
The issue of Western truck production versus drone production is stark
Ukraine in 2025 is making ~12,000 FPV and grenade dropping class small drones a month.
The peak annual US Army FMTV production was in 2005 for a total of 8,168 trucks.
Those trucks are 20 years old.
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21st Century truck logistics in the age of 50 km unjammable fiber optic guided FPV drones requires systematic combat service support engineering to build vehicle "net tunnels" to protect from powered and persistent drones.
Injection molding gets you a lot of one thing cheaply. Think lots of fiber optic guided FPV drones, which are immune to radio jamming.
3D/AM allows a lot of modifications to meet the changing requirements of war. Think rapidly evolving Ukrainian interceptor drone designs.
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The issue for Ukraine versus Russia is Ukraine has to more widely disperse its industrial base because Russia has a bigger cruise and 500 km(+) ballistic missile production base.
Ukraine's need to disperse production and evolve drones means 3D/AM is a better industrial fit.
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