Video of an apparent Ukrainian attack on a Russian tank on 6 May is getting much attention for the turret's attempt to go to the Moon. It should be getting a lot more attention, though, for where it happened and what this means for Russia. A short 🧵. /1
This attack wouldn't have been particularly remarkable if it had taken place on the front lines. It didn't. The site of the attack has been geolocated to near Novoazovsk, a town deep in the separatist "Donetsk People's Republic". /2
The town has been under Russia/separatist control since 27 August 2014, when it was the scene of fighting (pictured below) during an attempted advance on Mariupol. It's 100 km inside separatist territory, and only 13 km from the Russian border. /3
So how on earth did the Ukrainians blow up a tank this far inside separatist territory? It shows that Russia's worst nightmare in its occupied territory is coming true: a guerrilla war of roadside bombs, drones and loitering munitions - Iraq or Afghanistan on steroids. /4
It's not yet clear how this attack was carried out. Ukraine doesn't have any artillery that can reach that far, and there's no obvious sign in the video of incoming fire. Special forces were very likely involved. There are a few possible scenarios. /5
DRONES: Ukraine has been using octocopters (like the one pictured) to drop RKG-1600 grenades - anti-tank grenades of a 1950s design converted into aerial bombs by fitting 3D-printed fins. They can penetrate 200mm of armour, more than enough to destroy a tank. /6
During testing, Ukrainian drone pilots were able to hit targets 1m wide from an altitude of 300m. This would certainly be accurate enough to destroy a tank, or as in this video, a BMP-3 (targeted with a drone-dropped mortar round). /7
IEDs: Improvised Explosive Devices were the bane of NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, causing hundreds of deaths. Ukrainian troops served alongside NATO in both conflicts. They will certainly have learned how to defuse IEDs, and by extension how to make them (not too hard). /8
The Ukrainians have certainly used IEDs against Russian forces. In one notable incident, Ukrainian special forces used daisy-chained IEDs (probably using 152mm shells) to attack a Russian convoy, likely somewhere near Kyiv. /9
MINES: Landmines are easily transported and concealed on or off roads. Recently, Ukrainian forces have been using German-made PARM-1 off-road mines (pictured), compact but nasty weapons that sit in the bushes until a tank goes past. /10
ATGMs: Ukraine has lots of anti-tank missiles, of course, but they need the operators to be quite close. I would be surprised if this was how it was done. /11
LOITERING MUNITIONS: Ukraine has recently taken delivery of US-made Switchblade 600 loitering munitions. These have a total range of 80 km. It's quite possible that Ukrainian units infiltrated Russian-held territory and used a Switchblade for a deep strike. /12
So what does this all signify? Big trouble for Russia. The strip of territory it controls in southern Ukraine is only about 100 km wide. It's clearly vulnerable to infiltration, and the Russians are unpopular with the local people. It's ideal for insurgent tactics. /13
Unconventional and asymmetric tactics tend to favor the militarily weaker side. This makes them ideal for Ukraine, particularly given the already demonstrated weaknesses of the Russian occupiers. Ukrainian SOF have already shown themselves very proficient at this. /14
The attack at Novoazovsk is clearly a statement both of intent and capability: that Ukraine is capable of striking wherever it wants in occupied territory, and that it's willing to use insurgent tactics to do so. Western weapons will help with this. /15
Expect to see more attacks of this sort aimed at disrupting, demoralising and attriting Russian forces far behind the front lines. Ukraine clearly aims to show the Russians that they're not safe anywhere in the territory they hold. If I was the Russians, I'd be very worried. /end
Some people have been asking "how much does the turret weigh?" and "how high did it go?". Assuming it's a T-72, the turret plus gun weighs about 17 tons (the turret alone is 12 tons), and is about 7m (21 ft) long. I'd estimate it reached a height of at least 50m (~160 ft).
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1/ Ukraine's attacks on Russia's oil refineries are reportedly pushing them into a crisis, with a loss of control over fuel supplies and a lack of effective anti-drone defences. Russian oil giant Rosneft is reportedly pushing for nationalisation. ⬇️
2/ Russia's oil refinery ownership is dominated by a handful of large vertically integrated companies. State-controlled Rosneft and Gazprom Neft control the largest and most modern refineries, along with a number of private companies including Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Tatneft.
3/ All of these companies' refineries have come under repeated and highly costly attacks from Ukrainian drones, which have caused increasing shortages of fuel across western Russia. There is said to be a critical lack of coordinated efforts to defend the refineries.
1/ Many of the Russian soldiers seen daily being blown up by Ukrainian drones are there not because they're trained infantry, but are specialists or even officers who are being sent to their deaths as a punishment. A Russian colonel says he's never seen anything like it. ⬇️
2/ An 'old recruit' who has survived two years' service in the Russian army writes to warblogger and journalist Maxim Kalashnikov to relay his experience of how the army is routinely sending men to die in assaults for displeasing their superiors, regardless of their expertise:
3/ "About a month ago, I managed to meet with an officer from our artillery battalion. We started serving in it at the same time. I was dropped from the unit to the hospital earlier. He displeased his superiors and ended up in an assault unit. He wasn't alone, though.
1/ The Russian government claims that Ukraine's drone attacks against Russia are for political rather than military aims, given the supposed impossibility of a Ukrainian victory. A Russian warblogger warns that this is a dangerous illusion resulting from distorted information. ⬇️
2/ Svyatoslav Golikov, author of the 'Philologist in Ambush' Telegram channel, writes:
3/ "The official domestic information space is circulating the idea that enemy air strikes on critical infrastructure, primarily fuel and energy facilities and logistics,…
1/ Russian warbloggers are baffled and angry at the Kalashikov Group's announcement of a single-shot shotgun, chambered in a lower-powered calibre, for shooting down drones. One comments that "You can probably only shoot yourself with it". ⬇️
2/ In a Telegram post on 8 June, the Kalashnikov Group announced a new gun produced by specialists at the Central Research Institute of Precision Engineering (JSC TsNIITochMash, part of the Rostec State Corporation under the management of the Kalashnikov Group):
3/ "This compact, single-shot shotgun chambered for 12x70 mm cartridges is designed to defeat small, low-flying UAVs. The weapon's main advantage is its compact size and light weight—weighing only 1.8 kg."
1/ Why is Russia so vulnerable to Ukraine's mid-range drone attacks? Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev says that it's due to an ongoing and unresolved series of Russian failures in developing new interceptor drones and anti-drone capabilities. ⬇️
The balance of the war has shifted significantly in the enemy's favour, not because of any problems on our part at the front—the same positional dragging continues there, essentially."
3/ "Problems have arisen in the rear—due to the exponential increase in the number and capabilities of deep strikes and middle strikes, as well as the focused pressure on our logistics, especially fuel and energy infrastructure.
1/ Russia faces "tectonic events" in the near future due to Ukraine's seizure of the initiative in the war, which presages an "impending disaster", according to a gloomy commentary by Russian journalist and warblogger Maxim Kalashnikov. ⬇️
2/ Kalashnikov draws attention to the convergence of several unfavourable trends for Russia – economic, military and industrial – which he says are seriously threatening a Russian war effort that is faltering and weakened by chronic corruption, inertia, and backward-thinking.
3/ He writes:
"We are on the eve of a new upheaval. Anyone who studied dialectical and historical materialism ... knows that the number of changes always leads to a qualitative leap. Or a collapse.
War in early summer 2026 is the threshold of the latter. What do we have?"